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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The objective of this deliverable is to provide a background analysis that allows the identification of the 
key issues that will be addressed in the subsequent DIFFERENT deliverables and work packages.  
 
The deliverable focuses on the following research areas:  
 
¾ the theoretical background of charges differentiation for infrastructure use as far as economic 
theory and behavioural theory are concerned,  
¾ existing charges differentiation practices across European countries with reference to all transport 
modes (road, rail, maritime and airport infrastructure) and 
¾ the availability of modelling tools that can be used to assess the potential impacts of differentiated 
charges. 
 
Economic theory provides a complex picture.  On the one hand, an analytical stream of economic 
theory suggests the optimal framework (the normative approach) for transport charges differentiation. 
It is reached pursuing economic efficiency, a concept derived from welfare economics, according to 
which transport charges (prices) should equate with marginal social costs in order to obtain the 
maximal social welfare.  According to this theory, prices should be equal to marginal social cost 
(throughout the economy) to obtain maximum social welfare.  With this pricing principle, potential 
travellers who value their trip above the costs they impose by adding to traffic flows will travel. Those 
who value their trip below that cost will not travel or use some alternative means.  Such an optimal 
price is based on all costs involved with driving one additional kilometre, or one extra transport unit 
using infrastructure.  Because this also includes external costs, these charges are highly differentiated 
and vary along with variations in many behavioural dimensions. 
 
On the other hand, a complementary stream of analysis questions the practical application of the 
concept of marginal cost in transport, due to technological, institutional and political reasons, opening 
the way for deviations from the first-best pricing rules, i.e. towards second-best pricing approaches.  
This means a move from a normative approach (how transport charges should be in order to ensure 
welfare maximization) towards a positive approach (how transport charges actually may be when 
taking account of real-life constraints). 
 
In terms of impacts on charges differentiations practice, it can be said that following the normative 
approach a high degree of charge differentiation is required, i.e. the charges should vary taking 
account of several dimensions simultaneously (variability of vehicle technology, time of travel, place of 
driving, driving style, etc).  Conversely, following a positive approach, a less differentiated price 
structure could be required.  Economic theory offers in fact several options that are second-best: 
optimal given the existing constraints.  Most likely these pricing measures will be differentiated 
according to a fewer number of behavioural dimensions, reducing the complexity of the pricing 
structure. 
 
Behavioural theory may suggest the adoption of a less differentiated charge structure also in 
consideration of the cognitive limitations that restrict the degree of complexity that people can deal 
with and thus the degree of differentiation possible.  People in fact do not just react “rationally” to 
transport infrastructure charging. There are several constraints on behavioural adaptation to 
differentiated prices which can depend not only on cognitive but also motivational, personal or 
situational factors. The degree of differentiation implied by first–best pricing may prove to be too 
complex for people to deal with.  The most important questions are:  
 
¾ Up to which degree of complexity are people able and willing to understand and to respond to 
differentiated charging structures?   
¾ Which are the relevant psychological factors that determine the relationship between price 
differentiation and user reaction?   
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A first theoretical approach assumes a non-linear relationship between the level of price differentiation 
and its effectiveness: there is a point, beyond which the price differentiation and therefore the effort 
involved into understanding a price system becomes too large, which will lead to a loss of its 
effectiveness, because people will avoid a system that has become too complex altogether and will 
stop trying to use it to their best advantage.  So far, it appears that the cognitive capacities of 
individuals as well as their willingness to process complex information on highly differentiated pricing 
systems play an important role in limiting their potential effectiveness. 
 
Within the DIFFERENT project this theoretical approach and the related questions shall be addressed 
by analysing theoretical and empirical knowledge concerning the identified psychological factors which 
may have an impact on user reaction towards differentiated pricing.  This theoretical analysis shall 
lead to the formulation of hypotheses about peoples´ response to complex pricing systems.   As there 
is very little empirical evidence, and since much of that which exists is controversial, it will be quite 
difficult to formulate clear hypotheses on every aspect.  It is therefore necessary to prioritise research 
questions to be explored within the DIFFERENT project.  The analysis of case studies and/or the 
implementation of small experiments will clearly be required to allow an empirical analysis of the 
theoretical approach. 
 
Concerning the existing charging structures, differentiation criteria for road (urban and motorways), 
rail, air and maritime (ports and port access e.g. access channels) infrastructure use, the analysis 
allows the evaluation of two different but interwoven processes: a) the degree of convergence across 
European countries around specific charging practices and b) the degree of differentiation reached by 
each charging scheme.  
 
The ‘degree of convergence’ looks at the level of current harmonization between existing charging 
practices across European countries. 
 
The ‘degree of differentiation’ concerns the capability of existing charging differentiation schemes to 
address the variability of transport conditions, e.g. time, locations, traffic conditions, etc, in order to 
charge the users at the point of use of the infrastructure by taking account of the full range of 
externalities.   
 
The following table summarises the current state of the two processes for each infrastructure type in 
terms of their qualitative assessment in high, medium and low levels.  
 
 
DEGREE OF DIFFERENTIATION  
High Medium Low 
High Motorways  Airport 
Medium  Rail  
DEGREE OF 
CONVERGENCE 
Low Maritime Urban Roads  
 
  
Motorways and maritime infrastructure both show a high level of differentiation but lie on the opposite 
side of the classification in terms of convergence.  Infrastructure charges for the use of motorways 
show a high degree of convergence across the European countries in so far as at least some part of 
the motorway network are charged in most European countries.  The degree of differentiation is often 
very high: all of the most important parameters affecting externalities, e.g. type of vehicle, distance 
travelled, weight, emission class, etc, have been considered in the determination of the charge (even if 
they are then generally not been accounted for in full).  
 
Charges for the use of maritime infrastructure also display a high level of differentiation, but at the 
same time the level of convergence is low.  Charges are levied on the basis of a variety of principles 
and with a strong involvement of local, municipal or regional authorities.  
 
The degree of differentiation and convergence in rail infrastructure charging occupies an 
intermediate position, in the sense that both processes are currently under way, with lights and 
shadows.  Differentiated charges currently applied mainly consider infrastructure damage (gross t-km), 
type of train and distance travelled (train-km), which capture some of the important drivers addressing 
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externalities.  However, charges for congestion and scarcity are scarcely levied in rail track access 
charges in Europe. On the other hand, the process of convergence, even if not completely fulfilled, is 
being supported by the European Commission through the “Common Transport Policy” and specific 
Directives1, aiming at ensuring interoperability and adopting common approaches in charging 
infrastructure at national level.    
 
Urban roads and airport infrastructure charges show a mixed trend, i.e. a medium degree of 
differentiation with low convergence (urban roads) and a low degree of differentiation with high 
convergence (airport).  Charge differentiation for the use of urban roads has been rising over the past 
years, i.e. from the charge for public transport and for parking space for deterring the use of urban 
space (the most common forms of charging) to more sophisticated charging schemes addressing 
congestion and environment. However, there is no convergence yet: charging with the specific aim of 
reducing congestion is only applied in very few cities (London, Stockholm), while most only charge for 
entering in a specific city area. 
 
In airports there is a large convergence towards the use of landing charges for recovering the runway 
provision and maintenance, based on the maximum take-off weight, and, particularly in large airports 
near urban areas, a charge addressing noise and emissions.  It should be noted, however, that noise 
is basically addressed with command and control measures and charging still only has a minor role. 
Even less important has been the role of emission charges so far. Nevertheless reduction of the 
climate change impact of aviation is coming top on the European Commission agenda now. The 
introduction of an Emission Trading System (ETS) and a tax on kerosene are the main regulatory 
instruments being considered at the moment. Even less examples can be found with reference to 
charging based on congestion and scarcity.       
 
Concerning future possible developments of charge differentiation, it is widely acknowledged that 
technology is deemed to play an important role, providing the material basis for a sharp increase in 
charging differentiation.  The future developments of positioning technologies, for example, including 
combinations of Dedicated Short-range Communication (DSRC) equipment and GPS/GSM 
approaches, are expected to allow further scope for charge variation.  Highly sophisticated OBUs fitted 
with maps, GPS devices, cellular technologies for communication and back-office operations, could 
allow the capture of variations in traffic situation, road infrastructure use, population distribution, etc. 
GALILEO, the European satellite navigation system, has recently received a new push.  All the 
relevant parameters for a full assessment of external costs and in particular for an effective pricing of 
congestion could be potentially addressed through the use such technologies. 
 
It is to be expected that technological developments are pervasive and able to affect all transport 
modes in the same way.  Currently GPS-GSM devices find their main application in the road sector, 
for instance in the German HGV tolling system that relies on satellite tracking to determine the 
distance trucks travel on the autobahn network, while in several countries car insurance premiums are 
becoming based on distance travelled (through in-vehicle GPS).  However, also in the maritime sector 
more pollutant ships are being tracked at ports and along the trip in most environmental sensitive 
areas (Mediterranean Sea), and GPS devices are also used for real-time communications about rail 
delays in freight services. 
 
There are a number of modelling tools available for the assessment of potential impacts of 
differentiated charges for transport infrastructures, although their degree of coverage of the various 
transport modes is definitely not homogenous.  These modelling tools might be divided into two main 
categories: multimodal models, which are capable of dealing with several transport modes at the same 
time and of looking at the long-term consequences also in terms of modal change, and mode specific 
models, which might offer an in-depth analysis of the characteristics of a given transport mode.  In the 
first group, the level of analysis is usually of strategic nature and covers metropolitan areas, regions, 
countries and in some cases the whole of Europe.  Among the transport modes, road transport is 
much more analysed than any of the other modes and this would make it possible to analyse the 
impact of some types of fare differentiation.  Furthermore, there are distinct differences between 
models available for the passenger and the freight sector: 
 
                                                     
1  Directive 91/440, Directives 2001/12, 2001/13 and 2001/14 
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¾ In the passenger sector, most of the models in use assume that individual consumers 
(travellers) have full and perfect knowledge of prices and respond to them wholly rationally”. Such 
models do not allow for the fact that consumers might not be able or willing to understand 
complex price structures nor be equipped to responds to them wholly rationally. 
¾ In the passenger sector the behaviours of the suppliers who set prices and of the consumers who 
pay them are rarely considered within a single model; the usual situation is for the behaviour of 
suppliers to be represented extremely simplistically – and indeed often only by means of 
exogenous assumptions.  
¾ Among the potential responses of individual travellers to differentiated charges, only route choice 
and mode choice are modelled in much detail. Models tend to ignore, or deal rather simplistically 
with other potential responses such as change in driving style, departure time, destination or trip 
frequency. Longer term responses such as changes in car ownership, activity patterns or 
residential location are dealt with briefly if at all.  
¾ The variation in behaviour in response to changes in prices over time is not generally dealt with in 
much detail. Most models tend to assume the existence of an equilibrium between supply and 
demand and do not dwell on the dynamic processes by which this might come about or the 
dynamic disequilibria which might exist. Similarly, most traffic models are concerned with a 
particular time of day (e.g. the peak or off-peak) and do not seek accurately to represent the 
transition between them.  
¾ In the freight sector, the models used to predict organisations’ response to prices are quite 
simple and tend either to assume that decisions will be made in such a way as to take full 
account of any price differentiation or variation (almost irrespective of any administrative costs 
involved in so) or that they respond to medium term average costs without regard to 
differentiation or variation. There is insufficient data and knowledge to know where, on the 
spectrum between these responses, the response of a given firm might lie in a given 
circumstance. 
¾ Most of the models used to predict the performance of transport systems are focused on demand 
behaviour and derived from engineering and statistical analysis. The models of the road sector 
tend to be the most advanced.  Tools to investigate tariff differentiation in the rail, air and shipping 
sectors come mainly from the economic analysis and although quantitative, are not models in the 
sense that the term is used in the road sector.   
In brief, the quantitative assessment of the effect of the differentiation of charges has to take into 
account the features of currently available modelling tools, which only partially cover the several 
dimensions involved in this topic. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The DIFFERENT Deliverable 2.1 focuses on four research areas: 
1. to review the body of economic theory of differentiated charges for infrastructure use (chapter 2); 
2. to introduce concepts and approaches of the behavioural theory in response to differentiated 
charges (chapter 3); 
3. to review at European level the implementation of differentiated charges for infrastructure use, 
shedding light on criteria, degrees of differentiation and convergence (chapter 4); 
4. to review the characteristics and field of applications of existing transport models, in particular 
analysing their capability to simulate the impacts on transport demand and users’ behaviour in 
presence of differentiated charges (chapter 5). 
 
The aim of the analysis is to provide a background analysis allowing the identification of the key issues 
for each area that will be addressed in the subsequent DIFFERENT deliverables and workpackages. 
Hence, the analysis has been designed to set the scene for the future DIFFERENT research and not 
to provide an exhaustive analysis of all the theoretical and practical implications arising from the 
economic, behavioural and modelling tools analysis of differentiated charges for infrastructure use. 
References can be found in the final section of this deliverable for further details about authors and 
issues.  
 
Chapter 2 deals with the economic theory of differentiated charges for infrastructure use.  It 
distinguishes two different approaches: the normative and positive economic theory of price 
differentiation.  The normative approach in discussed in the section 2.2 in two sub-sections: 2.2.1 
about efficient pricing and the implications this may have for differentiation of transport prices, and 
2.2.2 which addresses important complexities that arise from the nature of the cost structure of the 
transport industry, and other relevant pricing constraints.  The positive theory of regulation and its 
consequences for price differentiation are discussed in sub-section 2.2.3.  Finally, Section 2.3 draws 
some conclusions. 
 
Chapter 3 introduces the behavioural theory.  Following a general introduction to this chapter, sub-
section 3.2.1 focuses on psychological theories of behavioural adaptation and on those psychological 
constraints which are seen as most relevant.  Sub-section 3.2.2 concentrates on empirical evidence 
that is so far available from other studies and past research concerning traffic user reaction on 
differentiated prices, but also includes transferable results from other sectors such as 
telecommunications.  The last section 3.3 draws conclusions and provides an outlook for further 
analysis within DIFFERENT.  
 
Chapter 4 reviews the on-going practice in charging of infrastructure use.  For each type of 
infrastructure, basic issues like charge description, level of implementation, institutional background, 
underlying principles, etc are discussed.  The chapter then draws conclusions about trends, patterns 
and future development.  A particular issue is the assessment of current degrees of differentiation and 
convergence and possible developments driven by technologies.  This task partially overlaps with 
GRACE, an on-going DGTREN research project on generalization and research on accounts and cost 
estimation; the main difference is that GRACE aims at finding new evidence on charge differentiation 
through specific case studies in a sample of EC countries, while DIFFERENT provides an overview of 
the current implementation of charges at EU level. 
 
Chapter 5 reviews the existing models for the impact assessment of the application of differentiated 
charges.  More specifically, the chapter presents: a) generalities on modelling approaches (on a mode 
by mode basis); b) examples of applications of modelling approaches (on a mode by mode basis); and 
c) a discussion of the capability of the modelling applications presented to simulate differentiation of 
tariffs. 
 
Final conclusions are drawn in chapter 6. 
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2 ECONOMIC THEORY 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Transport has some characteristics that make it different from other goods.  Possibly the most 
important characteristic of transport is that it is often not really demanded in its own right (Button, 
1993).  People wish, in general, to travel so that some benefit can be obtained at the final destination.  
Similarly, users of freight transport perceive transport as a cost in their overall production function and 
seek to minimise it wherever possible.   
 
While the demand for transport has particular, if not unique, features, also certain aspects of supply 
are entirely peculiar to transport.  More specifically part of the plant is mobile - almost by definition – 
and is entirely different in its characteristics to the fixed plant (for example, roads, airports etc.).  The 
fixed component is usually extremely long-lived and expensive to replace.  Further, few pieces of 
transport infrastructure have alternative uses.    
    
Demand and supply work together to determine the market price in competitive markets.  The price of 
a good or a service is what must be given in exchange for the good or service (Stiglitz and Driffill, 
2000).  When the forces of supply and demand operate freely, price measures scarcity.  In addition, in 
the competitive model, the equilibrium price of an object will normally equal its cost of production 
(including the amount needed to pay a firm’s owner to stay in business rather than seek some other 
form of employment).  Elementary economics tells us that in the long run price will then be equated 
with the marginal (and average) costs of each supplier.  But the transport market is different.  Simple 
market economic theory cannot directly be applied to transport for a variety of reasons.  Since 
journeys are unique in space and time, monopoly is likely to arise in varying degrees, especially when 
technological change offers an advantage to a particular mode or where economies of scale affect one 
mode more than another.  This situation also affects the pricing of transport services.  Transport prices 
do not simply result from the law of supply and demand.  
 
The complexity underlying transport pricing arises if one looks at the different transport pricing 
objectives. 
 
Pricing can be seen as a method to affect resource allocation.  Pricing strategies permit specified aims 
to be achieved; there is no such thing as the right price independent of the aims pursued.  The pricing 
policy adopted by any transport undertaking with some degree of market power depends upon its 
basic objectives.  For example, an optimal price aimed at achieving profit maximisation may differ from 
that needed to maximise social welfare, or to ensure highest sales revenue.  Social welfare refers to 
the measure used to express a society’s aggregate well-being. It can be defined in many ways, most 
of which take individuals’ utilities as a building block.  Applied research often uses (weighted) sums of 
individual welfare measures, which is true also for “social surplus” as we will use below.  There is no 
objective criterion for the specification of a social welfare function; i.e. economists can not define it 
objectively (see, for example, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) for further details). 
 
In some cases there is no attempt to devise a price to maximise or minimise anything, but prices are 
rather set to permit lower level objectives (for example security, minimum market share) to be attained.  
Further, prices may be set to achieve certain objectives for the transport supplier in terms of his 
welfare (this is normally the case of private enterprise transport undertakings), while in other areas 
prices may be set to improve the welfare of consumers (as has been the case with publicly owned 
transport undertakings).  This distinction is important, as many undertakings consider that the 
employment of the pricing mechanisms to achieve their objectives is automatically to the benefit of 
customers.   
 
It is clear that pricing objectives differ depending on the provision of transport services (public or 
private) and market conditions.  The following pricing objectives can be distinguished: 
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¾ Economic efficiency2 ; 
¾ Profit maximisation; 
¾ Cost coverage; 
¾ Environmental sustainability; 
¾ Equity (including redistributive objectives); 
¾ Objectives transcending the boundaries of transport markets, including macroeconomic 
objectives. 
 
The objective of economic efficiency is usually important to governments, as it reflects the aim to 
maximise welfare of all inhabitants; this will be discussed in more detail in the following section.  
Profitability reflects the traditional economic assumption that firms set prices as to maximise profits.  
Variations on this theory suggest that many undertakings adopt prices that maximise sales revenues 
(Baumol, 1962) when in an expansive phase, or simply price to ensure that certain satisfactory levels 
of profit or market domination are achieved (Simon, 1959).  A third possible objective is that of cost 
coverage.  Most publicly owned firms are not so much focused on making profits, but rather to stay in 
business and recoup their costs, often induced to do so for political or fiscal reasons.  Protection of the 
environment has become an important objective for governments in recent years.  Transport in 
general, and road transport in particular, are widely recognised as an important source of pollution 
which threatens environmental sustainability.  Pricing measures have been suggested or introduced to 
deal with these problems.  It is arguable that promoting environmental objectives is consistent with the 
aim of securing welfare maximisation through economic efficiency, in particular when social welfare 
incorporates environmental social costs and benefits.   
 
Equity objectives and the distribution of real incomes in society are important issues to a government, 
reflected in the pattern of taxation and public expenditures.  Whilst transfer payments, such as benefits 
and pensions, are a major means of redistributing income, the provision of services, such as transport 
at subsidised prices, is often considered to be equally important (United Nations, 2001).  Moreover, tax 
policies (or other policies) aimed at regulating transport and the various possible allocations of tax 
revenues, will have distributional consequences that may or may not match more generally formulated 
distributional targets, and may therefore motivate adjustments in currently used (distorted) taxes, 
which in turn implies that indirect efficiency effects may occur elsewhere in the economy.  Finally, 
public bodies are concerned with macroeconomic policy objectives.  Governments usually focus on 
four target variables: the level of unemployment; the rate of inflation, the balance of payments and the 
rate of growth of national output (see Stiglitz and Driffill, 2000).  The level of investment in, and the 
pricing of, transport infrastructure and transport services both affects and is affected by 
macroeconomic policies.   
 
These sorts of objectives are complex and are often not compatible.  Whilst there are many transport 
pricing objectives, economists often focus on the pursuance of economic efficiency alone.  Prices that 
are socially optimal are seen as the first-best benchmark, which is in most cases politically desired.    
 
Nevertheless, an expanding body of literature on transport pricing is emerging that considers pricing 
and revenue allocation in the context of a wider – general equilibrium – framework, in which 
(tax)distortions elsewhere in the economy and distributional objectives as represented in social welfare 
functions are considered explicitly (e.g. Mayeres and Proost, 1997 and Parry and Bento, 2002).    
 
This chapter aims to discuss some important economic principles of transport pricing.  The intention is 
not to provide a complete overview of all economic theory on this, but to focus on relevant issues in 
the context of the DIFFERENT project.  We distinguish two different approaches: the normative and 
positive economic theory of price differentiation.  The normative approach assumes that all actors try 
to maximise welfare.  Pricing is efficient when welfare is maximised.  Section 2.2 first explains what 
efficient pricing looks like and then addresses (more realistic) situations where first-best conditions are 
not fulfilled.  It is divided in two sub-sections: 2.2.1 about efficient pricing and the implications this may 
have for differentiation of transport prices and 2.2.2, which addresses important complexities that arise 
                                                     
2  Economic efficiency is concerned with the use of society’s resources such that no mutually beneficial 
transactions remain possible. 
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from the nature of the cost structure of the transport industry, market distortions and other relevant 
pricing constraints that makes optimal pricing rather difficult.   
 
The positive theory of regulation and its consequences for price differentiation are discussed in 
Section 2.2.3.  This approach focuses on one particular type of constraint of optimal pricing: the 
political dimension.  Policy makers are often influenced by interest groups and it is therefore likely that 
prices will not be set at an efficient level.  Finally, Section 2.3 draws conclusions. 
 
2.2 THE CURRENT SITUATION 
2.2.1 FIRST-BEST PRICING PRINCIPLES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR DIFFERENTIATION  
 
Efficiency: social marginal cost pricing 
 
The concept of economic efficiency is derived from the theory of welfare economics, and is concerned 
with the allocation of resources in an economy.  Welfare economics takes a rather wide view of 
pricing, looking upon price as a method of resource allocation which maximises social welfare rather 
than simply the welfare of the supplier (Button, 1993).  According to this view, prices should equate 
with marginal social cost to obtain maximal social welfare.  What marginal cost pricing does, in effect, 
is to result in transport services being provided up to the point where the benefit for the marginal unit is 
equated with the costs of providing that unit (Button, 1993).  Sometimes, private provision of the good 
or service may also result in maximising the social welfare.  Otherwise, regulatory policies may be 
applied to private companies so that their pricing policy is modified to maximise social rather than 
private welfare.  Deriving socially optimal prices needs an objective function (describing the target to 
be optimised, in this case social welfare).  The most general form of this function is a social welfare 
function.  Formally, a social welfare function has as its arguments the indirect utility functions of 
individuals (Varian, 1999).  These indirect utility functions indicate the maximum utility levels of the 
individuals at given prices, incomes, and magnitudes of externalities such as congestion and pollution.   
The social welfare function inevitably incorporates welfare judgements with respect to the distribution 
of economic resources.   These value judgements will be reflected in the policy prescriptions based on 
the welfare function.   
 
An allocation is to be said first-best, if it maximises social welfare subject to the irreducible 
technological constraints of production (Dreze and Stern, 1987).  A first-best optimum in transport is 
an allocation defined by quantities of goods, including passenger and freight transport volumes that 
maximises welfare given the prevailing technology such as vehicle fuel consumption and emissions, 
and the capital stock including transport infrastructure (MC-ICAM, 2002).  This definition encompasses 
externalities if their costs are internalised in the decisions of agents who generate them and included 
in their utility functions.  Economic efficiency then implies that the full costs of transport services are 
accounted for, including social and environmental costs (no externalities).   
 
We should mention that this optimal pricing rule only prevails as a market equilibrium under certain 
conditions, which include: 
 
¾ perfect competition; 
¾ no distortions in other market segments; 
¾ no externalities; 
¾ perfect information; 
¾ no subsidies or indivisibilities of demand or supply. 
 
Clearly, these assumptions will never be met in reality.  This makes first-best pricing very much a 
theoretical result, which is often used as a benchmark for other, more realistic, pricing approaches.   
 
Marginal cost pricing and behavioural dimensions 
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Optimal pricing of infrastructure requires that the user charge equals the marginal social costs.  
Marginal costs are those variable costs that reflect the cost of an additional vehicle or transport unit 
using the infrastructure.  This implies that both user costs (e.g. fuel and time costs) and external costs 
determine the level of the charge.  The distinction between private costs and external costs is not new.  
Pigou showed already in 1920 in his economic analysis of road pricing and congestion costs that 
individual users entering the road will only consider the costs they personally bear (marginal private 
costs), but not the external (congestion) costs (marginal social cost) they impose on other road users 
(Pigou, 1920).  This leads to over-demand and a non-optimal situation.  He showed that a levy (a 
Pigouvian tax) equal to the marginal external congestion costs should be imposed from a social point 
of view.  In this case only congestion costs have been included in the analysis, but the analysis holds 
for all types of external costs.   
 
There has been a lot of discussion about marginal costs and their central role for pricing in the 
transport sector in the previous decades (see Rothengatter 2003).  One of the most pressing issues is 
the practical application of the concept of marginal costs in the real world.  A critical prerequisite for 
marginal cost pricing in practice is a sound estimate of relevant marginal costs (MC-ICAM, 2001).  
This is not evident for many external costs.  It requires fundamental knowledge on the mechanisms 
behind the generation of these costs.  This understanding, in turn, demands identification of the 
different types of activities in which the users of transport infrastructure are involved.  These activities 
may be called behavioural dimensions.  Various dimensions can be distinguished, depending on the 
marginal costs caused by the individuals, including a large variety of external effects (congestion, 
emissions, noise annoyance, accidents).  When we look at road use, this means that optimal individual 
charges should at least vary according to the following dimensions (Verhoef, 2000): 
 
¾ the vehicle (technology) used; 
¾ the actual state of this vehicle; 
¾ the number of kilometres driven; 
¾ the time of driving; 
¾ the place of driving; 
¾ the actual route chosen; 
¾ the driving style. 
 
A similar list of dimensions can be composed for other modes of transport.  It is needless to say that 
such a system requires very sophisticated technologies that can monitor information about the actual 
state with respect to these dimensions, and calculate a charge accordingly (an issue which we will 
discuss in the next section).  This involves a wide range of various critical decisions, both short run 
(e.g. departure time) and more long run (i.e. car ownership) in nature, which determines charge levels. 
The great number of behavioural dimensions and categories of external costs to be accounted for 
makes the task of marginal social cost pricing in providing optimal incentives to transport users to 
change their behaviour extremely complex (MC-CAM, 2001).  Different dimensions may also 
simultaneously affect several cost categories, making it even more complicated.  Table 2.1 (adopted 
from AFFORD) illustrates this and considers road transport as an example (a similar illustration could 
be given for freight transport and public transport).  Car drivers can respond in various ways to 
hypothetical first-best pricing.  When people do not change to other modes, they may choose to drive 
fewer kilometres, change departure time, choose another route, or adjust driving style.  More long-
term behavioural decisions include car ownership and spatial behaviour, which refers to the choice of 
residence and the location of other activities.   
 
The table indicates the relevance of each dependence on a three point scale.  The assigned stars are 
merely indicative and debatable.  That is also the reason for using a three-point scale only.  However, 
the table is illustrative in drawing explicit attention to the dependence between various externalities 
and behavioural dimensions (Verhoef, 2002).  For instance, the way people drive affects congestion 
levels and accidents (risk levels increase with speed).  But it has also a strong impact on noise levels 
and the level of air pollution.  Regarding the congestion externality, Table 2.1 makes a distinction 
between bottleneck congestion and flow congestion.  The main difference is that bottleneck 
congestion is caused by the existence of physical bottlenecks in the network, such as bridges or 
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tunnels.  Flow congestion refers to (limited) road capacity in general.  In real networks, observed 
congestion is often a mixture of both types of congestion.  As shown in Table 2.1, bottleneck 
congestion is independent of the total vehicle*kilometres driven in the network.  It depends only on the 
question of whether a driver wants to pass the bottleneck. 
 
 
Car use Car ownership  
Vehicle 
km 
Number of 
trips 
Time of 
driving 
(peak/off 
peak) 
Place of 
driving 
Driving 
style 
Fleet 
size 
Vehicle 
technology 
Spatial 
behaviour 
(location of 
work, 
residence) 
Intra-sectoral 
externalities: 
- flow congestion 
- bottleneck 
congestion 
- infrastructure 
damage 
- accidents 
 
 
* 
- 
** 
* 
 
 
- 
** 
- 
- 
 
 
** 
** 
- 
* 
 
 
** 
** 
- 
* 
 
 
** 
- 
- 
** 
 
 
* 
* 
* 
* 
 
 
- 
- 
* 
* 
 
 
** 
** 
** 
* 
Inter-sectoral 
externalities: 
- noise 
- local emissions 
- global 
emissions 
 
 
* 
** 
** 
 
 
- 
* 
* 
 
 
* 
* 
- 
 
 
** 
** 
- 
 
 
** 
** 
** 
 
 
* 
* 
* 
 
 
** 
** 
** 
 
 
** 
** 
** 
** particularly strong and direct relation; * possibly strong indirect relation, or moderately strong direct 
relation; - no particular strong or direct relation 
Table 2.1: Dependence of various external costs of road transport on behavioural dimensions 
 
Obviously, first-best pricing affects all behavioural dimensions.  But, as will be shown in the next 
section, this is not very realistic in practice.  We then enter the world of second-best pricing with the 
consequence that not all dimensions will be affected, or to a lesser extent.  For instance, fuel taxes do 
have an impact on the number of kilometres driven, the number of trips and car ownership, but they do 
not affect time and place of driving. 
 
 
2.2.2 DEVIATIONS FROM FIRST-BEST PRICING IN TRANSPORT: CONSEQUENCES FOR 
DIFFERENTIATION  
 
The marginal cost pricing concept has been addressed in policy documents for many years.  Still three 
years ago, the European Commission has suggested introducing marginal cost pricing in the transport 
sector as a general principle from which departures are only admitted in exceptional cases 
(Rothengatter, 2003).   More recently, however, the Commission seems to adjust their views by 
introducing the concept of ‘smart charging’, which focuses on the financing of transport infrastructure 
without mentioning marginal cost pricing (CEC, 2006).  As is apparent, it is not so easy to apply this 
first-best principle in practice.  Given the optimality of marginal cost pricing, the question arises why 
such an evidently attractive instrument has only rarely been used in practical policy making.  Apart 
from issues related to the limited social feasibility of pricing instruments, a different explanation for the 
low level of practicality may be the fact that reality is often much more complicated than the simple 
world assumed in theoretical textbooks.  This may seriously complicate the determination and 
application of optimal infrastructure charges in reality. 
 
In this section we first address the transport market.  The transport market is characterised by several 
market imperfections which makes it very unlikely that the market, without regulation, will set transport 
prices equal to marginal social costs and, therefore, social welfare will not be optimised.  Besides 
market failures, governments may also have other reasons to intervene and adjust prices.  Equity is an 
important reason that deserves attention in the context of price differentiation.  The second subsection 
discusses more practical constraints of first-best pricing.   
 
 DELIVERABLE 2.1
 
Date: 18/1/2007 Deliverable 2.1                                                  Page  
 
  11
Deviations from marginal cost pricing 
 
The previous section has shown us that equality of prices and marginal costs leads to an efficient use 
of resources in an otherwise ideal world.  But the real world is not ideal.  Actual (market) prices may 
deviate from marginal costs for a number of reasons.  Some reasons result from market failures in the 
transport industry, in particular:  
 
¾ Imperfect competition (e.g. monopoly); 
¾ Increasing returns to scale (indivisibilities of supply: fixed capacity); 
¾ Imperfect information; 
¾ Indivisibilities of demand: peak load; 
¾ Externalities. 
The pervasive involvement of public agencies in transportation and the failure of these agencies to 
apply marginal cost pricing principles is caused in part by several peculiar characteristics of the 
transport market (Gomez-Ibanez, 1999).  These characteristics are not unique to transport – some are 
found in other capital-intensive sectors (such as electricity and telephones).  But they make both social 
marginal cost pricing and private provision seem more complex and controversial than in many other 
markets (e.g., for a discussion on the adoption of marginal cost pricing in ports, Goss and Stevens 
(2001) and Haralambides et al. (2001)).  When the principle of optimal pricing is applied to the 
transport sector, it is usually necessary to extend theory in order to deal with certain industry specific 
characteristics.  We discuss some relevant issues in the context of price differentiation.  Transportation 
facilities and services often require capital intensive infrastructure, and vehicle needs (leading to 
certain industry specific characteristics) may cause particular pricing problems.  Specifically, the large 
fixed investment costs and the joint use of the facilities and services may result in necessary 
deviations from marginal cost pricing.   
 
Equity is another important reason why actual prices deviate from optimal prices.  Therefore we added 
equity to the following discussion of transport industry characteristics and their impact on price 
differentiation. 
 
Economies of scale 
 
A characteristic of physical transport infrastructure is the considerable capital costs, which are often 
higher than the associated operating and maintenance costs for the infrastructure provider (especially 
on longer distance infrastructure), and can be very long lasting (see also Nijkamp and Rienstra, 1995).  
Once committed, infrastructure investment usually has few alternative uses and is normally regarded 
as sunk cost.  This fixed component, such as roads, railways, bridges and runways normally give rise 
to significant economies of scale (marginal costs are below average costs).  Once a rail track is laid, 
the marginal costs of using it falls until a certain capacity level is reached.  Firms with large sunk costs 
and facing economies of scale have marginal costs that are lower than average costs, so that pricing 
at marginal costs does not generate enough revenue for the firm to be financially self-sufficient.  In 
addition, transport vehicles, such as railcars and buses are also subject to scale economies in 
operation, though they are generally not as expensive as the infrastructure.   
 
In the long run, however, congestion externalities may show up, resulting in an increase in marginal 
costs.  A toll should be installed which optimally should equal the external costs (Pigouvian charge).  A 
major contribution of Mohring and Harwitz (1962) was to show that the revenues from such a 
congestion toll will just cover the costs of the facility provider as long as there are no economies or 
diseconomies of scale in facility capacity, and the facility provider is investing optimally.  This holds 
under certain conditions and concerns optimal highway investment in a first-best world (Lindsey and 
Verhoef, 2000).   
 
Budgetary problems are especially common in transportation, because transport services often exhibit 
economies of scale so that marginal cost pricing does not generate enough revenues to cover costs.  
Ramsey pricing is often suggested to be a solution in order not to deviate too much from efficient 
pricing.  Ramsey pricing minimises the distorting effect of charging more than marginal cost by 
increasing prices more in those markets where demand is least sensitive to price (Nash, 2001).  The 
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basic idea is to charge those customers with the least price elastic demand the largest mark-ups 
necessary to cover marginal cost and thereby minimise the reduction in consumption that occurs from 
charging prices that are higher than marginal cost.  Commuters, for instance, will be charged more 
than shoppers, and business travellers more than leisure passengers.  It should be noted, however, 
that this form of price discrimination has itself often been regarded as unfair as it exploits market 
power to raise the price for the captive user.  If the view of equity is that all users should contribute to 
the cost of that facility in proportion to their use of it, then some form of average-cost pricing is the only 
admissible pricing policy. 
 
Indivisibilities 
 
Applying marginal cost pricing to transport infrastructure and services is often problematic, because 
capacity can only be increased in relatively large indivisible units.  There are many examples to be 
found in the transport sector: if the capacity of a railway coach is 60 passengers, then to carry 61 
persons requires another coach.  Existing airports at full capacity are another example: expansion 
requires a new runway and terminal facilities.  It is often extremely costly to make (small) additions to 
physical capacity.  The issue is one of optimal investment timing, since, under conditions of growing 
demand, there will come a point at which an increase in capacity will be worthwhile.  This brings us to 
the distinction between short-run and long-run marginal costs. 
 
In specifying the marginal cost-pricing rule, it is important to understand the distinction between short-
run and long-run marginal costs.  The distinction arises because different factors of production, used in 
providing transport services, have varying degrees of fixedness or variability over various business 
planning horizons (United Nations, 2001).  Airports, for example, facing increased demand may be 
able to increase throughput in the short term, whereas in the longer term the operator is forced to 
invest in new infrastructure (e.g. a terminal or runway).  All costs are essentially fixed in the very short 
term, and, conversely, in the long run, all inputs and costs are ultimately variable (Braeutigam, 1999).  
Over a planning horizon, it is important to identify those costs that can be varied (variable costs) and 
those which cannot be varied (fixed costs).  Prices should normally be set in relation to short-run 
marginal costs, which may be higher, lower, or equal to long-run marginal costs. 
 
What this means for optimal pricing and optimal investment can be illustrated with an airport example 
(investment in a terminal).  The initial marginal costs of using a terminal will be very low, so the price is 
low when set according to short-run marginal costs (excluding investment costs).  There is no need for 
new investment as there is spare capacity.  If the demand function shifts outwards over time, the 
marginal costs will (sharply) increase due to congestion effects.  A new terminal might be needed now.  
When the price in the peak period consists of operational costs (including that of additional 
investment), the corresponding demand will give a clear indication of the necessity of the investment.  
Continuation of excess demand with these LRMC charges justifies investment in a new terminal.  In 
the long-run optimum, SRMC=LRMC may apply (Mohring-Harwitz type of equilibrium: see economies 
of scale). 
 
The previous essentially implies that marginal cost pricing could produce fluctuations in price before 
and after capacity adjustments are made.  Further, whether or not the airport makes a profit depends 
on whether the price lies above or below the long-run marginal cost curve.  The terminal might be 
profit or loss making at any moment.  The investment is worthwhile, when the net present value of the 
investment in additional capacity is positive over its life time.  Such fluctuations in prices and profits 
are likely to be undesirable, but unavoidable, because any other pricing pattern will produce welfare 
losses.  Prices above marginal costs during times of excess capacity will cause underutilisation.  If 
price caps are set, during periods of excess demand, non-price rationing methods will be required.   
 
 
 
Common and joint costs 
 
A related set of pricing complications occurs because transportation firms often use the same facilities, 
equipment and labour to produce different services: they are multi-product firms.  This leads to the 
conceptual and practical problems of determining transport prices associated with fixed and variable 
costs and choosing the relevant time period because many costs may also be ‘joint’ or ‘common’ to a 
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number of users.  Pricing in these circumstances may be difficult, as it is not always clear how to 
allocate costs between products.  This may make it difficult to determine marginal costs.  Joint costs 
exist when the provision of a specific service necessarily entails the output of some other service or 
product at little extra expense (Gomez-Ibanez, 1999).  The classic example of jointness is the return 
trip, where the supply of a transport service in one direction normally implies the provision of a return 
service (Button, 1993).   
 
Common costs are similar to joint costs, in that they are incurred as a result of providing services to a 
wide range of users, but differ, in that the resources used to provide one service do not unavoidably 
result in the production of other services (United Nations, 2001).  An airport, for example, faces 
considerable common costs.  A terminal is used by different types of users: terminal retailers and air 
passengers.  The same holds for runways, these are used by different types of planes.  The allocation 
of these common costs among users poses particular practical problems, which consequently also 
leads to pricing problems.   
 
Monopoly 
 
Firms facing the previously mentioned aspects, such as high fixed costs and economies of scale, 
together with significant indivisibilities in the provision of capacity, have limited competition.  These 
circumstances, often the case in the transport industry (particularly in terms of infrastructure), give rise 
to monopolies.  Under these conditions, and a fairly small transport market relative to the optimal size, 
a good or a service can only be produced at least cost if only one firm is engaged in its production and 
a natural monopoly is likely to emerge.  Public transport companies are often claimed to be a natural 
monopoly, although there may be little evidence of scale economies (Gomez-Ibanez, 1999).   
 
Imperfect competition creates a major distortion in the market for transport services.  There is every 
risk that the monopolist will not provide optimal transport prices, and an unregulated market will 
therefore not lead to the maximisation of social welfare.  In such circumstances, the government may 
decide to intervene either by directly providing the transport services or by regulating prices.   
 
The existence of declining average costs in the transport industry is an important reason for the 
emergence of natural monopolies in many sectors.  The potential monopoly power and the possibility 
of abuse of this position may be reflected in high prices (or price discrimination) and has often led to 
government price regulation and public ownership.  This is, for instance, the case in the airport 
industry.  Governments are afraid of private airports setting inefficiently high prices.  Therefore airports 
are often in public hands, or privatised airports are (price-) regulated.  When governments take over, 
and prices are set equal to marginal costs, it is obvious that a subsidy is needed.  It may also be 
possible to look for pricing policy options to assist cost recovery while at the same time minimising the 
resulting allocative efficiency losses.  Two-part tariffs (consisting of a fixed charge per consumer and a 
variable charge per unit consumed) and Ramsey pricing have been suggested in these cases.   
 
Externalities 
 
The transport industry is characterised by various externalities.  The essence of an externality is that it 
involves (i) interdependence between two or more economic agents, and (ii) failure to price that 
interdependence.  Formally, externalities exist when the activities of one group (either consumers or 
producers) unintentionally affect the welfare of another group, without any payment or compensation 
being made (Button, 1993).  Most attention in transport is paid to the negative (costs) externalities, 
although also positive externalities (benefits) have been identified (for a discussion on this latter issue, 
see Verhoef (1996)).  It is quite clear from everyday experience, that there are costs associated with 
transport that are not directly borne by those generating them.  Transport generates many negative 
externalities, including noise, accidents, pollution, and congestion.  Road travellers, for example, 
impose noise and vibration costs on those living adjacent to highways.   
 
A result of the clear presence of externalities in transport is that the early neo-classical writers studying 
market failures frequently illustrated their viewpoints using transport examples.  Dupuit was in 1844 
one of the first to illustrate efficient pricing of public goods (Button and Verhoef, 1998).  Coase (1960) 
considered the absence of property rights in relation to the existence of externalities for a railway.  
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Another well-known example is that of a congested road, including optimal congestion charges (Pigou 
in 1920).  They all showed that the market mechanism fails to allocate resources efficiently.   
 
The existence of externalities has been one of the main motivations for governments to intervene in 
the transport industry.  Economists have argued that a correction of transport prices should take 
precedence.  The previous section has shown that optimal taxation (dealing with all types of external 
costs) has as a consequence that the charge will be highly differentiated according to many 
behavioural dimensions.  However, policy makers may decide, for instance, to focus only on 
congestion.  Despite lower efficiency, it would considerably reduce the complexity of the pricing 
mechanism since location and time are the two remaining dimensions to be considered. 
 
Equity 
 
Finally, transportation often raises equity concerns that seem to conflict with marginal cost pricing.  
Marginal cost pricing clearly results in very differentiated charges with the consequence that no one 
transport user pays the same price which may be perceived as unfair.  Equity is important in the 
context of the acceptability of pricing.  Many stakeholders raise objections about pricing measures that 
they perceive to be unfair.  If a pricing measure is unfair either to themselves in relation to other 
people or to people perceived to be less well off in society, then there could be significant acceptability 
problems.  Transport pricing is often perceived as a form of regressive taxation, allowing only those 
with enough money to access a resource (e.g. infrastructure) that was once considered free.  
Implementation strategies are therefore discussed that allow certain sections of the community to be 
exempted from pricing, or compensate some groups with a lump-sum transfer.  The problem of who 
should receive extra benefits (e.g. tax exemption) and the wider problem of making sure price 
measures are both equitable and perceived to be so, are important issues to be included in any 
successful implementation strategy.  Here the concept of price discrimination shows up.  In public 
transport, for instance, it is common that different prices are charged for the same service.  The fare 
policy of governments may benefit particular groups of society, e.g. the elderly. 
 
The public finance and tax literature makes a distinction between horizontal equity and vertical equity.  
Horizontal equity refers to the principle which states that those who are in identical or similar 
circumstances should pay identical or similar amounts in taxes (Stiglitz and Driffill, 2000).  It requires 
that those with equal status - whether measured by ability or some other appropriate scale - should be 
treated the same.  If, for instance, income were the only measure of a person, then two persons with 
equal incomes would be treated as equals.  Vertical equity states that people who are better off should 
pay more taxes (Stiglitz and Driffill, 2000).  This generally requires that those with less ability to pay 
are treated favourably relative to those with greater ability.   
 
The role of these concepts in transport can be illustrated by describing the implementation of road 
pricing and the use of the revenues.  Horizontal equity implies that similar users should pay identical 
tolls.  But the question who ‘deserves’ the benefit (or revenues) according to this criterion is a matter of 
debate.  It can be defined as those who actually pay the toll, or it could also include those who change 
their behaviour (travel pattern), thereby incurring costs in terms of inconvenience, and providing 
congestion reduction benefit to the toll payers.  So the difficulty is that the initial users of the road have 
become ‘unlike’ after the implementation of the charge, and should be compensated.  The use of road 
charges to fund public transport is an example.  Horizontal equity is further complicated by the 
existence of externalities from motor vehicle use, including accident risk and environmental 
degradation.  That vehicle use imposes costs on other people itself represents horizontal inequity.  If 
the criterion is horizontal equity and external impacts are recognised, then revenues may be used to 
compensate for external costs (Litman, 1996).  Funding candidates may include environmental and 
social programmes that mitigate the harm of motor vehicle use.  However, compensation for external 
costs may, in turn, induce inefficient behaviour by the recipients of externalities in the sense that 
insufficient incentive is provided to avoid incurring the externality (Oates, 1983; Verhoef, 1994).  This 
implies that (also) from this perspective, there may be trade-offs between efficiency and equity in the 
regulation of externalities.   
 
Vertical equity is concerned with the treatment of individuals and classes that are unlike.  By this 
principle, the distribution of costs and benefits should reflect people’s needs and abilities.  Progressive 
tax rates, and need-based services such as programmes to help the poor, seniors, and disabled 
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people, are examples of policies reflecting vertical equity.  Vertical equity is often measured with 
respect to income.  This is an imperfect metric, since people with the same income often have very 
different needs and abilities.  Road pricing is usually considered vertically inequitable because charges 
impose a relatively larger burden on the poor.  For example, a €2 per day toll might be horizontally 
equitable (everybody pays the same amount), but vertically inequitable because it represents a larger 
portion of income for a lower-income driver than for a high-income driver.  This fact is tempered by the 
fact that lower-income people drive less on average than those with higher incomes. 
 
Another equity issue refers to spatial or geographical equity, which is concerned with the treatment of 
individuals located in various regions or cities.  Congestion pricing could be considered as unfair from 
this point of view, as charges (depending on time and place) will differ among regions.  Another 
illustration of spatial equity concerns in transport is the experience of Sydney City Council, which 
decided that transport availability should not depend on the geographical area in which a person lives.  
Transport services should be available equally to people across the Sydney metropolitan region. 
 
Constraints on marginal cost pricing: second-best pricing 
 
Social marginal cost pricing assumes a theoretical first-best world.  Such first-best pricing is 
increasingly recognised as being of limited practical relevance, but it might serve as a useful 
theoretical benchmark.  Besides the previously described reasons for market failures, various 
constraints and barriers may exist that prevent a regulator from charging (optimal) prices that it ideally 
would like.  Verhoef (2002) mentions the following important constraints: 
 
¾ Technological and practical constraints: first-best pricing requires charges that vary continuously 
over time, place, route chosen, type of vehicle, driving style etc, which might be too sophisticated 
and not understood by drivers or impossible to implement under available charging technologies; 
¾ Acceptability constraints; there may be too much resistance and uncertainty (e.g. about objective 
and necessity of the measure) that may make it preferable to start with a few small-scale 
demonstration projects; 
¾ Institutional constraints; one example is where local or regional governments cannot affect some 
transport charges that are set by a higher level government; 
¾ Legal constraints; ideal prices might not be possible on the basis of legal arguments (e.g. when 
taxes should be predictable) 
¾ Financial constraints; for instance the prior definition of minimum or maximum tax revenue sums 
to be collected; 
¾ Market interaction constraints; transport taxes will have many consequences for other markets, 
among the most important is the labour market; 
¾ Political constraints: charges may become a political issue much more than an economic 
question. 
 
Under such conditions, the regulator has to resort to second-best pricing: setting the prices that are 
available optimally, under the constraints applying.  
 
This has led to some discussion on the practical relevance of marginal cost pricing.  Rothengatter 
(2003) argues that marginal cost pricing is no longer optimal when aspects such as acceptability and 
institutional consequences are introduced into the analysis, and a real-world pricing system can 
therefore not be based on abstract economic theory.  Nash (2003) replies that indeed difficulties and 
uncertainties remain (which should be carefully considered), but that there is no need for a totally 
different theoretical approach, since marginal social costs are the correct starting point in the 
development of any efficient pricing policy.   
 
Given these constraints and discussions, economic research has focused on setting prices that are 
available optimally, under the constraints applying: second-best prices.  Examples of second-best 
tolling include the use of toll cordons around cities instead of tolling each road in the network, and the 
use of step tolls instead of smoothly time-varying tolls.  It is safe to state that second-best pricing will 
be the rule for the implementation of marginal cost-based pricing in reality.  Much of the relevant 
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literature is reviewed in Lindsey and Verhoef (2001), whereas MC-ICAM (2002) gives insight into the 
kind of analysis.  We discuss two relevant subjects in the context of price differentiation.   
 
Networks 
 
First-best pricing in a network assumes that each link of a road network is efficiently priced.  This is 
often impossible due to excessive costs, the requirement of toll-free alternatives by governments, and 
the likeliness of incremental implementation.  The question under study is then how second-best tolls 
should be set on toll roads, given un-priced congestion on un-tolled roads elsewhere in the network.   
 
This network problem is one of the most widely studied, where the simplest version concerns a simple 
network in which there are two links connecting the same origin and destination.  Verhoef et al. (1996) 
demonstrate that, if one of the links is often congested, the optimal second-best toll of the other link 
can be negative.  This study also shows that the optimal toll depends on the relative free-flow travel 
times and capacities of two routes, and on the price elasticity of travel demand.  Welfare gains from 
second-best pricing are, according to this study, a small fraction of the benefits from the first-best 
benchmark (only 10%).  Other studies have looked at ways to enhance efficiency and have 
incorporated the possibility of dynamic (time varying) tolls, and sorting of drivers according to value of 
travel time.  This does indeed yield higher absolute efficiency gains.   
 
Most network studies assume a unimodal network.  In reality, a traveller has the possibility to choose 
between modes.  The leading example is the choice between public transport and the private car.  
Tabuchi (1993), for example, uses a second-best framework which is characterised by a road, subject 
to bottleneck congestion, that runs parallel to a railway.  Assuming inelastic demand and average cost 
pricing of rail trips (to stay in business), it is shown that the road share of travel is highest with an 
optimal (time-varying) road toll, and successively lower with a step toll, a uniform toll, and no toll.  
Another study that reviews second-best choices in a transport network with two modes is by Arnott 
and Yan (2000).  The main difference between second-best problems on networks and those for mode 
choice is that, in the former case, an assumption of perfect substitutability is often made.  Although, at 
first sight, the two-mode problem appears to be relatively simple, it has proved to be difficult to solve 
(MC-ICAM, 2002).  Results are very much restricted by the assumptions made (such as fixed capacity 
and a fixed toll) and often complicated and difficult to interpret.   
 
Second-best studies have not only addressed the issue of the level of second-best tolls in different 
types of networks, but recently the toll location has also been included.  Verhoef (2002) examined the 
selection of individual toll links, and the determination of toll levels using some sensitivity indicators.  
Yang and Zhang (2002) considered selection of optimal toll levels and optimal locations for achieving 
maximum social welfare using a bi-level programming approach with both discrete and continuous 
variables.  And Shepherd and Sumalee (2004) explored the usefulness of solving the optimal toll 
problem for a medium scale network. 
      
Heterogeneity 
 
Travellers and road vehicles differ in a number of characteristics.  Vehicles vary, for example, in the 
road space they occupy, and in weight and acceleration capabilities.  Travellers have different values 
of time, desired speed, and so on.  First-best pricing often makes it necessary to distinguish between 
different vehicle types and users (because of different marginal costs).  It is important to know whether 
first-best congestion pricing can still be implemented, given these dimensions of heterogeneity, and if 
not, how second-best tolls are optimally determined.  In this context a distinction is often made 
between anonymous tolling schemes (independent of vehicle type and driver) and non-anonymous 
(type-specific) tolls.    
 
Many studies have been conducted on the implications of the problem of heterogeneity and pricing.  
The topics range from heterogeneity in drivers’ values of time and trip-timing preferences to the 
heterogeneity in travel speed.  Another example of a study that is of interest here is that of Verhoef 
and Small (2004), who consider a differentiation of tolls across parallel traffic lanes by using a static 
model.  They show that an anonymous toll may still be optimal on each lane separately, and efficient 
segregation of drivers is achieved without regulation.  It should be noted that the extra gains are rather 
small, so that a second-best single toll applied to the entire highway does not impose much of a 
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welfare loss.  Optimal anonymous tolling may entail segregation of vehicle or driver types onto 
separate routes.      
 
 
2.2.3 THE POSITIVE THEORY OF INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES  
 
We have seen that various constraints can be identified which make first-best pricing rather unrealistic 
in practice.  The last constraint mentioned in the previous section was the political one.  Economists 
generally assume governments and politicians will maximise welfare of their citizens.  They may still 
do so when facing constraints of equity, cost coverage or cognitive limitations of the users.  This will 
affect differentiation of the charge, but welfare is still maximised.  However, politicians may well have 
different objectives leading to deviations of optimal prices.   
 
The following sections assume that politicians and civil servants follow their own individual goals and 
that, in doing so, they are open to the influence of Special Interest Groups (SIGs)3. This does not 
necessarily mean that under this approach decision makers never care for public welfare.  First, there 
are limits to the discretion of decision makers due to competition for their offices.  Second, there may 
be cases where following public welfare coincides with individual interests.  Third, and perhaps most 
important, the decision maker must convince the public of his policies; usually this cannot be achieved 
without at least some regard to normative argumentation.  Nevertheless, there may be cases where 
real-world policies can be better explained by assuming individual utility maximization than welfare 
maximization on the part of decision-makers.   
 
Departing from the axiom of welfare maximization means that instead of asking how transport pricing 
should be set (in order to achieve economic efficiency, i.e. a maximum of welfare) we ask how 
transport prices are actually set under real world conditions.  In economic jargon: we are moving from 
the normative to the positive approach of economic theory.   
 
This change of perspective does not mean that the two approaches have no connection (in the sense 
of two different “schools” of economic theory or the like).  As was just explained, there are often cases 
where both approaches make the same predictions.  In addition, there is the need for every policy-
maker to take normative considerations into account, if he wants to be re-elected.  Furthermore, one 
may argue, as was done in the introduction to this section above, that the change of perspective 
amounts simply to adding “the political constraint” to marginal cost pricing.  This is a matter of 
semantics, of course, which should not detract from the fact that both the normative and the positive 
approach use the same apparatus of economic theory.  The change from positive to normative 
analysis therefore means no radical break in the overall approach in this part of the DIFFERENT 
project.  Rather the two approaches are complementary, or one may also say that one is a special 
case of the other, depending on perspective.   
 
In the following sections the positive approach will be applied to the problem of tariff differentiation in 
transport.  It must be said, however, that the literature in the positive branch of economic analysis on 
this question is far less developed than in the normative branch.  An important part of the work done in 
DIFFERENT will therefore be experimental in the sense of applying existing literature on related topics 
to transportation pricing.  The following sections show which parts of the positive theory might be good 
candidates for such an application.  The adaptation and application itself remains to be done.  
Consequently, some discussions may be more abstract compared to the normative analysis.   
 
 
 Special Interest Group theories 
 
Special Interest Groups are always interfering with the political process.  Noll (Noll, 1989) names two 
major reasons why interest groups are formed: first they are formed to solve the problem of 
powerlessness and second to counter the problem of controlling politicians. 
 
                                                     
3   In a world without special interest groups the policy maker would try to maximize overall welfare. The 
existence of SIGs makes, therefore, the incorporation of the political constraint necessary in order to derive 
“real world” conditions. Thus, from the positive theory point of view, policy makers and SIGs are the main 
actors participating in the political game. 
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Due to the fact that a single voter is powerless against the politicians, the forming of special interest 
groups enables voters to express the intensity of their preference for certain policies far more clearly 
than just through the voting process.  Likewise, controlling the performance of some politicians may be 
far too costly for any individual voter, but not for a special interest group that can distribute these costs 
over the number of its members.   
 
Special interest groups engage in many activities.  The most important are:  
 
¾ to gain access to policy-makers; 
¾ to supply policy makers with information; 
¾ to support the election campaigns of their favoured candidates; 
¾ to “educate” the general public on their favoured policy. 
 
Although all of these activities can be observed in reality, it is not clear that they really buy influence.  
Empirical studies so far do not seem to offer clear evidence on this point (Grossman/Helpman 2001).  
The main problem here is that studies of the effects of the activities of interest groups must compare 
the “real world” situation to the imaginary situation where interest groups would not have been present. 
 
For the purpose of the following discussion, two of the above mentioned activities of interest groups 
are of special relevance: campaign contributions and the provision of information.  
 
Campaign contributions 
 
Campaign contributions have the aim to exert influence on decision-makers to implement a certain 
type of regulation, e.g. a certain type of pricing policy. 
 
The main model, which initiated the economic research in the direction of interest groups, is the well 
known Stigler/ Peltzman model (Peltzman, 1976).  This paper, in turn, was based on an empirical 
study by Friedland and Stigler (1962) which stated serious objections regarding the effectiveness of 
regulation of electric utilities.  Friedland and Stigler formulated an econometric model to test the effect 
of regulation on electricity prices.  Their result was that regulation had an insignificant effect on the 
average price of electricity.  Apparently, regulation in this industry was pro-producer rather than pro-
consumer.  This led Stigler to the concept of “regulatory capture” (Stigler 1971).  The term “capture” 
here means that after a while the regulatory agency becomes an instrument of the industry it is 
supposed to regulate.  According to Stigler the main reasons for that are as follows: 
 
¾ Regulators gain from supplying regulation; 
¾ The industry likes regulation, because in most cases regulation also means restriction of 
competition; 
¾ The consumers are not well informed and not well organized; 
¾ The producers can form small but well organized interest groups. 
 
The standard model of this process of regulatory capture is the Stigler/Peltzman model (Peltzman 
1976, 1993).  Methodically, it is a similar approach to the microeconomic utility maximization model 
(Figure 2-1).  The main aim of a politician/regulator is to stay in office.  To that aim he or she tries to 
maximize net votes.  This is modelled by assuming a so-called voting function (political support 
function), the level of which is depending of the price P and the industry profits Π.  This function has 
the form: M(P,Π).   
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Figure 2-1: Optimal Regulatory Price in the Stigler/Peltzman model (Source: Peltzman 1976) 
The regulator’s aim is to find the optimal price that maximizes the political support.  Due to the fact that 
the industry profit Π(p) is a function of the price, the optimal choice for a regulator is the tangential 
point between the profit function and the “Iso-Support-Curve“(constructed from the political support 
function).  This situation is depicted in Figure 1.  M1, M2 and M3 are the mentioned “Iso-Support-
Curves“.   Each one of them depicts all the possible combinations of price and profit and represents a 
certain level of political support.  Upper “Iso-Support curves” indicate higher political support for the 
policy maker.  In Figure 2-1, M3 corresponds to higher political support compared to M2 or M1.  Their 
slope is according to their definition positive; higher industry profit increases political support by the 
interest group, whereas higher prices reduce political support by the voters.  Π(p) is the industry profit 
function.  The optimal price for the regulator P* lies between the competitive price Pc and the monopoly 
price Pm.   At Pc the profit for the industry is zero.  At Pm profit reaches its maximum. 
 
However there are several weaknesses of this type of model.  The major weaknesses are the 
following:  
 
¾ First, the influence on a decision maker increases with the group’s contribution.  This empirical 
knowledge, however, hasn’t been treated in the Stigler/Peltzman model.   
¾ Second, it is assumed, that the candidates will indeed implement the political program as 
promised to the interest groups.   
¾ The related problem of credible commitment is not mentioned.   
¾ Frequently political support models of the Stigler/Peltzman type contain just three groups of 
actors: the producers of the good in question, the consumers and the regulators.  In reality there 
are normally far more interest groups than just consumers and producers. 
 
The next important step in the development of the positive theory of regulation was the contribution of 
Gary Becker (1983, 1985), where regulation is modelled as an equilibrium of the political pressure of 
competing interest groups.  If all SIGs are represented equal in the political process, then the result 
will be relative “efficient”.  If not, the policy choices will yield monopoly rents. 
 
Politicians, political parties and voters are not explicitly modelled in Becker’s approach.  In this sense 
Becker’s model is a model without institutions.  Individuals belong to particular pressure groups 
defined by certain characteristics.  These groups use their political power to enhance the welfare of 
their members. 
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Even if Becker does not use prices in his model, his approach is indirectly associated with them, since 
increased welfare for the members of an interest group is also a matter of the existing price level and 
pricing scheme. 
 
Becker and the authors that used this type of model describe the result of lobbying activities using a 
so-called “influence function”, that relates the political influence of each pressure group - expressed by 
the benefits the members of a group receive - to the pressure exerted by the given group and to the 
countervailing political pressure exerted by all the other social groups.  This model is a zero-sum 
game, in which increased political influence of one group decreases the influence of others. 
 
Becker also stated that a key issue for an interest group is the number of its members.  An increase in 
the number of members can raise on the one hand the resources available for lobbying activities, but 
on the other hand can cause the free rider problem4 within the group.  One important implication of the 
Becker-Model is that, if a SIG can keep the free rider problem under control, then it is very likely to 
succeed. 
 
An important dimension of research using the Becker-type model is the rent-seeking literature. Rent 
seeking describes the behaviour of persons, firms, or groups which are willing to spend money in 
order to achieve uncompensated welfare.  An example may be the rent connected with a monopoly 
granted by the state.  The more resources an interest group spends to gain this rent the higher the 
probability that it will get this rent. 
 
Keeler’s contribution (1984) to the positive theory of regulation consists in a development of the 
Stigler/Peltzman and the Becker model in two dimensions.  First, the Stigler/Peltzman model and the 
Becker model had high explanatory power on the question why regulation occurs, but they could 
hardly explain deregulation.  Second, Keeler observed, that in some cases politicians’ behaviour 
seems to be the basis of the Stigler/Peltzman paradigm.  In other cases, however, politicians seem to 
behave very close to the normative theory point of view.  Therefore, Keeler tried to solve these two 
problems by using positive and normative features in his model. 
 
The main improvement in Keeler’s model is the use of the each group’s Consumer Surplus in the 
Stigler/Peltzman’s political voting function:  
 
W = W(CS1, CS2, ………….., CSn). 
 
CSi: Consumer Surplus of group i. 
  
The use of Consumer Surplus in Keeler’s model shows the importance of the price for each interest 
group.  A price level (or a pricing scheme) that maximizes one interest group’s utility does not 
necessarily maximize the utility of the rest of the interest groups. 
 
Various researchers used models that are similar to the Keeler approach.  In these models regulators 
look for policies that maximize a weighted representation of the utilities of different social interest 
groups.  
 
The best known application here is the Grossman/Helpman model.  The Grossman/Helpman model is 
a foreign trade model.  The model refers to international trade with two goods (footwear and 
electronics).  There are two factors of production which are represented by two interest groups (capital 
and labour).  A tariff on footwear would have a positive impact on the real wage of labour, whereas a 
subsidy on the export of electronics would affect positively the income of capital.  All individuals own 
either capital or labour, but not both.  The policymaker has the task to choose a tariff rate and a 
subsidy level in order to maximize a weighted sum of aggregate welfare and campaign contributions. 
 
Using methods of game-theory Grossman and Helpman showed that in the equilibrium of the game it 
is indeed the politician’s optimal behaviour to maximize a weighted sum of the welfare of both 
capitalists and labour.  This means that the politician will indeed maximize an objective function, which 
                                                     
4  The term free rider describes a person within a group who benefits from the policy carried out by all other 
group members without bearing the respective costs. 
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includes political contributions from organized lobbies and also aggregate welfare.  From this point of 
view, the tariff can be seen as a compromise between competing interest groups and the regulator. 
 
In this model the whole population of this economy belongs either to the group of capital owners or to 
the group of workers.  However, in reality such an exact division of citizens is impossible and not 
realistic.  A “real world” test of the Grossman/ Helpman model would probably yield a falsification of 
the model’s predictions.  Still the model is important in pointing out a promising methodological 
approach, which may also be useful with respect to road pricing. 
 
Provision of information 
 
The provision of information as an activity of SIG’s is extremely important.  Although the provision of 
information is not directly connected to matter of prices, it is crucial for a SIG to act on that field, in 
order to gain access to the policy-maker.  In addition provision of information has the aim to convince 
a policy maker that the group’s most favourite policy is also the best one.  Politicians are interested in 
such information because in most cases they have of less information and in addition they have limited 
resources available to gather it.  A SIG in contrast has access to cheap information because of the 
highly specialized knowledge of its members and because of the fact that information costs can be 
spread among its members. 
 
Due to the fact that a politician has limited time to listen to interest groups, he will separate “important” 
from “less important” groups and “valuable” from “less valuable” information.  In doing so campaign 
contributions may be a helpful means. This means, the more a group contributes to a policy maker, 
the higher the probability to be heard.  
 
Given, however, that a SIG has gained access to a certain policy-maker, it faces, first, the problem 
that the politician may have different policy aims than the SIG and, second, the problem to convince 
the politician of the credibility of the information supplied. 
 
Concerning the simplest variation of the existing models, Grossman/Helpman’s research on this topic 
showed that first the policy- maker will always prefer information from moderate SIG’s and second the 
optimal strategy for the SIG’s is not to give very precise estimates.  A level of information which 
includes ranges of values increases the credibility of the lobbyist. 
 
The credibility problem of the SIGs becomes far sharper when the political parties have already taken 
their position with respect to the political issue in question.  In particular when the SIGs have to issue 
their statements close to election time, credibility will become the major problem.  The citizens know 
that the SIGs will try to influence their information in favour of their favourite party and will evaluate this 
information accordingly. 
 
Positive theory and price structure 
 
So far it has been shown how Special Interest Groups are interfering in the political process in favour 
of their members (campaign contributions, provision of information).  In the models mentioned above, 
prices are playing an important role; however these models are considering the price level, not the 
price structure.  This subsection gives an example of price structure superiority. 
 
It is very difficult in the highly developed transport sector of the EU to achieve Pareto improvements5 
through transport policy measures (e.g. pricing schemes).  In general, such measures create winners 
and losers.  This fact makes it very likely that SIGs will try to affect pricing schemes in favour of their 
members.  Laffont (2000) picked up this topic and researched the conditions of superiority of this type 
of second-best pricing. 
 
Arguments for infrastructure pricing have already been made by Adam Smith.  Smith’s proposals on 
this topic concern full cost recovery and a tariff proportional to marginal cost.  Laffont used the Smith 
pricing rule as a basis of comparisons to other forms of infrastructure charges, namely a 2nd degree 
price discrimination. 
                                                     
5  A Pareto improvement can be reached if an economical measure enhances welfare for at least one person 
without making anyone else worse off. 
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Smith starts from the principle that price should equal marginal cost.  This, however, leads to a deficit 
as described above.  Therefore Smith proposes to inflate marginal cost prices by a constant mark-up, 
so that, overall, total costs are covered.  Formally:  
 
pi = δ MCi and TC= pi qi. 
pi : tariff for user i 
TC :  total cost of the infrastructure facility,  
MCi  :  marginal cost of user-type i,  
qi :  quantity of infrastructure services consumed by type i  
δ:  constant factor.   
 
From the normative theory point of view the Smith rule is inferior compared to pricing schemes such 
as Ramsey or non-linear pricing, because it causes welfare losses.  Laffont however, argues that this 
result may change when SIGs affect the pricing scheme. 
 
Laffont’s model describes an economy consisting of two groups, which differ with respect to the utility 
they derive from the output of a certain monopoly, for instance the highway network.  These two 
groups alternate in power with a certain probability.  This assumption enables this model to calculate 
with alternating power situations.  The natural behaviour of each group (when in power) is to 
implement such policies (concerning the level of production and the tariff structure) that maximize its 
own welfare.  The group in opposition must accept the policy made by the other group so that its 
welfare is a function of the policy made by the group in power. 
 
Laffont now compares two situations.  In the first situation, the Smith rule has been implemented as 
the pricing principle in the country’s constitution.  The word “constitution” here should not be 
interpreted too literally.  It means that a basic political decision has been taken to implement a certain 
tariff-model, perhaps very akin to what the EU-Commission has been searching for over the last two 
decades with respect to infrastructure charging.  In the context of road pricing, one could compare this 
to a situation where a law has been passed that implements a uniform tariff for all vehicles based on 
marginal cost but with a mark-up designed to guarantee full cost recovery.  In a sense this is the case 
with respect to the German HGV toll.   
 
In the second situation, the 2nd degree price discrimination is implemented in the constitution.  The 
groups can choose between two two-part tariffs.  One such two-part tariff is shown in Figure 2-2.  In 
2nd degree price discrimination a user has the choice between two of these tariffs: depending on 
whether he is a low use customer or a high use customer, he will choose a tariff with a high fixed 
component F and a low usage fee p or vice versa.  In this way customers “self-select” into two 
customer groups.  If the firm in question designs the two tariffs in the “right” way, each group will select 
the tariff that is “made for it”.  If this is the case, the two tariffs are said to be “incentive compatible” or 
to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint.   
 
In both cases this means that after the basic decision for a tariff-model has been taken, the structure 
of the financing scheme cannot be changed any more, but only the level of its various components.   
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Figure 2-2: Two-part tariff (Source: Viscusi et al., 2005).  
 
But in the case of the Smith rule the group in power has no room to decide on the structure of the 
tariff, because the Smith tariff is a uniform tariff.  It can only decide on the production level of the 
natural monopoly and, as a consequence, on the level of the mark-up.  Nevertheless the decision of 
the level of the mark-up has an impact on both groups.  As a result the group in power can stipulate a 
production level according to its consumption preferences, but it has limited room to move the financial 
burden to the other group. 
 
This is different in the case of the two-part tariff.  It is natural that the groups will choose the two-part 
tariff that maximizes the group’s welfare, and this depends on how intensive the two groups use the 
infrastructure facility.  In this case, the group in power now gets the opportunity to shift a larger share 
of the financial burden to the other group by consuming more or less than optimal.  This means that 
the group in power has enough room to manipulate the two tariffs in such a way that it can maximize 
its own welfare at the cost of the minority. 
 
Laffont compares the total expected welfare in both situations.  He arrives at the result that the Smith 
rule causes less distortions of expected welfare than second degree price-discrimination.  However, 
there are limits of the Smith rule’s superiority: 
1. It becomes worse (from a welfare point of view) the higher the fixed costs.  After a certain point 
second degree price discrimination is superior to the Smith rule. 
2. Its welfare performance depends also on the degree of heterogeneity of the two groups (with 
respect to the utility they derive from the consumption of a monopoly’s output, e.g. the highway 
network).  In that case, it is impossible for the group in power to shift financial burdens to the other 
group.  Regarding their consumption behaviour, both groups can be seen as one.  Hence, if there 
is no scope for the one of the groups to shift financial burdens to the other, the welfare losses of 
the Smith rule are higher than the ones of the multipart tariff, and the Smith rule becomes inferior. 
 
Even if Laffont’s model gives enough room for criticism, it still has high explanatory power and opens 
new perspectives for the treatment of cases that involve tariffs and alternating majorities.  Moreover, 
as far as we know, it is the first model which centres on the structure of tariffs, not just the level.  As 
such it is of high relevance for the question of the differentiation of tariffs and therefore for the 
DIFFERENT project.  Laffont’s model shows that it is important to consider aspects of the positive 
theory and to look for realistic solutions concerning tariff structure proposals.  However it will not 
always be the case that the Laffont results are applicable.  Therefore it is highly important in every 
different case to study the precise framework conditions which apply to this case.   
 
q 
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2.3 CONCLUSION 
Several transport pricing objectives can be distinguished, such as economic efficiency, profitability and 
cost coverage.  Economists will usually argue that the pursuance of economic efficiency should take 
precedence, in any case as long as political power does not indicate its preference about redistribution 
and equity.  The concept of economic efficiency is derived from welfare economics, and is concerned 
with the allocation of resources in an economy.  According to this theory, prices should be equal to 
marginal social cost (throughout the economy) to obtain maximum social welfare.  With this pricing 
principle, potential travellers who value their trip above the costs they impose by adding to traffic flows 
will travel.  Those who value their trip below that cost will not travel or use some alternative means.  
Such an optimal price is based on all costs involved with driving one additional kilometre, or one extra 
transport unit using infrastructure.  Because this also includes external costs, these charges are highly 
differentiated and vary along with variations in many behavioural dimensions. 
 
Such a first-best setting is recognised as a useful theoretical benchmark, but it is of less practical 
relevance.  The regulator faces several barriers and constraints preventing it from setting optimal 
prices (e.g. technical or political in nature).  Less differentiated price structures will be less optimal, but 
they are more realistic.  Economic theory offers several options that are second-best: optimal given 
the constraints applying.  Most likely these pricing measures will be differentiated according to a fewer 
number of behavioural dimensions, reducing the complexity. 
 
Additional insight can be gained from adding the positive view of economic analysis to these 
normative considerations.  By introducing the influence of special interest groups into the analysis one 
arrives at further (political) constraints on pricing policy.  The main purpose of adding these policy 
based constraints is to be able to design tariffs which are as little amenable to political manipulation by 
interest groups as possible.  It may be the case, for instance, under certain political circumstances that 
a uniform tariff (e.g. for a road) may lead to higher expected economic welfare than a highly 
differentiated tariff because the uniform tariff is less likely to be manipulated by politicians wanting to 
favour certain user groups (e.g. local residents vs. long distance travellers).  
 
The overall picture, which takes both the normative and the positive way of analysis into account, 
should be able to provide guidance as to the desirable degree and direction of price differentiation in 
transport.  
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3 BEHAVIOURAL THEORY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the transport sector differentiated pricing is increasingly used to manage the user’s demand for 
infrastructure capacity, thus influencing behaviour.  To describe behavioural changes induced by 
prices, economists use the concept of price elasticities.  Price elasticities describe the extent to which 
people change (consumer-) behaviour following a change of prices.  Elasticities are able to describe 
quantitative changes in behaviour; for example, price elasticities could describe the extent to which 
motorists drive more or less after the introduction of road pricing, while cross elasticities can describe 
the extent to which people might change their amount of deriving following a change in the attributes 
of alternative modes.  However, elasticities are not able to describe which cognitive or motivational 
processes are behind these quantitative changes, nor which behavioural adaptation strategies an 
individual chooses – both of which are necessary to understand and predict user reactions to 
differentiated pricing. 
 
There are several aspects, which can have consequences for the implementation of a new pricing 
structure.  Firstly, in most situations, mobility behaviour is highly habituated and strongly linked to 
peoples´ lifestyle.  Changes in travel habits may not be possible without changes in daily routines, and 
this may prove difficult or costly and lead to inflexibility even when conditions change.  A second 
problem is that people have limited mental capacities to process information.  These cognitive 
limitations restrict the degree of complexity that people can deal with and thus the degree of 
differentiation possible.  If the differentiation becomes too complex for individuals to understand, 
people tend to base their behaviour on heuristics.  It appears that different individuals have different 
abilities to understand complex prices and that this also depends on personal and situational factors. 
Moreover, motivational aspects have to be seen as constraints on behavioural adaptation to 
differentiated prices.  Thus even if transport users are able to understand a complex pricing system 
and to predict prices in advance, it does not mean that they are willing to deal with these charges and 
to adjust their behaviour.  In this context, acceptability and disengagement are the most important 
aspects. Thus, when looking at users’ reaction to differentiated pricing, it seems reasonable to 
consider the question of people’s acceptability together with their ability to respond to the price signals. 
 
This chapter aims at presenting and explaining psychological factors, which are potential determinants 
of the relationships between transport policy provisions and behavioural adaptation of transport end 
users.  (Transport operators are not considered within this report.)  Of course, there are many 
psychological theories and factors which could explain and influence peoples´ reaction towards 
differentiated prices.  Section 3.2.1 focuses on psychological theories on behavioural adaptation and 
on those psychological constraints which are seen as most relevant.  Psychological determinants 
include cognitive and motivational as well as situational and personal factors.  A complete and more 
precise analysis will follow at a later stage of behavioural analysis in this project.  Section 3.2.2 
concentrates on empirical evidence that is so far available from other studies and past research 
concerning traffic user reaction on differentiated prices, but also includes transferable results from 
other sectors such as telecommunications.  The last section 3.3 will give a first theoretical approach 
and an outlook for further work and analysis within the DIFFERENT project concerning psychological 
and behavioural theory. 
 
3.2 THE CURRENT SITUATION 
3.2.1 OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY 
 
The relevant determinants of user responses to price differentiation can be exemplified by the popular 
Stimulus-Organism-Response-Model (SOR) of human behaviour. The SOR-Model describes the 
relationship between a stimulus, which can be seen as information from the environment and peoples´ 
reaction on that. The organism is seen as interfering variable that determines the resulting individual 
behaviour via psychological constraints (Figure 3-1). 
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Stimulus         Organism           Response 
S     O     R 
       External economic   psychological constraints  mobility or travel 
       Stimuli e.g. prices   e.g. cognitive abilities, motivation      behaviour 
        
Figure 3-1: The SOR-Model 
Stimulus in this case means political instruments like price-policy or the communication of it.  The 
reaction represents mobility or travel behaviour.  Within economic theories it is often assumed that the 
organism-variable is a black box.  Thus the user is seen as a rational deciding actor (homo 
economicus) who shows standardised behaviour and whose attitudes have no influence on choices.  
But this rational choice approach does not always work.  Jacoby & Olson (1977) claim that external 
economic stimuli, such as prices, do not exert direct effects upon human behaviour.  There is no 
predictable response, because stimuli must first be perceived and interpreted before they can affect 
decision processes and behaviour.  Therefore individual behaviour has to be explained with the help of 
psychological constraints as it depends on individual perceptions, attitudes, motivations and 
personality.  That means that the organism is no black box.  There are psychological determinants in 
terms of cognitive, motivational, situational and personal factors, which may influence users´ reaction 
towards transport infrastructure charging. 
 
Table 3.1 shows an overview of identified political, psychological and behavioural aspects concerning 
differentiated pricing, integrated into the SOR-Model.  The analysis of the stimulus – in the case of 
DIFFERENT the transport infrastructure charges and their implementation – is obviously a very 
important part of the analysis of the overall problem, but it will not be discussed further in this chapter, 
as it does not directly relate to psychological aspects. They will be considered at a later stage of 
behavioural analysis in this project, analysing their relationship with user responses.  
 
Peoples´ reaction to transport infrastructure charging, especially on differentiated pricing systems, is a 
central aspect of the work within the DIFFERENT project.  That is why some basic assumptions and 
underlying theory referring to behavioural adaptation shall be clarified first.  Afterwards there will be 
four sections presenting briefly the four types of psychological constraints which may determine this 
behavioural adaptation.  Thus the focus is on those determinants which are thought likely to be the 
most important. The remaining variables will be considered in Deliverable D4.1. 
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Table 3.1: Overview of political, psychological and behavioural aspects of differentiated pricing
Stimulus Organism Response 
Transport policy / Key 
policy inputs  Cognitive Factors 
Motivational and Emotional 
Factors 
Personal Characteristics 
and Situational Factors Behavioural Adaptation 
• Price differentiation 
• Information provision 
• Availability / Use of aids   
  and advice systems 
• Price variability  
• Modus of payment  
• Competing possibilities and    
   their prices  
• Enforcement / Penalties 
• External justification  
 
• Information processing 
- (price) perception and   
  storage / knowledge 
- comprehension 
- mental capacity  
• Heuristics 
- anchoring and framing  
• Cognitive comfort /   
  Psychological costs 
• Demand on attention 
• Experiences and      
  Expectations 
 
• Acceptability 
- Problem perception 
- Goals 
- Perceived    
  Effectiveness 
- Outcome expectations 
- Perceived fairness  
- Social norms 
• Perceived behavioural  
  Control 
• Disengagement 
• Habits  
• Economy 
• Personal involvement 
• Perceived infringement on  
  freedom / Reactance 
• Reference prices  
• Negative emotions 
• Trust  
• Personality type  
• Sex 
• Age 
• Education 
• Income 
• Type of journey 
• Time pressure 
 
• Higher Decision on Mobility  
  and Driving Behaviour 
- Residence location 
- Work location 
- Leisure activities 
- Car ownership 
- Vehicle selection 
• Mobility Behaviour 
- Modal choice 
- Destination choice /  
  Aggregation of    
  destinations 
- Route choice 
- Trip frequency /  Trip 
  suppression  
- Change in distance 
- Change in timing 
- Ride sharing / Car  
  Pooling 
- Compliance rate (errors  
  / violations) 
• Driving Behaviour 
       - Style of driving 
       - Speed choice  
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 Behavioural adaptation 
 
Behavioural adaptation occurs as users respond to changes in the transport system.  However, there 
are some premises that have to be fulfilled so that a change of behaviour can occur (OECD, 1990):  
 
¾ The traveller must be able to perceive the change, although the perception does not have to be 
conscious. 
¾ The traveller must have the possibility to change their behaviour. 
¾ The traveller must have the motivation to change their behaviour. 
 
Differentiated pricing is increasingly applied to manage the user’s demand for infrastructure capacity. 
But therefore it is necessary to understand and predict not just quantitative but also qualitative user 
reactions towards differentiated pricing in order to manage mobility.  Important dimensions of mobility 
and driving behaviour are general aspects of transport use like mode choice, length of trip, route 
choice, time of driving, trip frequency or style of driving.  Thus, congestion for instance is mainly 
determined by the time of driving, route choice and style of driving (steady driving and a homogeneous 
flow of traffic decreases the probability of congestion).  There are various options that people actually 
employ to reduce their car use; for example, trip chaining, changes in mode choice and departure time 
etc.  As travel behaviour is strongly linked to people’s lifestyle, changes in the transport system might 
influence not only these daily routines but also higher level decisions such as vehicle selection, leisure 
activities and choice of residence (Gärling et al., 2002).  Therefore a differentiation has to be made 
between behavioural adaptation, that refers to short-term, medium-term or long-term decisions.  The 
hierarchical structure of mobility behaviour (Schlag, Schade & Risser, in press) describes these three 
relevant decision and behaviour levels (Figure 3-2). 
 
 
 Behaviour level Behaviour Content Environment Time horizon 
I 
Higher level decisions 
with consequences on 
mobility and driving 
behaviour 
- Residence choice 
- Workplace choice 
- Leisure activities 
- Car ownership 
- Vehicle selection 
 
long-term  
(reflected) 
II Mobility behaviour 
- Mode choice 
- Trip frequency 
- Route choice 
- Length of trip 
- Time of driving 
Space structure, 
land use, road 
network, Traffic 
supply 
 
medium-term 
(routinized) 
III Driving behaviour 
- Style of driving 
- Speed choice 
- Etc.  
Driving situation 
short-term 
(automatized) 
 
Figure 3-2: Hierarchical structure of mobility behaviour (Schlag et al., in press) 
The top level includes long-term (life-style) decisions which do not directly concern mobility behaviour 
but which both affect, and are affected by, this behaviour.  They include decisions on place of 
residence or place of work and therefore on spatial relations that have to be managed in future.  
Decisions on car ownership or on the type of car also belong to this level.  Decisions at this stage are 
made infrequently and with some care: they may have long-term consequences and tend to constrain 
decisions at the lower levels.  The medium-term level of mobility behaviour includes mode choice and 
other decisions which directly affect traffic participation. These decisions refer to concrete trips and to 
intentions that will influence driving behaviour.  The third level describes the short-term aspects of 
concrete driving behaviour.  
 
Decisions at the first and second level have underlying habits and are thus hard to change.  Higher 
order life-style decisions can create objective constraints, whereas habituation on mobility behaviour 
causes subjective constraints, which are seen as unchangeable.  Driving behaviour is characterised 
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by strong preferred habits which are supported by automatisms.  Thus we see impediments to 
changes in mobility behaviour on all levels as they are associated with high costs.  
 
But if behavioural changes become necessary, an adaptation occurs normally according to the “cost 
minimization principle” (Loukopoulos, 2005).  This principle states that people are unwilling to change 
their basic routines as a result of economic incentives or prices.  They prefer the status quo as in other 
areas of life as well.  If changes are necessary, they will be kept as small as possible.  “As small as 
possible” means that people want to maintain the present activity schedule (Gärling et al., 2002).  
Thus, the type of strategy chosen will depend on the “psychological costs” associated with it.  A wide 
range of adaptation alternatives including, for example, more efficient car use, suppressing trips, and 
switching travel mode are considered.  These adaptation alternatives are argued to be implemented 
sequentially over time according to the cost-minimisation principle beginning first with the less costly 
and effective alternatives.  The cost minimisation hierarchy may vary according to trip purpose.  For 
instance, for work trips it might be easier to switch mode in order to maintain the activity schedule 
whereas for shopping or leisure trips other strategies such as trip chaining or changing destination will 
be seen as more appropriate.  
 
Cognitive factors 
 
Research in cognitive psychology already provides knowledge about the cognitive limits of users faced 
with a differentiated charging scheme.  Thus the perception and the knowledge of prices play an 
important role in users´ reactions.  Whether a person can understand a pricing system and its 
communication depends on their prior knowledge and experiences.  Experience with principles of 
differentiated charging in various domains of life may enhance people’s understanding and 
acceptance of these principles in transport.  But it also could be that these experiences are domain-
specific and hardly transferable.  For example, the introduction of yield management pricing by rail 
operators in e.g. Germany was met with heavy opposition, while airlines use these principles 
successfully for years.  However, it is not clear yet how experience influence user reactions.  
Furthermore there is always the question on cost of behavioural adaptation.  Costs in this context 
include financial costs, but also psychological effort required to process the relevant information and 
change behaviour.  Thus, the higher these psychological costs, the less likely a change in travel 
behaviour as a reaction to differentiated charging becomes.  Processing lots of information is also 
restricted by people’s limited attention span and mental capacity to process information.  
 
For the purpose of attempting to understand consumer reactions to prices, the short-term memory 
(STM) and long-term memory (LTM) systems and their respective capabilities are the most critical 
aspects as both systems have a strong effect on the processes by which consumers acquire and use 
information such as prices (Jacoby & Olson, 1977).  The LTM contains a seemingly unlimited number 
of symbols representing all stimuli in permanent storage.  In contrast the STM system has a severely 
limited information storage capacity and there is a decay of symbols, if one does not rehearse the 
information.  That means that people are able to process only a certain amount of information at a 
time.  When people are provided with too much and too complex information (information 
flooding/overload), as might be the case with highly differentiated prices, capacity is exceeded and 
consumers become overstrained.  This may lead to poorer decisions (Engel, 1990).  
 
Mental capacity is often described in terms of chunks, which represents a grouping or combination of 
information that can be processed as a unit.  Referring to the limits of people’s capacity for processing 
information, Miller (1956) has shown that the extent of memory capacity amounts to between 5 and 9 
chunks.  Too many dimensions in price differentiation would make the pricing system too complex, i.e. 
people would not be able to deal with all the information and would therefore be unable to understand 
it and adjust their behaviour accordingly.   
 
If the differentiation becomes too complex for individuals to understand, people tend to base their 
behaviour on a simplified mental model of the price structure.  In contrast to systematic processing of 
information, the use of such heuristics is a more limited processing mode that demands much less 
cognitive effort and capacity.  There people focus on available information that enables them to use 
simple rules to formulate their judgements and decisions.  This entails only minimal amounts of data 
collection and analysis.  Heuristics are cognitive strategies which are often described as rules of 
thumb.  These mental shortcuts are quite useful as they reduce complex problem solving tasks to 
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more simple judgmental operations, but also allow for a much greater chance of error.  The results are 
suboptimal decisions, which represent the price of simplification.  
 
Homburg and Koschate (2005) suppose that people prefer the heuristic processing as it means less 
effort.  Heuristics will be used depending on the personal relevance or importance of the problem, the 
time and cognitive resources available and whether the heuristics seem likely to lead to the decision 
intended.  The more important a decision is the less heuristics will be used, but if resources are 
limited, heuristic strategies may be adopted. 
 
Kahnemann, Slovic and Tversky (1991) have investigated several heuristics used in making decisions.  
For example, availability heuristics involve judgements on the basis of the most easily accessed 
relevant information.  Heuristics related to availability are anchoring and framing. The framing heuristic 
implies that the selection of an option is influenced by the way the options are presented; an option 
can either be framed positively as gain or negatively as loss.  Small but certain gains are generally 
preferred over larger but uncertain gains, while large but uncertain losses are generally preferred over 
smaller but certain losses (Sternberg, 1996). The ‘adjustment-from-an-anchor’ heuristic describes the 
common human tendency to rely heavily (to “anchor”) on one trait or piece for information when 
making decisions. 
 
Another problem is cognitive comfort.  This refers to psychological costs in terms of transaction costs 
and concerns the effort required to process complex information.  People tend to object to highly 
differentiated price structures as processing complex information tends to put them off, because they 
are cognitive misers who do not want to waste effort.  This means that they will be looking for ways to 
economise on their mental effort and, where possible, will tend to rely on heuristics. This is for 
example obvious in the telecommunication sector, where people often prefer fixed charges (Bonsall et 
al., 2004).  
 
Motivational factors 
 
Even if a differentiated charging system is designed in a way that people would be able to understand 
it, they may not be willing to do so.  Therefore, apart from the cognitive aspects, a central motivational 
factor that might influence user reaction toward differentiated pricing is acceptability.  If users do not 
accept the system, they may not make an effort to understand it.  In such cases they may not change 
their behaviour to the extent they could, or may even resist making any change (consumer resistance 
to Deutsche Bahn AG’s new fare system may be an example of this).  
 
The definition of “acceptance” and “acceptability” should be clarified at this stage. In some definitions 
“to accept” is described as “to give an affirmative reply to something” (Hornby & Growther, 1995). 
Elsewhere it is described as “to respond/react favourably to”.  But one has to distinguish between 
attitudes and behaviour.  Eagly & Chaiken (1993) define attitude as “a psychological tendency that is 
expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favour or disfavour”.  In terms of 
attitudes “acceptance” would be defined as an affirmative attitude towards an specific object like 
infrastructure charging.  In terms of behaviour “acceptance” could be defined as a behaviour which 
corresponds to the aims and objectives of the system to be implemented.  To prevent inaccuracy of 
terms the concept of “acceptability” was introduced.  Acceptability refers to the (affirmative) attitude 
towards a specific object.  Therefore it is more hypothetical, whereas “acceptance” is related to some 
kind of behaviour as an (re-) action towards an object.   Attitudes are relevant before the measure is 
introduced, i.e. when people are unfamiliar with the proposed concepts.  When the measure is 
introduced, there is the assumption that the previous attitudes, among other things, guide peoples´ 
behaviour.  In this investigation we will concentrate on attitudes and hence on “acceptability”.  
 
Within the heuristic model of acceptability by Schlag et al. (1998) several factors have been identified 
which contribute to the acceptability of transport pricing measures.  For the evaluation of such pricing 
systems the most relevant issues of acceptability seem to be:  
 
 
¾ Problem perception 
¾ Personal Goals 
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¾ Perceived effectiveness 
¾ Perceived fairness  
¾ Social norms. 
The perception of traffic-related problems is a necessary precondition for regarding problem-solving 
measures as important (Steg & Vlek, 1997).  It is assumed that high problem awareness will lead to 
increased willingness to accept solutions for the perceived problems.  
 
There are different general aims connected to transport pricing measures (e.g. financial aims, 
ecological aims, demand management, etc.).  On the other hand, travellers as well as others pursue 
certain mobility aims.  The potential conflict between these perhaps different aims is crucial for the 
question of acceptability.  The problem is that, in principle, a large number of competitive aims and 
interests are imaginable.  Derived from the concept of “social dilemma” social vs. personal aims are 
distinguished (Dawes, 1980). In the case of road pricing it is to be expected that a higher valuation of 
common social aims will be positively related to acceptability of the charge, while pursuing personal 
and gain maximising aims may lead to a rejection of road pricing, because of a threatening restriction 
of personally important aims (cf. Jaensirisak, 2001; Schade & Schlag, 2000). 
 
If someone recognises traffic problems and their consequences (problem perception), and identifies at 
least in part the aims of changing these problems (reducing traffic congestion, declining environmental 
damage, etc.), he or she has to answer the crucial question, of whether the proposed measures are of 
appropriate effectiveness.  Effectiveness refers to the degree to which the aims of the measure can be 
reached.  Lower scores in perceived effectiveness usually correlate with lower acceptability of the 
particular measure and vice versa.  Unfortunately, the factors defining the direction of this relationship 
are not yet known (cf. Bartley, 1995). 
 
When discussing the introduction of road pricing measures, arguments often arise which question the 
fairness of such a system (Teubel, 2000).  From a psychological point of view, perceived justice or 
fairness are important prerequisites of acceptability.  Justice, as people perceive it, may differ from 
objective distribution of costs and benefits but surely depends on it as one major parameter influencing 
personal perceptions.  And, as with most personally mediated perceptions, it differs not only between 
different situations (intra-individual variance) but also between people in the same situation and even 
between people with comparable objective costs and benefits (inter-individual variance).  Therefore, in 
addition to rational cost–benefit calculations, additional variables influencing the personal cost–benefit 
ratio must be taken into account.  If fairness is tentatively operationalised as personal outcome 
expectations (cf. Viegas, 2001), it is expected that the more people/respondents perceive advantages 
following the introduction of transport infrastructure use charges, the more they will be willing to accept 
it.  
 
Perceived social norms and perceived social pressure refer to perceived opinions of significant others 
(family, friends) multiplied by the importance of the others´ opinions for the individual (cf. Ajzen, 1991).  
More precisely, social norms refer to the respondent’s assumption about whether his significant others 
would think that he should accept the strategy.  These normative beliefs are concerned with the 
likelihood that important referent individuals or groups approve of performing a given behaviour.  Thus, 
the more favourable the perceived social norm is with respect to a presented pricing strategy, the 
more acceptable should the strategy be to that individual. 
 
The influence of acceptability on user reactions on prices will become even more important in the near 
future, when people will have access to electronic assistance systems which will be able to calculate 
even the most highly differentiated prices.  In this case, user reactions will be less determined by 
restrictions in cognitive capacity, but even more by the attitude towards the price- and assistance 
systems including issues such as fairness, trust or social norms. 
 
As described above, acceptability is strongly related to the willingness of users to deal with 
differentiated pricing systems.  The complexity of such a charging system has an impact on user 
engagement and therefore on user reaction.  
 
Bonsall et al. (2006) found out that a significant proportion of consumers 'disengage', if they perceive 
cost structures to be too complex.  This disengagement sometimes leads them to delay the decision, 
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avoid purchase, opt for the simplest or least uncertain option (if there are alternatives), or just pay up 
regardless.  The qualitative evidence suggests that a proportion of the population would respond to 
complex road charges by disengaging.  This disengagement will sometimes take the form of paying 
the charge irrespective of its size, and sometimes deciding to adopt an option which avoids exposure 
to the charge.  This could have profound implications for the performance of road pricing schemes and 
for the structure of models used to predict behavioural responses.  
 
Personal and situational factors 
 
Inter-individual differences in the ability of dealing with complex information are due in part to cognitive 
abilities, but the user’s age, gender and education have to be taken into account when analysing 
consumer reaction on differentiated prices.  Concerning elasticities it is often claimed that travellers 
with higher incomes tend to be less price sensitive than lower-income travellers (for example, Litman 
(2006) states that real income as well as age have a positive and statistically significant effect on 
mileage).  However, income does not seem to affect the effort a person is willing to take to estimate 
costs of a trip (Bonsall et al., 2006).  Qualitative research by Bonsall et al. (2006) has suggested that 
there are a number of “behavioural types” with different attitudes, preferences and behaviours, which 
are reflected via gender more than income.  This is a very interesting result.  In interviews the 
existence of three personality types was discussed: "determined/confident", "cautious", and "trusting".  
'Determined/Confident' people always try to get the best deal by spending time looking at different 
options and exploiting the opportunities provided by complex or highly differentiated price structures.  
'Cautious' people wanted a good deal, but were not able or not prepared to spend time ensuring they 
got one.  They might shop around to an extent, but go for something simple, because they were put off 
by complexity.  'Trusting' people took what was on offer, because they did not feel they could assess 
what was available or did not feel it was worth the effort.  Some of these respondents characterised 
themselves as 'lazy', whilst others lacked confidence in their ability to judge deals.  As mentioned 
before the distribution of the three types seems to be related to gender.  Males were more likely to 
want to get the best deal, whereas females were more likely to be happy to take things on trust.  But 
there was no effect for income.  In psychological research, income is often seen as being related to 
acceptability, but Schade (2005) found no direct impact of income on acceptability.  The desired level 
of awareness of expenditure varies between people of different income, gender and age and 
differences also exist regarding the preferred payment method.   
 
Peoples´ ability to understand complex pricing systems depends further on situational aspects such as 
the time available to deal with relevant information.  If people are pressed for time when trying to find 
out an optimal decision on mobility behaviour regarding the price and their aims, they will have 
difficulties to process all relevant information to make a good choice.  In this case they tend to use 
heuristics again.  Another very important situational aspect is the type of the intended journey as trips 
range in their value; emergency-, commuting- or major shopping-trips are higher-value trips and 
therefore inflexible even when conditions change.   
 
3.2.2 AVAILABLE EVIDENCE 
 
Most organisations responsible for the supply of services recognise that they can operate more 
efficiently, if they can influence the pattern of demand to match their ability to supply the service.  The 
use of price differentiation is an obvious means to achieve this end.  Thus the use of peak premiums, 
or off-peak discounts, is long established in the electricity supply, telecommunications and public 
transport industries.  As in the case of road pricing, theory would suggest that dynamic variations in 
price might be used to fine-tune the demand hour by hour and even minute by minute and, at least in 
the case of telecommunications, there is no technical reason why this should not be done.  And yet, 
most pricing regimes are relatively simple and there are few, if any, examples of fully dynamic pricing. 
Indeed there is distinct trend, notably in the mobile phone and internet markets, towards customers 
being offered a completely unmetered service where a single lump-sum payment buys unlimited 
access at any time of day or night.   
 
Research (Nahata et al, 1999; Szabo,1999) suggests that the additional effort required of the 
consumer to calculate prices is treated by them as a “transaction cost” and that this may explain the 
popularity of fixed charges in lieu of usage pricing in a wide variety of markets (buffet meals, local 
telephone service in the US, flat fares throughout the New York City and Moscow subway systems, 
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the Eurail pass, employer-provided family health care premiums that are independent of family size 
and amount consumed, Disneyland entry fees). 
 
Examples from the telecommunications and utilities sectors 
 
Most suppliers of phone and internet services seem to have concluded that the ability to influence the 
pattern of demand over time can be an unaffordable luxury in a competitive market.  Customers have 
a preference for simple price structures, or perhaps more accurately, for predictable expenditures, and 
market share is gained by those prepared to offer this.  Exceptional decisions, such as that by AOL in 
the 1990s, to withdraw, or not to offer, fixed-price packages generally reflect operational problems 
caused by excessive peak-time consumption rather than an assessment that they are not popular with 
customers (Nahata et al, 1999;  Odlyzko, 2001). 
 
The fact that a supplier may offer a wide range of tariff options is not necessarily inconsistent with their 
perception of a general preference for simple structures or predictable prices (AARP Research, 2004 ; 
Glazer et al, 2001) – rather it reflects the recognition that different types of user will prefer different 
price and service packages reflecting their personal pattern of consumption or their personal 
preference for fixed versus variable prices.  It is interesting to note, however, that although some 
suppliers, particularly those who already have a large market share, emphasise in their marketing 
material that customers can choose the package that most suits them, others, particularly new 
entrants, offer a single simple tariff and emphasise this simplicity in their marketing material.  These 
organisations have clearly recognised that customers are generally put off by the prospect of complex 
tariff structures.  
 
Research within the telecommunications industries has suggested that customers are rarely very 
accurate in their estimate of call charges – often overestimating the price of a given call by up to a 
factor of three (Ovum, 1998).  The research also reveals that many, if not most, customers are not 
sure which tariff would be most advantageous to them and that a substantial minority have consciously 
chosen to opt for simplicity while recognising that they might not be getting the cheapest deal (FDS 
International Ltd, 2001).  A significant number of mobile phone users apparently tend to rely on word 
of mouth rather than thorough analysis when choosing a tariff package.  The decision to think about 
changing from one package to another tends to be triggered by some external factor, most usually the 
need to buy a new handset, rather than by something specifically to do with the price (Gutteridge, 
2004). 
 
Similarly, within the utility sectors there is a tendency for a significant number of customers to remain 
with the supplier they have always had and not switch despite wide publicity for the benefits of 
switching.  One reason for this behaviour is that people find it hard to understand the differences in 
tariffs charged by different companies and, even if they could understand them, they are unwilling to 
spend the time making the necessary comparative calculations (OFGEM, 2001a).  This behaviour is 
again consistent with the notion that their choices are conditioned by search costs or transaction costs. 
 
Examples from the Public Transport sector 
 
The public’s general preference for simplicity and predictability of prices clearly limits the extent to 
which, in a competitive market such as telecommunication, suppliers can seek to use variable prices 
to influence the pattern of demand.  But what of the transport sector, where suppliers may have a 
virtual monopoly? 
 
Two high-profile attempts to introduce variable pricing in the transport sector were defeated by 
adverse public opinion; the capacity related  discounts and advance booking incentives introduced by 
the German rail operator Deutsche Bahn in 2003, and the yield management pricing introduced by the 
French rail operator SNCF.  Public objection was in each case based on the supposed unfairness of 
the new pricing regime and its failure to achieve its stated objectives (Seidel et al, 2004).  It was 
suggested that the complexity of the pricing structure and uncertainty as to the availability of tickets 
made it difficult or impossible for would-be travellers to plan their journeys effectively.  This complaint 
was broadened to include wider accusations of management failure (Deutsche Bahn’s supposed 
failure to operate its trains to timetable, and SNCF’s problems with its booking software which led to 
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spectacular own goals such as the widely publicised occasion on which a train was sent out empty 
because no tickets had been sold due to a glitch in the software) (Rothengatter, 2004).  
  
The problem of perceived unfairness is strongly related to public acceptability.  Acceptability is an 
important precondition for the successful implementation of pricing strategies.  However, empirical 
findings have shown that the acceptability of such strategies is low.  Until now economists have been 
looking for reasons for this refusal by analysing first of all socio-economic characteristics of the drivers 
concerned.  But it is doubtful whether these alone have high explanatory value.  Based on a heuristic 
acceptability model, different determinants of the acceptability of road pricing strategies are identified 
and analysed in more detail.  Concerning the factors influencing the degree of acceptability the 
analyses showed that in particular the variables “social norm”, “personal outcome expectations” and 
the “perceived effectiveness” are positively related to the acceptability of pricing strategies.  These 
variables account for nearly 40% of the criterion variance and thus can explain acceptability of such 
measures much better than the socio-economic variables included (Schade & Schlag, 2003).  Schade 
(2005) has shown a clear correlation between acceptability and the different traffic-related behavioural 
intentions, but further research is necessary to make clear predictions of behaviour related to 
acceptability. 
 
The accusation of unfairness in the SNCF and Deutsche Bahn cases is interesting, because it has not 
featured in the discussion of peak pricing in the telecommunications or utilities industries.  The concept 
of fairness does not seem to arise in the context of competitive markets, presumably because the 
public know that they can always change their supplier, but it is interesting that peak/off peak 
differentials in tariffs set by monopolistic suppliers of telecommunications or electricity services have 
not, apparently, let to accusations of unfairness.  Perhaps the key question is whether the peak/off 
peak differential was perceived as an off-peak discount or a peak surcharge.  In the two transport 
examples quoted above, it seems that the differentiation was seen as an unfair penalty on those who 
were unable to book ahead or avoid using the peak rate services.  This point has obvious implications 
for the introduction of congestion-related charges for road use. 
 
It seems that, in the two rail examples quoted above, the accusation of unfairness was linked in some 
way to the question of complexity – that it was unreasonable to expect travellers to be able to work out 
when to travel, what type of ticket to purchase, or which service to use so as to avoid the perceived 
price penalties.   This complaint about complexity is echoed in the frequent criticism of rail ticket 
pricing in the UK - two thirds of the individual customers consulted recently as part of the Strategic Rail 
Authority’s policy consultation on fare structures in the UK rail industry said that fare complexity was a 
major problem (SRA, 2003).  Some potential customers are apparently so concerned that they do not 
know how to secure the best deal, or avoid paying more than need to, that they avoid using the mode 
at all.  Even though some of the behaviour may be misconstrued – it may be that the complexity of the 
fares is quoted, post hoc, as an excuse for not travelling by train, rather than being a real cause of the 
behaviour – it is clear that, for some people at least, the complexity of the fares makes the service less 
attractive than it otherwise would be.  As in the case of the people who opt for simple 
telecommunication tariffs even when they could save money by doing otherwise, it seems that price 
complicity is adding a transaction cost (or disutility). 
 
The apparent success of Virgin Trains’ new ticket pricing policy is interesting in this context; customers 
have apparently welcomed the company’s simplification of the fare structure by designating different 
services as peak or off peak and removing the former complication (which is still prevalent in rail 
pricing practice elsewhere in the UK) whereby the price of one leg of a journey depended on whether it 
was part of a return journey and, if so, when that return journey might be made (Cavanagh, 2004). 
 
The approach to pricing of airline tickets is perhaps unique in the transport sector; the price of these 
tickets can change, without warning, from one minute to the next and the customers cannot be sure of 
the price until they purchase their ticket.  Uncertainty of this sort might be thought inappropriate in the 
context of international travel and yet the public do not complain – indeed they seem happy with the 
thought that they are getting a good deal, even if the price is not at its lowest.  They seem to 
understand that the prices will be higher when the demand is high and that, unless they book well in 
advance and avoid the most popular services, they are unlikely to get the keenest prices.  It appears 
that the negative connotations of uncertainty in prices is offset, or perhaps does not even apply, when 
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the prices on offer are very attractive or when it is relatively easy, in this case via the internet, to 
access information about the current price of a given service. 
 
The use of time-of-day pricing via off-peak fares is now the norm in public transport in the UK and is 
broadly accepted by passengers. However, the US experience of time-of-day pricing in the bus 
industry has been disappointing; thirty-three US transit agencies introduced time of day pricing 
between 1970 and 1983 but, within a few years, only three of these had increased the differential, 
nineteen had allowed inflation to reduce the real value of the differential and eleven had been 
discontinued.  The main reasons for abandonment were, apparently, loss of revenue, fare disputes 
and failure to achieve the hoped-for shift in demand into the off-peak (Cervero, 1984; Glazer et al, 
2001).  
 
The cost of using metered taxis, which are generally considered to be a form of public transport, is 
interesting in the current context, because the precise cost of the ride is not known to the customer at 
the point at which they commit to making the journey.  The actual cost may depend on the distance 
and the time taken, (which will depend on the route taken by the driver and the conditions met on that 
route) and may vary according to the time of day or night, whether particular administrative boundaries 
are crossed and whether “extras”, such as a charge for carriage of luggage, are added.  Unsurprisingly 
perhaps, previous research suggests that, except in the case of regular journeys, most people have 
only a very approximate idea of what a taxi journey is likely to cost them (Toner, 2004).  Although this 
uncertainty dissuades some potential passengers, others seem content to trust that the cost will be 
within reasonable limits and are prepared to commit to the expenditure without knowing what it will be. 
 
Examples of tolls and charges applied to motorists 
 
Thus far, evidence has been drawn from sectors other than private motoring, but this sector does, of 
course, provide several examples worldwide of prices which vary over time and which some people 
might regard as unpredictable.  Two interesting examples come from Singapore.  The first is the road 
user charge levied electronically on vehicles using the central area (Chin, 2002).  This charge varies 
by time of day and, with up to 12 separate charge bands between 0730 and 0930, is significantly more 
variable than that which had been applied during the previous, low-tech, area licensing scheme.  Prior 
to its implementation, there was a concern that this degree of variation would lead to confusion but, 
after a short period during which people became accustomed to the fact that they would need to make 
sure their watches were showing the right time, the public response to the new system has been 
favourable.  The public also seem to accept, perhaps even to welcome, the fact that the tariff rates 
and differentials are subject to periodic review in the light of changes in the pattern of congestion.   
 
The other example from Singapore is the pricing of vehicle registration permits.  The price of these 
permits, which effectively control the number of vehicles in use on Singapore’s roads, reflects current 
supply and demand – the government determines the monthly supply (n) in the light of recent 
congestion data and people wanting a permit indicate the maximum they are prepared to pay – the 
actual price is then determined by the nth highest bid.  Thus a would-be car owner is faced with 
uncertainty as to whether he will get a permit at all and about the price he will have to pay.  Despite 
these uncertainties the system has apparently been accepted by the Singaporeans as fair, logical and 
necessary (Chin, 2004).  But the question is how it might be received in a country less used to strong 
government intervention in the citizens’ day to day business. 
 
The introduction of peak period surcharges on motorway tolls in France and the US provides some 
very interesting case studies.  In 1996 the French motorway concessionaire, Cofiroute, introduced 
time-differentiated tolls on its motorways near Paris.  The charge structure, which was designed to 
help spread the peak post-weekend flow of traffic back into Paris, included four different time bands 
between 1300 on Sundays and 1300 on Mondays.  The system was not liked by the public who 
regarded it as unfair, ineffective and unnecessarily complicated.  The accusation of complexity was 
made even though there were only four time bands (Mesqui, 2004).  The scheme was withdrawn 
following public protests and a concern about behavioural responses on the feeder roads (excessive 
speeding by drivers seeking to get there before rate increases and cluttering up of toll plazas by 
drivers waiting for cheaper rate periods to begin).  A simpler scheme, introduced by a different 
concessionaire, which is implemented on the A1 and A26 motorways to the North East of Paris on 
days when particularly heavy congestion is forecast, has not stirred such antagonism. 
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Holguin-Veras et al (2005) report that a third of truckers who regularly use the New York New Jersey 
Port Authority’s toll facilities were unaware that there were any discounts for off-peak usage and only 
2% were aware of the discount for night time usage. We do not know whether this ignorance was due 
to poor publicity or a lack of interest by the truckers; and even if it is down to the truckers, we do not 
know whether their lack of interest reflects a disinclination to think about differential charges or a 
rational conviction that their usage of the toll facility is so time-constrained that discounts for usage at 
other times of day would be of no possible relevance to them.  Nevertheless, it is clear that part of the 
reason for the failure of differential pricing to achieve behavioural change may be that, for one reason 
or another, the existence of discounts may not be widely known.    
 
The US experience of value pricing and HOT (High Occupancy Toll) lanes suggests that, if differential 
charges can yield more reliable journey times, the existence of time-varying charges is not a serious 
issue for individual motorists.  Although there are several examples of peak period charges the two 
most interesting case studies are from California: the I-15 in San Diego (Supernak et al, 2001) and the 
SR91 in Orange County (Sullivan, 2000).   
 
The I-15 HOT lane was introduced in 1996 as two tidal toll lanes running alongside an existing toll-free 
highway.  Since 1998 the tolls have been varied dynamically in the light of the expected level of 
congestion (being kept just high enough to dissuade sufficient users to ensure that the HOT lanes are 
kept congestion free).  Current tolls are clearly posted so that people can make an informed choice 
before deciding to enter the lane and, although the toll might change again before the motorist has left 
the lane, the lower rate will be charged.  Although the tariffs are variable (changing as often as every 6 
minutes) and unpredictable from one day to the next, and although the aim of a congestion-free 
journey is not always achieved, the scheme has been welcomed by motorists and its success has led 
to it being extended to 4 lanes over 22 miles.  The unpredictability of HOT lane charges (and the 
complexity of the underlying formula) have not attracted widespread opposition from private motorists 
since the scheme was launched, and it is suggested that the fact that the individual driver has a choice 
(to continue in the all-vehicle lane) has been an important factor in defusing criticism (Sullivan, 2001; 
Supernak et al, 2001;  Wilbur Smith Associates, 2002; Eliasson and Lundberg, 2003 and Lindsey, 
2003).  The scheme organisers do, however, receive a lot of complaints, if the billing system makes a 
mistake or if the expected level of service in the HOT lane fails to be provided (e.g. if, due to a system 
failure, the price is set too low or if drivers have been charged and then see traffic flowing quite freely 
on the parallel freeway) (Supernak, 2004).  Interestingly, there is evidence that drivers have come to 
associate high prices in the toll lanes with congestion on the parallel-running highway and that some 
drivers are choosing to use the toll lanes only when their price is high (Barton, 2004); this is a logical 
response by drivers who have a particular aversion to delays and congestion but must complicate the 
calibration of price elasticity curves.  Another interesting result is that, in contrast to private motorists, 
some businesses do not welcome the uncertainty of their monthly bill for HOT lane usage and express 
a preference for the previous system of fixed charge peak-period passes (Supernak, 2004; Sullivan, 
2004).  This difference in attitude may reflect the fact that businesses cannot control their exposure to 
HOT lane charges as readily as individual motorists. 
 
The SR91 HOT lanes opened in 1995 as a privately built and operational HOT lane facility comprising 
4 lanes for transponder-equipped vehicles in the median of an existing 8 lane highway (Sullivan, 
2001).  The tolls vary according to a pre-published schedule which currently has up to 11 different 
charge bands on a single day.  This level of complexity has been phased in as the operators, with 
experience, learned how to fine tune the demand and is apparently quite readily accepted by those 
who use the lanes (Sullivan, 2004).  Any antipathy towards the complexity of the tariff schedule is 
apparently offset by the fact that the toll lanes offer a good level of service even during peak periods 
and that, ultimately, the motorist can choose whether or not to pay for that service (Sullivan, 2001). 
 
3.3 CONCLUSION 
It is clear that people do not always react “rationally” to complex prices.  Although there are examples 
where people show an ability to understand moderately complex pricing signals, they appear to have a 
general preference for simple and predictable prices and there are also many examples where they 
even appear unwilling or unable to engage with pricing signals that are only moderately complex.  
Work within DIFFERENT will need to focus on the circumstances and factors which affect peoples´ 
 DELIVERABLE 2.1
 
Date: 18/1/2007 Deliverable 2.1                                                  Page  
 
  37
ability and or willingness to engage with differentiated pricing of the kind which might theoretically be 
beneficial in the transport sector. 
 
The degree of differentiation implied by first–best pricing may prove to be too complex for people to 
deal with and behavioural adaptation to differentiated prices is likely to be constrained by cognitive, 
motivational, personal or situational factors. The most important questions are:  
 
¾ Up to what degree of complexity, and in what circumstances, are people able and willing to 
understand and to respond to differentiated charging structures?   
¾ What psychological factors determine the relationship between price differentiation and user 
reaction?   
 
A first theoretical approach regarding this is illustrated in Figure 3-3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-3: Relationship between behavioural adaptation and price differentiation 
A non-linear relationship between the effectiveness of a pricing system (the degree of behavioural 
adaptation) and the price differentiation is assumed. There is a point, beyond which, the more 
differentiated and complex a price structure, the less behavioural adaptation will occur. This 
relationship is in line with the effort people are ready to expend dealing with the new pricing system 
and is influenced by cognitive, motivational and situational factors.   
 
Evidence so far suggests the cognitive capacities of individuals and the acceptability of the pricing 
regime play particularly important roles, because they constrain the ability as well as the willingness to 
process complex information on highly differentiated pricing systems.  
 
Within the DIFFERENT project this theoretical approach and the related questions shall be addressed 
by analysing theoretical and empirical knowledge concerning the identified psychological factors which 
may have an impact on user reaction towards differentiated pricing.  This theoretical analysis shall 
lead to the formulation of hypotheses about peoples´ respond to complex pricing systems. As there is 
very little empirical evidence, and since much of that which exists is controversial, it will be quite 
difficult to compose clear hypotheses on every aspect. It is therefore necessary to prioritise research 
questions to be explored within the DIFFERENT project.  The analysis of case studies and/or the 
implementation of small experiments will clearly be required to allow an empirical analysis of the 
theoretical approach. 
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4 EXISTING CHARGING STRUCTURES 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
The present chapter reviews charge differentiation criteria currently in use for transport infrastructure.  
The aim is twofold: 
1. to provide an overview of existing charging differentiation criteria across Europe, whose 
application is currently under way without considering hypothesis of future changes in their 
structure and fields of implementation; 
2. to give insights about past changes and possible developments in infrastructure charging 
practices. 
 
The review covers all four modes: road, rail, air and maritime transport.  For road transport, a further 
distinction is made between motorways and urban roads.  There are also cases where user charges 
are levied on roads outside urban areas other than motorways, mainly in the form of bridge or tunnel 
tolls, and in the special case of Switzerland through a national network-wide charging scheme’ but, in 
accordance with the DIFFERENT work programme, these roads fall outside the scope of this project. 
 
The geographical scope of the review covers the EU 27 level (the 25 Member States + Norway and 
Switzerland).  There is an intrinsic difficulty in providing a summary of charging practices at country 
level, because charges may differ internally according to specific site characteristics, e.g. a given type 
of urban area, port, or specific stretch of network etc.  In order to avoid an excessive level of detail, the 
focus is on the “representative” charging practice by each type of infrastructure in a given country, to 
be understood as the most frequent or common charging scheme applied in a given context.   
 
The number and the complexity of parameters represent the key factors for assessing the degree of 
differentiation of a given charging scheme.  In principle, the presence of more parameters related to a 
given criteria is in itself an indication of higher differentiation.  For each type of infrastructure, the 
subchapters 4.2.1- 4.2.5 discuss some basic issues like charge description, level of implementation, 
institutional background and underlying principles.  
 
Table 4.6 summarises the charging differentiation criteria.  They have been marked in bold characters, 
followed by the related parameters, when available.  The distinction between criteria and parameters 
is important to the extent that a given charging criteria, e.g. a landing charge for airport infrastructure 
use or a user charges for goods vehicles > 12 t for road infrastructure use, may be further specified 
through different parameters, e.g. the maximum take-off weight and/or the night time surcharge for 
airport, and the emission classes and/or vehicle number of axis for road. 
 
Section 4.3 draws some conclusions about trends, patterns and future development. 
 
4.2 CURRENT SITUATION BY TYPE OF INFRASTRUCTURE  
4.2.1 MOTORWAYS 
Current practice in price differentiation is reviewed with reference to the two basic options to build, 
operate and finance motorways in Europe: 
1. to establish concessions and to rely on tolls, and  
2. to rely on taxation/public budgets and have the national motorway system administrated as a 
whole by a state owned enterprise.  
 
In motorway concession regimes, all vehicles categories are subject to distance based charges.  Toll 
rates are determined to contribute to finance the total cost, including investment and return on 
investment for the concessionaire.  Tolls are currently levied on some 20.000 km of motorway 
networks mainly located in Southern Europe.  Countries that historically relied on toll collection to fund 
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motorway development include France, Italy, Portugal and Spain.  More recently, also Greece, Croatia 
and Slovenia have chosen to levy tolls to fund the development of their national motorway networks.  
In closed tolled motorway links, each vehicle is identified (either visually or electronically) as it passes 
trough a toll plaza and then charged (either manually or electronically) as a function of vehicle 
attribute, distance between entry and exit plazas.  On the European tolled motorways, the average 
proportion of revenue generated by cars and Heavy Goods Vehicles (HGV) is 80% and 20% 
respectively.  In countries where different motorway links are operated by several concessionaires - as 
in Italy (25) or France (14) – inter-company remote payment procedures have progressively developed 
on a national basis (TELEPASS in Italy, T.I.S. in France and Via Verde in Portugal) to enable 
motorway users to pay without requiring vehicles to stop using the same payment means regardless 
which company is operating the link and what charges are levied.  At European level, positions and 
interests of tolled motorway concessionaires (114 organisations in 14 countries) are represented by 
ASECAP. 
 
Since 1995, in most European countries whose motorway development has been traditionally funded 
through public budgets, the purchase of a permit (vignette) has been made mandatory for both 
domestic and international vehicles “having a maximum permissible gross laden weight of no less than 
12 tonnes”. So far, only Austria and Germany have joined Switzerland in the decision of levying 
infrastructure charges on heavy vehicles as a function of mileage performed on the national motorway 
system (all interurban roads in Switzerland), while maintaining other fiscal instruments for cars: 
taxation on fuel and time based user charges (vignette).  In all the three countries, a new generation of 
Electronic Fee Collection systems (EFC) has been implemented to levy distance based charges 
without requiring vehicles to stop, as well as to recognise different vehicle attributes. 
 
The European Community framework for motorway tolling in Europe 
 
At European level, rules for road infrastructure charges in both types of context are specified in 
Directive 2006/38/EC, which amends the 1999 ‘Eurovignette’ Directive 1999/62/EC.  The new regime 
allows (but not obliges) the Member States to levy user charges or tolls on the entire road network and 
set the rules for price for vehicles over 3,5 t on the TEN-R network. 
 
The so-called ‘Eurovignette’ Directive was adopted in the year 1999 to complement the creation of a 
single market for road haulage with a framework to harmonise fixed taxes and infrastructure fees 
levied in various countries. While ruling that tolls and user charges6 may not discriminate on the 
ground of nationality of the haulier or origin/destination of the vehicle, the Directive specifies: 
 
¾ the type of network – motorway or dual carriageway roads specially designed and built for motor 
traffic – where tolls can be levied on all motorised vehicles and user charges can be levied on 
good vehicles that are registered in a different country than the one where the trip is undertaken;  
¾ criteria for determining tolls i.e. the payment of a specific amount for a vehicle travelling the 
distance between two points of the infrastructure.  
 
The EU regulation specifies criteria for toll determination that are financial in nature (cost recovery).  In 
particular, it specifies that the weighted average toll shall be related to the cost of constructing, 
operating and developing the infrastructure network concerned.  The weighted average toll may also 
include a return on capital or profit margin based on market conditions.  In the absence of a 
Community framework for tolled motorway concessions, the notion of weighted average tolls is a 
rather broad umbrella for the variety of approaches used in different Member States to determine tolls.  
 
As recently amended (Directive 2006/38/EC), Community regulation for motorway charges covers 
both the definition of tolls and the range for their differentiation.  The amount of tolls shall be based on 
distance travelled between two points on the infrastructure and the type of vehicle classified by: 
 
¾ weight (<3,5 t; >3,5 t and <12 t; >12t); 
                                                     
6   ‘Toll’ means a specified amount payable for a vehicle travelling a given distance on a section for infrastructure 
and the amount is based on the distance travelled. ‘User Charge’ means when the payment confers the right 
for a vehicle to use the infrastructure for a given period time. 
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¾ number of axles (2, 3, 4 or more); 
¾ dimension; 
¾ damage caused to road infrastructure (Annex IV Directive 2006/38/EC); 
¾ Class of emission (EURO 0; EURO I; EURO II; EURO III; EURO IV and less polluting). 
 
Without prejudice to the weighted average tolls, tolls can be varied in accordance to vehicle’s emission 
standard and period of the day provided that the toll is not more than  
 
¾ 100% (it was 50% in the previous Directive 1999/62) above the toll charged for equivalent 
vehicles with the strictest emission standard; 
¾ 100% above the toll charged during the cheapest period of the day. 
 
In either case, fine tuning of tolls must be proportional to the objective such measures aim to achieve. 
In adoption of the principle of subsidiarity, provisions of Directive 1999/62 were already specifying that 
the Directive “shall not prevent” a Member State from 
 
¾ extending tolls and users charges to other sections of the primary road network where there are 
safety reasons for doing so or in the absence of a coherent network of dual motorway/dual 
carriageway; 
¾ applying regulatory charges specifically designed to combat time and place related congestion; 
¾ attributing a percentage of revenue from tolls and access charges to environmental .protection 
and balanced development of transport networks. 
 
The revision of the ‘Eurovignette’ Directive has been prepared during a two years’ negotiation process. 
The old directive was updated with the twofold aim of creating a uniform platform for motorway tolling 
in the EU and giving further incentives to improve capacity use and environmental performance in the 
road transport sector.  In addition to the reduction of the minimum weight from 12,5 to 3,5 tonnes, 
main changes introduced by Directive 2006/38/EC make reference to the calculation of infrastructure 
costs and to their possible differentiation. 
 
1. Stricter rules for the calculation of infrastructure costs and their allocation to vehicle 
categories. The benchmark of pricing is the weighted average costs of the infrastructure, where 
costs include capital costs (depreciation and interest on capital), structural repair and current costs 
of operation and maintenance. Calculation of capital costs is only allowed for new infrastructure 
(age less than 30 years); exceptions from this rule have to be demonstrated by the Member 
States.  Calculation of tolls shall be based on actual or forecast heavy good vehicles’ share of 
vehicles/km adjusted.  If they are based on forecasts, mechanisms must be provided to correct 
any under or over recovery of costs due to forecasting errors.  For new concession companies 
(i.e. companies established after the transposition of the Directive), the maximum level of toll shall 
be equivalent to the level that would have resulted from the use of a methodology based on core 
calculation principles of the Directive.  Tolling arrangements already in place shall not be subject 
to the obligations set out in the Directive for as long as these arrangements remain in force and 
provided that they are not substantially modified  
2. Toll differentiation. For infrastructure in mountainous regions a mark-up may be added to the toll 
of specific road sections, which are subject to either acute congestion affecting the movement of 
vehicles, or the use of which by vehicles is the cause of environmental damage.  The mark-up 
may not exceed 25%.  Discounts may be given to frequent users, not exceeding 12% of the 
standard toll.  Unjustified disadvantages to non-regular users should be avoided. 
 
National practice in toll determination and differentiation 
 
Waiting for the transposition of amendments to Directive 1999/62/EC, Member States acted in various 
manners.  On 1 January 2004, Austria introduced the ‘LKW-Maut’, a tolling system for >3,5t vehicles, 
based on DSRC technology, whose fees differentiated by number of axles.  The system covers the 
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entire motorway network and other roads.  A similar situation exists in Germany, which introduced 
‘LKW-Maut’ on 1 January 2005, but only for motorways, for vehicles >12 t, and based on GPS-GPRS 
technology; German fees are determined by emission class and number of axles.  
 
Other countries like Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and Sweden operate a 
Eurovignette system (user charge) differentiated by number of axles and emission class.  In Great 
Britain, differentiation in prices is based on the time of day: on the M6 the day toll (06:00-23:00) is 
different to the night one (23:00-06:00).  In the ASECAP (http://www.asecap.com) countries like 
France, Spain, Greece, Italy and Portugal, parts of the motorway network are tolled for all vehicles, 
and the criterion of differentiation is the number of axles.  Cars are included in only one class (number 
of axles=1). 
 
Appendix 1 reports the situation of Member States with reference to existing status, planned 
interventions, additional opportunities allowed by Directive (the data are drawn from “A Price Worth 
Paying - A guide to the new EU rules for road tolls for lorries” T&E 06/1 published by the European 
Federation for Transport and the Environment). 
 
4.2.2 URBAN ROADS 
The review of differentiation criteria of urban road charges is based on charges actually implemented, 
without reference to demonstrations and experiments whose definitive implementation at large scale is 
still uncertain or delayed.  For example, a long series of past and on-going RTD European projects, 
e.g. CURAÇAO, CIVITAS, CUPID, PROGRESS, EUROPRICE, etc,  have involved a network of cities 
running several demonstrations of urban charging schemes, e.g. cordon/distance charges in Genoa, 
Bristol, Helsinki, Gothenburg, etc, but their full integration in urban policies is still not under way.  
Hence, results and insights from such projects have not been included in the present review. 
 
The only exceptions are the city of La Valletta, whose implementation of city area access charges 
scheme, reported in Table 4.6, is planned to be operative in the near future (by January 2007) and the 
city of Milan, whose implementation of the “pollution charge” will start in February 2007 as an 
experimental phase, and from October 2007 as a permanent measure. 
 
The following types of charging schemes are the ones relevant in the urban context: 
1. Access charges (access charges and cordon charges), regulating the access to urban areas or 
particular zones - usually city inner areas; and Area charges, in which people not subjected to 
exemptions are charged for driving inside a specific area, including residents (even if subjected to 
substantial discounts as in London);  
2. Parking charges, i.e. charging for the use of urban public spaces, widely adopted in Europe (in 
practice all the major urban areas use forms of parking charges schemes); 
3. Charges for the use of public transport in the form of buses and trams, as well as off-road systems 
in the form of metros and sub-urban trains;  
4. Premiums for car insurance, which in more recent schemes relate directly to infrastructure usage. 
 
Table 4.6 only lists the first type of schemes, since charges for parking and public transport do not 
show marked differences between different European countries.  Similarly, the advanced car 
insurance schemes - as far as they exist yet - do not differ much from each other.  
 
Access and area charges 
 
The most prominent of all urban charging systems worldwide is probably the one in Singapore, which 
developed through several stages from a simple flat-rate paper permit system to one that now 
changes in half-hourly intervals.    
 
Within Europe (Table 4.1), urban road user charging was spearheaded by the Norwegian cities, 
starting with Bergen, Oslo and Trondheim, which were later followed by Kristiansand, Stavanger, 
Namsos and Tønsberg; Tromsø with its introduction of a petrol tax is a special case that could only be 
employed where an area is remote from other cities (and therefore form other petrol stations).   
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City Type Purpose Differentiation 
Bergen Cordon Road investment 2 vehicle weight classes 
Concession for vehicles with tags 
Initially 16/5 then 24/6 (hours per day / 
days per week) 
Oslo Cordon Initially mainly road investment, 
now only public transport 
2 vehicle weight classes 
24/7 
Trondheim Initially cordon, 
then zonal 
system, then 
added inner city 
cordon, now 
discontinued 
Initially mainly road investment, 
later also public transport and 
traffic management 
2 vehicle weight classes  
Initially 11/5, then 12/5 then 12/7 
Kristiansand Cordon Mainly road investment 2 vehicle weight classes 
24/7 
Stavanger Zonal system Mainly road investment, but 
also public transport, walking 
and cycling 
2 vehicle weight classes  
Concession for vehicles with tags 
Initially 12/5, then 24/7  
Rome Cordon Traffic reduction, better 
enforcement of access control 
Permits available only to selected user 
groups; residents exempt  
6.30 - 18:00 Mon-Fri and 14:00 - 18:00 
Sat in Central Rome; 23:00-  03:00 Fri-
Sat in Trastevere 
Durham Single point 
access 
Environmental improvements 6/6 
London Area charge Congestion reduction, public 
transport investment, improved 
reliability of journey times, 
improved efficiency of distribution 
of goods and services 
Series of exemptions 
Concessions for residents 
11.5/5 
Tromsø Petrol tax First mainly road investment, then 
public transport and environmental 
improvements  
n/a 
Namsos Cordon Road investment Ceiling of number of payments per 
month 
12/5 
Tønsberg Cordon  Traffic calming 2 weight classes 
Concession for vehicles with tags 
24/7 
Milan Access charge Curbing pollutant emissions Vehicle emissions classes 
7:00-18.00 Mon-Fri 
Discounts for residents 
Florence Entry permits Traffic reduction, better 
enforcement of access control 
Daily permits for visitors pre-booked in 
hotels within the zone; annual permits 
at much reduced price available only for 
special user groups 
24/7 
Stockholm Cordon Traffic reduction, environmental 
improvements 
Series of exemptions  
Highly differentiated by time period 
12/5 
Maribor Access charge Traffic reduction, environmental 
improvements 
Type of vehicle (delivery vehicles 
exceeding 3.500 kg, delivery vehicles 
up to 3.500 kg) 
Table 4.1: Overview of Area and Access Charges in Europe 
The rationale behind the first schemes was to raise revenue for road or bridge construction projects 
and, accordingly, there was no need to consider differentiated charges.   Heavy goods vehicles were 
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generally charged higher, and in some cities there is a simple distinction between day (system on) and 
night (system off), while others do not even apply that simple distinction, but charge 24 hours per day, 
seven days per week.   
 
In Norway, as well in the other European countries where urban road user charging was being 
considered, the motivation behind this moved away from infrastructure financing to traffic and 
congestion reduction – hence the re-branding as ‘congestion charge’ - and the resulting improvements 
in environmental conditions.   This then led also to increased considerations of targeting the charge at 
areas, times and special user groups, where charging would be most effective to meet its overall 
objective. 
 
One result of this that in the most recent charging schemes that apply to all traffic, i.e. in London and 
Stockholm, an entire range of vehicles received exemptions for all those user categories that are 
deemed to be desirable (buses, low emission vehicles) or essential for the social and economic 
function of the city (emergency services, public utilities).  Motorbikes are generally exempt, albeit less 
for political reasons rather then practicality, since their number plates are very difficult to recognise 
with electronic means for enforcement purposes. 
 
The Stockholm congestion charge, which went through a full scale trial from 3 January to 31 July 
2006, was the most highly differentiated in Europe yet, since, quite apart from the range of 
exemptions, it varies the level of charge in accordance with the level of traffic in time slots that go as 
low as 30 minutes (Table 4.2).   
 
A referendum on the system’s future was held on 17 September and, although more than 60% of 
Stockholm residents were against the scheme before the start of the trials, a majority of residents 
within the city supported it in the referendum, while a majority of those in the surrounding area voted 
against it.  As a result of the general election held on the same day, the incoming government was a 
coalition of centre-right parties, who had opposed the scheme from the outset; but, to the surprise of 
many, they pledged to go ahead with the full-scale permanent introduction of the scheme, simply due 
to the fact that its effectiveness in terms of traffic reduction had been overwhelming. 
 
 
Time interval Charges (SEK) 
06:30 – 07:00 10 
07:00 – 07.30 15 
07:30 – 08.30 20 
08:30 – 09.00 15 
09:00 – 15:00 10 
15:30 – 16:00 15 
16:00 – 17:30 20 
17:30 – 18:00 15 
18:00 – 18:30 10 
18:30 – 06:30 0 
 
Table 4.2: Tariffs for the Stockholm Congestion Charge  
The urban charging schemes that are running in Italy so far are a hybrid between ‘general’ road user 
charging schemes and mere access control.  Historically, urban pricing in Italy has been associated 
with the institution of ZTL (Zones with Limited Traffic), corresponding to limited areas in historical 
centres in which the access is subjected to a payment for specific vehicle categories (generally freight 
and commercial vehicles). Currently, in Italy there are 93 municipalities with operative ZTL7, but in 
some cases no charge is required with the access to the city centre being only subject to 
administrative permits released by the local municipality police department.  When applied, charges 
                                                     
7  See LEGAMBIENTE (2006) 
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differentiation is related to vehicle pollution classes, e.g. in Milan, type of vehicle, time and day of the 
week. 
 
Parking charges 
 
Parking charges are applied in every single country of the EU27, and generally there is little difference 
between them.  The main differentiation criteria are day of the week (weekday vs Saturday vs 
Sunday), time of day (day vs night) and city area (generally, the more central and convenient, the 
more expensive).  Convenience also often means that on-street parking is more expensive than off-
street parking. 
 
Another differentiation criterion generally adopted in parking charges schemes is the differentiation 
between residents and non-residents, i.e. the set up of ‘Resident Parking Areas’, sometimes also 
referred to as ‘Blue Zones’, which allow residents a complete or partial exemption from parking 
charges or even reserve entire street sections for parking by residents only.   
 
One example of a more complex parking charges scheme can be found in the greater Athens Area, 
where the following distinctions are made: 
 
¾ Off-street parking in garages, with differentiated charges depending on the location, time of 
parking and duration (day, month, year, etc) as well as progressive charges where the first hour is 
much more expensive than subsequent ones (although this seems counterproductive to general 
transport policy since it favours long-term parking by commuters over short-term parking by 
shoppers); 
¾ Off-street open air ‘Parking Lots’, with another set of differentiated charges depending on time of 
the day; 
¾ Park & Ride schemes, with lower than usual rates (within the relevant area) applied in the off-
street park-and-ride garages developed near the Metro Stations by the Metro Operating 
Company and additional charges beyond these periods; 
¾ On-street parking (applied with limited success so far, due to the lack of systematic police 
enforcement and limited collection of fines) with a special controlled parking scheme to be 
introduced by the Municipality of Athens in the Central Business Area, where 5,500 spaces are to 
be provided in the first phase with 2,500 for residents (at €10 per year), 1,000 for special uses 
(government etc. mostly free) and 2,000 for short-term parking (up to 3 hours) for visitors at € 
0.50 per half hour for the first two hours and € 2.00 per hour for the third hour onwards, but only 
operating on Wednesdays and Saturdays (which are the main shopping days in the area). 
  
Public transport charges 
 
Charges for the use of public transport vary widely between European countries, and even within 
countries, with regard to the overall level of charges.  Most schemes relate their charges to the type of 
transport (metros generally the most expensive and buses the cheapest) and the length of the journey, 
the latter mainly in terms of distance travelled, but in some cases (e.g. in Poland) relating to the 
expected travel time duration.   
 
Discounts, and in some cases even full exemptions, are generally given to children, students, the 
elderly and people with a physical handicap, or in the form of weekly, monthly or annual season 
tickets.  Variations by time of day in the form of off-peak discounts, which exist for many trains, are 
less usual for single tickets in urban forms of public transport; where they exist, they often only apply 
to holders of season or other special tickets (e.g. on the London Underground). What can be found 
more frequently are special tariffs for weekends or for night buses. 
 
Insurance schemes 
 
A last category of differentiated charging schemes related to road usage are car insurance premiums, 
which used to consider only the type of car, the age of the driver and the length of time they drove 
accident-free.  Data from a trial carried out in The Hague will be subject of a DIFFERENT case study, 
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but these schemes are no longer only at a trial stage; they are now being rolled out in several 
European countries.  The latest of these schemes was launched in the UK on 5 October 2006, 
following a pilot with 5,000 motorists.   
 
This scheme consists of two parts: an up-front premium reflecting the driver’s age, driving experience 
and the car driven (as in traditional insurance schemes); after that the premium will depend on the 
mileage driven and the roads used (motorways being cheapest), a discount for driving in off-peak 
hours and, for 18 to 23 year olds, a premium for driving during the high-risk accident time between 
23:00 and 6:008  Obviously, these schemes apply to all roads and not just to the urban roads which 
are the focus of this section.  Furthermore, they are strictly speaking not charges for infrastructure use, 
but since they can influence infrastructure use by inducing drivers to use their cars less in favour of 
public transport they merit inclusion within the DIFFERENT reference framework. 
 
Ideal versus actual differentiation criteria 
 
Table 4.3 which is adapted from on an ‘ideal’ set of differentiation dimensions suggested by GRACE in 
their deliverable 2, in which a maximum degree of differentiation would be reached, compares this 
ideal with the actual situation with regard to urban charges against the currently ‘best’ existing 
charging differentiation criteria in urban roads. 
 
Actual Criteria Applied 
Ideal Differentiation Criteria Access and 
Area 
Charges 
Parking 
Charges 
Public 
Transport 
Charges 
New 
Insurance 
Premiums 
User characteristics 
¾ Type of vehicle √ (√) √ √ 
¾ Condition of the vehicle     √ (vehicle age)
¾ The way the vehicle is being driven     √ 
¾ Driver/passenger characteristics  √ (disabled) √ (disabled) √  √  
Location characteristics 
¾ Road characteristics    √  √ 
¾ Site environment   √   
¾ General level of traffic volumes √ (implicit) √ (implicit)   
Time period 
¾ Current congestion levels √ (implicit) √ (implicit) √ (implicit)  
¾ Accident risk    √ 
¾ Meteorological conditions     
¾ Sensitivity to noise  - (reverse)    
¾ Site characteristics depending on 
activities being undertaken  √   
Table 4.3: Ideal versus Actual Differentiation Criteria 
Table 4.3 shows that there are big differences between the different types of charging schemes.  The 
vehicle type is the one criterion that is most widely used, albeit to different degrees.  Disabled drivers 
or passengers generally get discounts or concessions, while price differentiation for the young and the 
elderly only applies for public transport use or for car insurance, generally in terms of discounts for 
these user groups with the notable exception of young drivers, who already used to pay higher 
insurance premiums due to their higher accident risk in traditional insurance schemes, but where new 
technology now –as mentioned above – allows to discourage them in particular to drive at night times 
through peak premiums.  The age of the vehicle played always a role in the determination of insurance 
costs, while the way in which it is driven could only be taken into account with the emergence of new 
technologies. 
 
                                                     
8  The Guardian, 6 October 2006. 
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Location characteristics are most widespread for the differentiation of parking charges: charges are 
generally highest in the most central and busiest locations, and in particular for on-street parking in 
front of rows of shops, where activity dependent time variation also comes in, since charges often only 
apply during shopping hours.  More generally, parking charges tend to be lower for overnight than for 
daytime parking.  For access and area charges, levels of traffic volumes are implicitly accounted for, 
since they are only introduced where traffic levels are high enough to cause problems, and the 
revenues are either used to expand infrastructure capacity or to manage demand.   
 
Similarly, for differentiation by time period, there is no scheme yet in operation which reacts directly to 
changing levels of congestion over the day (this was only trialled in Cambridge during the 1990s), but 
charges are often highest at times of the day when congestion is expected to be most severe, with 
Stockholm being the example where this is most apparent.  The suggestion made by GRACE to relate 
charges to noise sensitivity is interesting, but current practise runs into the opposite of what common 
sense would suggest: noise sensitivity is highest in the night, but with the exception of some of the 
Norwegian cities, where charging runs 24 hours per day, and the Trastevere district in Rome, where 
only night charges are used at weekends, charging operates only during daytime hours.   
 
4.2.3 RAIL 
Table 4.6 summarises the charging structure for rail infrastructure in the EU (ECMT, 2005).  Charging 
regimes can be distinguished by the following characteristics and each is discussed in more detail 
below: 
 
¾ pricing principles adopted (marginal cost pricing, marginal cost pricing with mark-ups, full cost 
recovery and full cost recovery less state subsidy); 
¾ type of mark-up (if any) (either two-part tariffs or mark-ups on the variable component); 
¾ type of variable charging (e.g. by train-km or gross t-km); 
¾ charges for different elements of cost (e.g. maintenance, renewal and environmental). 
 
Principles  
 
Marginal cost pricing is usually advocated in order to encourage efficient use of the railway network.  
However railways tend to exhibit economies of density and so the marginal cost of extra network 
utilisation is below the average cost.  Thus full cost recovery is not achieved through (simple) marginal 
cost pricing.  Therefore, two broad pricing principles can be distinguished; pricing by marginal cost 
(MC) and pricing to recover full cost (FC) (usually through some average cost pricing scheme).  There 
are two further pricing principles reported in the following table, marginal cost plus pricing (MC+) and 
pricing to recover full cost less government grants (FC-).  Both MC+ and FC- are aimed at full cost 
recovery less government grants, however the MC+ approach, being based on marginal cost pricing, 
is viewed as less distorting in terms of incentives.   Table 4.4 shows which principles are applied in the 
different countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 DELIVERABLE 2.1
 
Date: 18/1/2007 Deliverable 2.1                                                  Page  
 
  47
Country Pricing principles 
Austria MC+ 
Belgium FC- 
Czech Republic MC+ 
Denmark MC+ 
Estonia FC 
Finland MC+ 
France MC+ 
Germany FC- 
Hungary FC 
Italy FC- (Traffic management only) 
Latvia FC 
Netherlands MC 
Poland FC 
Portugal MC 
Romania FC 
Slovenia FC 
Sweden MC+ 
Switzerland MC+ 
UK MC+ 
 
Table 4.4: Rail charging principles in Europe 
Type of mark-up 
 
There are two kinds of mark-up used in charging MC+ pricing; a mark-up on the variable charge 
and/or a separate fixed charge (not related to actual usage).  Where mark-ups on variable charges are 
implemented, economic theory states that the least distorting method of doing this is to inversely relate 
the proportionate mark-up on marginal cost to the elasticity of demand for each user group (Ramsey 
pricing).  A separate fixed charge is an example of a two part tariff.  This has the advantage that once 
an operator has decided to enter the market, he pays only marginal costs, that is, incentives to act 
efficiently are not distorted unless the fixed part of the tariff is prohibitive of the operator entering the 
market.   
 
Type of variable charge 
 
As well as the proportion of revenue collected by actual usage charges differing between European 
countries, there are also differences in what unit of usage is used as the basis for charging.  A mixture 
of number of train-km, gross tonne km and train path km is used by systems in Europe.  In terms of 
charging marginal cost, the unit of usage should reflect the driver of the marginal damage caused to 
the network.  Therefore to reflect different cost drivers (and, as is likely, to reflect distributional 
concerns) a mixture of charging measures have been implemented. 
 
Elements of costs charged 
 
Across Europe elements of maintenance, renewals, train planning and operations, congestion and 
scarcity, accidents and environmental costs are used as the cost base to determine both marginal cost 
(in the MC and MC+ approaches) and average cost (in the FC and FC- approaches).   No country 
charges for all of these categories and only Switzerland, Germany and France charge for 4 of these 
categories.  All except Italy charge for maintenance expenditure and 13 out of 18 countries charge for 
train planning and operations.  Charges for congestion and scarcity, accidents and environment are 
only undertaken by a minority of countries. 
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Acceptability of railway pricing reforms  
 
Work has identified five major stakeholders important for acceptability: i) railway infrastructure 
managers, ii) train operators, iii) passengers, iv) policy makers and governmental bodies, and v) the 
business community e.g., freight forwarders and shippers.   Train operators will, argues Adler et al. 
(2002), be the most impacted by the proposed pricing strategy  
 
 Table 4.5 summarises the acceptability barriers for all groups of stakeholders identified in the analysis. 
 
Stakeholder Group Barriers to Acceptability 
Applicability of the pricing strategy 
Effectiveness/efficiency of the pricing strategy 
Risk of losing part of the market share of a specific truck or 
railroad terminal 
Infrastructure Operators 
Use of pricing strategy revenues 
Political cost 
Effectiveness/efficiency of the proposed pricing strategy Policy Makers 
Applicability of the proposed pricing strategy 
The extent of effectiveness/efficiency of the proposed pricing 
strategy 
Risk of losing part of the market share due to the increase in 
competition 
The level of charges imposed 
The use of the revenues deriving from increased charges (e.g. 
possible redistribution in the form of railway 
investments/capacity and service expansion) 
Train Operators 
Perception of equity of measures/discriminatory practices 
against particular user groups (e.g. small operators) 
Source: Adler et al., 2002 
Table 4.5: Acceptability barriers to marginal cost based pricing strategies for railways 
 
4.2.4 AIRPORTS 
Airports are infrastructures with a multi-product nature.  Many different services and activities are 
conducted, with commercial services becoming more important day by day.9  Actually, airport activities 
can be divided in three groups: operational, handling and commercial (Doganis, 1992).  Alternatively, 
the first two are usually considered as aeronautical services whilst commercial activities are regarded 
as non-aeronautical. 
 
The fare structure at any airport is parallel to such a classification and by any means complex.  When 
referring to operational activities the following charges can be mentioned: landing charge, passenger 
charge, freight charge, parking charge, security charge, and so on.  A similar myriad of charges is 
found for handling or even commercial services.  Such structure may vary slightly when paying 
attention to a particular airport, though the basic structure is always the same and based on 
International Civil Aviation Organization recommendations (ICAO, 1991).  For example the landing 
charge should be non-discriminatory and based on the maximum take off weight (MTOW).  
Nevertheless, and quite probably the main novelty on airport charges during the last decade has to do 
with environmental charges (noise and pollution) that try to put into practice the ‘polluters pay’ 
principle.    
 
Therefore the question of differentiation can be analysed for a range of airport charges, although most 
studies have focused their attention on the aeronautical side.10   
                                                     
9  Airports may generate more than 60% of their income from concession activities (Zhang and Zhang, 2003) 
10  It is worth mentioning here that landing charges only constitute about 5 percent (on average) of total costs for 
a single scheduled European flight. Still, total airport costs can constitute more than 20 percent of total costs. 
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For airports in Europe, a review of infrastructure charges based on information collected from internet 
sources and from the GRACE project11 was conducted.  Airport differentiation criteria are reported in 
Table 4.6 for a sample composed by main airports in each country according to number of 
passengers.  Smaller airports are not analysed, though in general the fare structure and differentiation 
criteria is usually quite similar to other larger airports in the same country.12  The review identifies the 
following main differentiation criteria: 
 
¾ Weight of the vehicle, which can be related either to the maximum take-off weight (in the majority 
of cases) or to the maximum take off mass.  In practice, all airports examined in the review use 
the weight of the vehicle as differentiation criteria. 
¾ Noise of vehicle, in the majority of big airports and in airports nearby urban areas. 
¾ Time of landing, according to which landing and noise emissions are surcharged during night in 
several airports. 
¾ Emission charges, only applied in London Heathrow, Stockholm Arlanda, Gatwick and Zurich.   
¾ Several discounts are applied to domestic flights and training aircraft, e.g. Larnaca, Copenhagen, 
Vilnius. 
¾ Peak/off peak traffic conditions are considered only in few cases, i.e. Vienna, Helsinki/Vantaa and 
in UK airports London Heathrow, Gatwick and Manchester Intl. 
DIFFERENT also focuses mainly on aeronautical charges, and in particular on those charges that are 
more frequently subject to differentiation criteria.  Quite probably the best known and, in many cases 
subject to differentiation criteria in itself, is the landing charge13.  This is a charge that tries to recover 
the cost of airport runway provision and maintenance14.  According to ICAO recommendations, this 
charge should be based on the aircraft maximum take off weight (or mass), and consequently it 
appears as such for all airports in our sample.  Another criterion to charge for landing might be the 
type of route, usually discriminating against flights connecting with non EU airports (e.g. in the case of 
Spain) or offering discounted charges for domestic flights or even training aircraft. 
 
Another important differentiation criterion relates to airport externalities, namely noise and air pollution.  
As a matter of fact, noise has been given a more extensive treatment than air pollution around the 
airport so far, though the prospects are that more emphasis will be put on air pollution and 
consequently on emission charges in the future15.   It should be noted, however, that the treatment of 
aircraft air pollution at upper levels of the atmosphere is not considered at the airport; this might be 
treated through other mechanisms as the European Commission and Parliament are considering at 
the moment16; a comprehensive treatment is being advocated in order to reduce the climate change 
impact of aviation.   Several proposals are of interest, in particular: 
1. Introduction of a tax on kerosene at least for domestic and intra EU flights with possible 
exemptions for carriers on routes that compete with non EU carriers.  This tax is already on 
application for domestic flights in the Netherlands. 
2. Introduction of and Emission Trading System (ETS) for airlines markets.17 Such a system is 
already in place for other industries and would constitute an important precedent from which to 
draw lessons in the case of air transport. 
3. Promotion of research on bio-fuels for aviation. 
                                                     
11  Deliverable 2 of GRACE. This project presents with more details the current practice at airports. 
12  A possible exception to this might be the so called “low cost” airports that are nowadays increasing their share 
of movements and passengers in Europe. 
13  Many airlines claim that there should be a shift towards a decrease share of airport fixed charges (e.g. landing 
charge) and an increase share of flexible charges (e.g. passenger charge) that could be used to cover the 
same costs that are actually covered by fixed charges. 
14  The usual reference for landing charge calculation is the average cost incurred. 
15  This charge depends on the volume and quality of aircrafts emissions, as levels of CO2, NOX, etc. 
16  Communication from the Commission on reducing the climate change impact of aviation (COM, 2005, 459 
final) and European Parliament resolution of July 2006 (TA-0296/2006) 
17  Directive 2003/87 established the European Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) affecting 12.000 energy 
intensive installations. 
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4. Air Traffic Control improvements and promotion of a Single European Sky18. 
 
Nevertheless the establishment of emission charges has not been ruled out completely, and in the 
future they might be even compatible with an Emission Trading Scheme. 
 
At airports the impact of aircraft noise has been traditionally attenuated through command and control 
measures, as ICAO also advises.  Specifically, the 33rd ICAO Assembly in 2001 introduced the 
concept of a “Balanced Approach” to noise management19.  This consists of identifying the noise 
problem at an airport and subsequently analysing the various measures available to reduce noise 
through the exploration of four principal elements: reduction of noise at source (i.e. less noisy 
airplanes); land use planning and management; noise abatement operational procedures (e.g. use of 
preferential runways) and operating restrictions.   
 
Although the ICAO Balanced Approach to noise management does not specifically consider the 
setting of noise charges, this institution recognizes that airports with serious noise problems may need 
to implement them.  In fact, the ICAO Airport Economic Manual ICAO (1991) states that noise related 
charges, if implemented, should stick to the following principles: 
 
¾ They should be levied only at airports experiencing noise problems and should be designed to 
recover no more than the costs applied to their alleviation or prevention (insulation schemes, 
monitoring)20. 
¾ Any noise-related charges should be associated with the landing fee, possibly by means of 
surcharges or rebates, and should take into account the noise certification provisions of Annex 16 
of the Convention on International Civil Aviation in respect of aircraft noise levels.  (The effective 
perceived noise level EPNL of the aircraft concerned could be used as a charging or rebating 
parameter). 
¾ Noise related charges should be non-discriminatory between users and not be established at 
such levels as to be prohibitively high for the operation of certain aircraft. 
 
Further, ICAO recommends taking as a cost basis for noise related charges the cost of noise 
monitoring and noise abatement measures.  No mention is made of noise annoyance or social cost of 
noise.  At this stage, it seems that ICAO recommendations and European Commission advice are 
quite contradictory (European Commission, 1995), since the Green Paper on Fair and Efficient Pricing 
states that “prices paid by individual transport users will have to more accurately reflect the full costs of 
transport”, therefore for the problem of noise, such statement implies that full (social) costs of noise 
should be taken into account when fixing airport charges.  However, when coming into practice, this 
problem has been only partially addressed by the EU21 so far. 
 
The Commission Communication on Air Transport and the Environment (European Commission, 
1999) proposes the use of economic instruments in order to improve the environmental performance 
of air transport operations.  To this end, a proposal for a directive for the purpose of calculating noise 
charges was prepared by the Commission in 200122.  In this proposal, the starting point was the 
classification of aircraft according to ICAO certification values in EPNL, that are considered to be the 
most consistent way to reflect the contribution of aircraft to the level of noise exposure around airports.   
It is also stated that such classification should be sufficiently flexible to allow for the introduction of 
airport specific elements, such as the fleet mix operating at a given airport, the unit noise charge at 
departure or arrival, the noise threshold at departure and arrival and the reference period during which 
the unit noise charge applies.  Nevertheless the proposal was not finally approved by the European 
Parliament and the Council. 
                                                     
18  This EU initiative seek to promote a more rational organization of European air space, increasing capacity and 
ensuring high safety standards throughout Europe. 
19  33rd ICAO Assembly in 2001. 
20  Therefore not the value of external costs. 
21  The importance of the airport noise problem in the EU has led the European Parliament and the Council to 
produce two Directives 2002/30/EC and 2002/49/EC. 
22  European Commission, (2001). Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on the 
establishment of a Community framework for noise classification of civil subsonic aircraft for the purpose of 
calculating noise charges. COM 2001,74 final. 
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To our knowledge there are no cases of noise charges based on the social cost of noise.  This would 
be a charge that fully internalizes the costs imposed on third parties due to aircraft noise.   
 
The actual practice when dealing with the noise problem through a pricing mechanism is not 
homogeneous.  Several options are possible: creation of a new charge (noise charge), for the 
differentiation of the landing charge based on this criterion (e.g. Heathrow airport) and/or introduction 
of surcharges on the landing charge when noise is perceived as most annoying (i.e. night periods).  
Examples of all these cases are shown in Table 4.6. 
 
Finally, the need to efficiently use capacity has resulted in a small number of airports applying peak 
pricing mechanisms.  The demand of airport infrastructure services does not have a flat profile; on the 
contrary, it exhibits seasonality, with peaks and off-peak period within the year, the week and the day.  
Only few airports made use of such alternative, in most cases where a peak appears at a given hour 
during the day.  The wider application of this charging policy is expected to give airlines and 
passengers a correct signal of airport capacity costs23. 
 
With reference to our sample of airports, it can be seen that all of them have a landing charge based 
on the aircraft weight.  Less than half have a night time or a noise surcharge (exactly, 46.5%) and no 
more than 10 per cent have some consideration of peak and off-peak periods (i.e. airports in Austria, 
Finland and United Kingdom).  Similar with regard to emissions charges, with only 4 out of 43 airports 
analysed having introduced it (i.e. airports in Sweden, United Kingdom and Switzerland). 
 
4.2.5 PORTS 
While some ports are to a large extent free to set their charges as they wish, and most notably in the 
UK, in most cases the state, municipal or regional authority concerned decides port tariffs.  Charges in 
this context refer to fees levied on shipping vehicles in return for their access to a given port.  This is 
not, however, related to the charges imposed for the physical transfer of goods (or passengers) 
between ship and shore, also known as the ‘utility’ function of a port, and which tends to be the 
domain of private actors (e.g. stevedores, terminal operators etc.).  Terminal charges therefore relate 
to port services provided for the most part by private actors, notwithstanding that much of the port 
infrastructure is leased from public port authorities, some of whom may not apply full cost recovery 
principles. 
 
The charging practice therefore differs by country and also by port within certain countries, and there 
is a large range of different charges that are applied.  For instance, the main categories of port access 
charges levied on ships in Rotterdam, which is Europe’s largest seaport, are as follows: 
 
¾ Harbour dues for seagoing vessel; 
¾ Harbour dues for inland vessel; 
¾ Quay dues; 
¾ Buoy dues (for anchoring); 
¾ Waste disposal dues; 
¾ Vessel traffic system (VTS) charge; 
¾ Reporting of vessels charge; 
¾ Pilotage charge; 
¾ Towage charge; 
¾ Mooring and unmooring charge. 
 
                                                     
23  Some proposal to develop a secondary market for slots at airports are being analysed by the Commission. If 
such a system is implemented this could also work as an efficient system to allocate slots based on 
willingness to pay at peak and off peak periods. 
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But even this long list is not exhaustive.  In addition to the above, charges applied in other European 
ports can also include: 
 
¾ Tonnage dues; 
¾ Canal dues; 
¾ Sanitary dues; 
¾ Small-ship dues; 
¾ Ice dues; 
¾ Freight dues; 
¾ Passenger dues; 
¾ Lighthouse dues 
¾ Cargo handling charge (usually by terminal operators). 
 
To some extent the charging regime within ports appears somewhat archaic, reminiscent of a bygone 
age, and also perhaps to some extent reflecting the natural monopoly positions of seaports in terms of 
regional and national trade.  There appears to be some scope to simplify charging practices, and to 
consolidate fees into fewer charges; the latter is now a common feature of the UK port system, which 
has tended to go further in the area of port privatisation than other EU countries.   
 
The combination of a great number of charging categories and a certain level of differentiation in each 
category leads to a rather differentiated structure of port and port access charges: Ship gross tonnage 
and cargo type, type of vessel, length of stay, time of stay etc are some criteria that are used widely.  
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DIFFERENTIATION CRITERIA 
Road COUNTRY 
Motorway Urban roads Rail Airport Ports 
Austria Toll for vehicles  >3,5t: 
• Vehicle class (axles);  
 
 
None Variable charges: 
• Charges per Gross t-km 
• Train-km 
Airports: Vienna and Salzburg. 
• Landing charge according to Maximum 
Take-Off Weight. 
• Peak/off-peak charge for general aviation 
(Vienna) 
Port dues and other fees: 
• Ship gross tonnage/cargo type 
wharfage dues: 
• Ship gross tonnage/cargo type 
Belgium User charge for vehicles 
> 12 t: 
• Emission class 
• Vehicle class (axles) 
None Variable charges: 
• Charges per Train-km 
• Quality of train 
• Path/service;  
• Speed of train;  
• Time of day;   
• Weight of train. 
 
Airport: Brussels Int. 
• Landing charge according to Maximum 
Take-Off Weight  
• Night time surcharge 
• Noise Charge. 
Port dues and other fees: 
• Ship gross tonnage/cargo type  
• Frequency 
• Ship type 
• Origin and destination of trade 
wharfage dues: 
• Ship gross tonnage/cargo type 
Cyprus None None Not existent Airport: Larnaca. 
• Landing charge according to Maximum 
Take-Off Weight  
• Night time surcharge 
• Special rates for domestic flights and 
training aircraft. 
Port dues and other fees: 
• Navigation and vessel dues based on ship 
gross tonnage 
Cargo dues: 
• For use of cranes etc based on cargo 
Czech Republic User charge for all 
vehicles: 
• Weight 
None Variable charges: 
• Charges per Gross t-km 
• Train-km 
• Distance travelled 
Discount charge 
• New operator 
• Environmental friendly 
vehicles 
Airports: Brno and Prague. 
• Landing charge according to Maximum 
Take-Off Weight  
• Noise charge (Prague). 
• Special rates for new additional flights 
(Prague). 
Port dues and other fees: 
• Ship gross tonnage/cargo type 
wharfage dues: 
• Ship gross tonnage/cargo type 
Denmark User charge for vehicles None Variable charges: Airports: Kastrup and Roskilde Port dues and other fees: 
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DIFFERENTIATION CRITERIA 
Road COUNTRY 
Motorway Urban roads Rail Airport Ports 
> 12 t: 
• Emission class 
• Vehicle class (axles) 
• Train-km 
• Per bottleneck 
• Landing charge according to Maximum 
Take-Off Weight  
• Night Noise charge (Kastrup) 
• Special rates for domestic flights and 
training aircraft (Roskilde)  
• Ship gross tonnage 
• Ship type 
• Length of stay  
• Frequency 
Cargo dues: 
• Type of cargo 
• Type of activity 
Estonia None None Variable charges: 
• Charges per Gross t-km 
• Train-km 
Fixed charges 
Airport: Tallin. 
• Landing charge according to Maximum 
Take-Off Weight  
Port dues and other fees: 
• Based on ship gross tonnage 
• Ship type 
• Frequency 
• Certain Standard compliances 
Finland None None Variable charges: 
• Charges per Gross t-km 
 
Airport: Helsinki/Vantaa. 
• Landing charge according to Maximum 
Take-Off Weight. 
• Night noise charge. 
• Peak/off-peak charge (minimum landing 
charges are higher during peak hours).
Port dues and other fees: 
• Ship gross tonnage 
• Length of stay 
• Annual volumes 
• Type of vessel 
wharfage dues: 
• Ship gross tonnage/cargo type 
• Direction of cargo flow 
• Type of traffic 
•  
France Toll for all vehicles: 
• Vehicle class (axles) 
 
None Variable charges: 
• Charges per path-km 
• Train-km 
Fixed charges 
Airports: Paris/Charles de Gaulle, Paris/Orly 
and Nice. 
• Landing charge according to Maximum 
Take-Off Weight (Mass in Nice). 
• Noise charge. 
• Night time surcharge (Charles De Gaulle 
and Orly). 
Port dues and other fees: 
• Geometric ship volumes, 
• Type of navigation 
• Frequency  
• Volume of activity 
• ,Type of ship 
Cargo dues: 
• Type of cargo 
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DIFFERENTIATION CRITERIA 
Road COUNTRY 
Motorway Urban roads Rail Airport Ports 
Germany Toll for vehicles > 12 t: 
• Vehicle class (axles) 
• Emission class 
 
None Variable charges: 
• Train-km 
 
Airports: Frankfurt Intl, Munich Intl, 
Berlin/Schönefeld, Sttutgart and 
Berlin/Tempelhof 
• Landing charge according to Maximum 
Take-Off Weight (Mass in Sttutgart). 
• Night noise charge (Frankfurt Intl). 
• Noise charge (Munich Intl, 
Berlin/Schönefeld, Berlin/Tempelhof 
and Sttutgart). 
• Type of flight (Munich): passenger or cargo.
• Special rates for training aircraft 
(Berlin/Schönefeld)  
• Night noise charge (Munich Intl and 
Berlin/Tempelhof). 
Port dues and other fees: 
• Navigation and vessel dues based on ship 
gross tonnage – rebates for regular 
liners 
• Type of cargo 
• Length of stay 
• Ship type 
Origin and destination of trip 
Greece Toll for all vehicles: 
• Vehicle class (axles) 
 
None Currently no charge for rail 
infrastructure use, but the 
following are awaiting 
ministerial approval for 
2007: 
• Train-km  
• Speed  
• Weight per axle  
• Quality of track (signaling, 
electric traction etc)  
• Departure time (peak/off 
peak)  
• Special issues (dangerous 
goods transport, electric 
power consumption) 
Airport: Athens Intl 
• Landing charge according to Maximum 
Take-Off Weight. 
 
Port dues and other fees: 
• Ship gross tonnage/cargo type 
wharfage dues: 
• Ship gross tonnage/cargo type 
Hungary User charge all vehicles: 
• Weight 
None Variable charges: 
Charges per path-km 
Train-km 
Type of train 
Airport: Budapest Ferihegy 
Landing charge according to Maximum Take-
Off Weight. 
Noise charge. 
Port dues and other fees: 
Ship gross tonnage/cargo type 
wharfage dues: 
Ship gross tonnage/cargo type 
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DIFFERENTIATION CRITERIA 
Road COUNTRY 
Motorway Urban roads Rail Airport Ports 
Ancillary services 
 
Ireland Toll (3 lnks) for all 
vehicles: 
• Vehicle class (axles) 
None No charge for rail 
infrastructure use (services 
operated by track owner) 
Airport: Dublin airport 
Landing charge according to Maximum Take-
Off Weight. 
 
Port dues and other fees: 
• Ship gross tonnage 
• Ship type, 
• Origin and destination 
Cargo dues: 
• cargo type, cargo condition 
Italy Toll for all vehicles: 
• Vehicle class (axles) 
City area access 
charge (e.g. Parma, 
Firenze, Roma, 
Ferrara, Milan, Reggio 
Emilia, Cesena and 
Bologna): 
• Day of week 
• Time of day 
• Type of vehicle 
(freight 
vehicles, 
discount or 
exemption for 
Electrically 
Propelled 
vehicles) 
• exemption for 
busses, taxi, 
NHS vehicles, 
etc 
 
Variable charges: 
• Charges per path-km 
• Train-km 
• Per node 
Fixed charges 
Airport: Milano Malpensa and Rome 
Leonardo da Vinci-Fiumicino 
• Landing charge according to Maximum 
Take-Off Weight. 
• Night time surcharge. 
Port dues and other fees: 
• Ship gross tonnage 
Cargo dues: 
• Tax on cargo commodity/value/weight 
Latvia None None Variable charges: 
• Train-km 
• Type of train 
Discount charge 
Airports: Riga and Liepaja 
• Landing charge according to Maximum 
Take-Off Weight. 
• Special rates for training flights. 
Port dues and other fees: 
• Ship type 
• Based on ship gross tonnage and number 
of calls/year 
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DIFFERENTIATION CRITERIA 
Road COUNTRY 
Motorway Urban roads Rail Airport Ports 
• Freight forwarders  • Night time surcharge (Riga). 
• Additional charge for landing from 16:30 to 
09:00 (Liepaja). 
Freight dues: 
• Tax on cargo commodity/tonnage or per 
unit 
Lithuania User charge for all 
vehicles  
Weight 
None n.a Airport: Vilnius 
• Landing charge according to Maximum 
Take-Off Mass. 
• Special rates for domestic flights. 
• Night time surcharge. 
Port dues and other fees: 
• Ship gross tonnage 
• Type of service 
• Type of vessel 
• Frequency 
• Compliance with certain standards 
wharfage dues: 
• Ship gross tonnage/cargo type 
• Ship type 
• Cargo dues: 
• Type of cargo  
• Volume 
Luxembourg User charge for vehicles 
> 12 t: 
• Vehicle class (axles) 
• Emission class 
 
None n.a Airport: Luxembourg: 
• Landing charge according to Maximum 
Take-Off Weight. 
• Night time surcharge. 
Port dues and other fees: 
• Ship gross tonnage/cargo type 
wharfage dues: 
• Ship gross tonnage/cargo type 
Malta Not existent City area access 
charge (La Valletta, 
from January 2007) 
• Day of week 
• Time of day 
• exemption for 
residents, 
public bus, 
electric cars, 
motorcycles, 
commercial 
vehicles with 
Not existent Airport: Malta Intl. 
• Landing charge according to Maximum 
Take-Off Weight. 
• Night time surcharge. 
Port dues and other fees: 
• Ship gross tonnage/cargo type 
wharfage dues: 
• Ship gross tonnage/cargo type 
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DIFFERENTIATION CRITERIA 
Road COUNTRY 
Motorway Urban roads Rail Airport Ports 
regular 
deliveries 
The Netherlands User charge for vehicles 
> 12 t: 
• Vehicle class (axles) 
• Emission class 
None yet Variable charges: 
• Train-km 
 
Airport: Amsterdam Schipol. 
• Landing charge according to Maximum 
Take-Off Weight. 
• Noise charge. 
• Night time surcharge 
• Other charges according to type of flight. 
Port dues and other fees: 
• Ship gross tonnage with discount for 
inland ships 
• Load of ship 
• Length over all (LOA) 
• Frequency 
• Type of cargo 
• Compliance with certain standards 
(negative tariff) 
• Origin and destination of service 
Other dues: 
• VTS and reporting fee based on ship size 
Poland User charge for vehicles 
> 3,5 t (on A1, A2, 
A4/A18 toll for all 
vehicles): 
• Weight 
• Vehicle class (axles) 
• Emission class 
None Variable charges: 
• Charges per path-km 
• Train-km 
 
Airports: Warsaw Frederic Chopin, Krakow-
John Paul II Intl., Katowice Intl. 
• Landing charge according to Maximum 
Take-Off Weight. 
• Season charge (Katowice Intl.): summer and 
winter charge. 
• Night noise  charge (Warsaw Frederic 
Chopin). 
• Noise charge (Warsaw Frederic Chopin). 
Port dues and other fees: 
• Ship gross tonnage/cargo type 
• Ship type, frequency 
wharfage dues: 
• Ship gross tonnage/cargo type 
Portugal Toll for all vehicles: 
• Vehicle class (axles) 
None Variable charges: 
• Train-km 
• Distance travelled 
• Speed (freight transport) 
• Maximum weight per axle 
(freight vehicles) 
 
Airport: Lisbon. 
• Landing charge according to Maximum 
Take-Off Weight. 
• Out of hours charge. 
 
Port dues and other fees: 
• Navigation and vessel dues based on ship 
gross tonnage 
• Type of ship 
• Frequency 
• Type of service 
• Length of stay 
Cargo dues: 
• Cargo type 
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DIFFERENTIATION CRITERIA 
Road COUNTRY 
Motorway Urban roads Rail Airport Ports 
• Origin and destination 
Slovakia User charge for all 
vehicles: 
• Weight 
None Variable charges: 
• Train-km 
• Track category 
Airport: Bratislava. 
• Landing charge according to Maximum 
Take-Off Weight. 
Port dues and other fees: 
• Ship gross tonnage/cargo type 
wharfage dues: 
• Ship gross tonnage/cargo type 
Slovenia Toll for all vehicles: 
• Vehicle class (axles) 
• Vehicle height 
City area access 
charge (Maribor) 
• Type of vehicle 
(freight 
vehicles, 
exemption for 
residents, 
disabled, etc) 
 
 
Variable charges: 
• Train-km 
• Type of train 
• Type of network 
• Peak off/Peak time 
 
Airport: Ljubljiana. 
• Landing charge according to Maximum 
Take-Off Weight. 
Port dues and other fees: 
• Type of cargo 
Gross Tonnage 
• Frequency 
Spain Toll for all vehicles: 
• Vehicle class (axles) 
None Variable charges: 
• Train-km 
• Peak off/Peak time 
• Track category 
Airports: all airports. 
• Landing charge according to Maximum 
Take-Off Weight. 
• Differentiation between type of airports and 
routes. 
• Special rates for training aircraft. 
• Out of hours charge. 
Port dues and other fees: 
• Ship gross tonnage/cargo type 
• Ship type 
• Frequency 
• Type of terminal operation 
• Out of hours charge 
wharfage dues: 
• Ship gross tonnage/cargo type 
Sweden User charge for vehicles 
> 12 t: 
• Vehicle class (axles) 
• Emission class 
City area usage 
charge 
• Day of week 
• Time of day (peak 
hour charge) 
• Type of vehicle  
• Exemption for 
busses, taxi, 
NHS vehicles, 
Variable charges: 
• Charges per Gross t-km 
 
Airport: Stockholm Arlanda. 
• Landing charge according to Maximum 
Take-Off Weight  
• Emissions charge. 
• Noise charge. 
 
Port dues and other fees: 
• Vessel dues based on ship gross tonnage 
• Ship type 
• Emissions (Gothenburg) 
• Compliance with certain standards 
(negative charge) 
• Type of cargo 
• Origin and destination 
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DIFFERENTIATION CRITERIA 
Road COUNTRY 
Motorway Urban roads Rail Airport Ports 
etc • Fuel type 
United Kingdom Toll (on M6): 
• Type of vehicle (car, 
van, HGV) 
• Day/Night 
City area usage 
charges: 
• Day of week 
• Time of day 
• Type of vehicle  
• Type of user  
 
Variable charges: 
• Train-km 
• Type of vehicle 
Fixed charges (franchisees 
only) 
Airports: London Heathrow, Manchester, 
Gatwick, Aberdeen, Glasgow and Edinburgh.
• Landing charge according to Maximum 
Take-Off Weight. 
• Noise charge (Heathrow, Manchester and 
Gatwick). 
• Peak/off-peak charge (Heathrow, 
Manchester and Gatwick). 
• Emissions charge (Heathrow and Gatwick). 
• Night noise surcharge (Aberdeen, Glasgow 
and Edinburgh). 
• Type of flight (Manchester): 
passenger/cargo. 
Port dues and other fees: 
• Ship gross tonnage/cargo type 
• Length of stay 
• Frequency 
• Ship type 
Harbour Captain Services: 
• Assessed on ship gross tonnage 
• Ship type 
• Service  
• Frequency 
 
Switzerland User charge distanced 
based for vehicles > 3,5 
t: 
• Maximum laden weight 
• Emission class 
User charge distanced 
based for vehicles > 
3,5 t: 
• Maximum laden 
weight 
• Emission class 
Variable charges: 
• Charges per Gross t-km 
• Train-km 
• Per node 
 
 
Airport: Zürich. 
• Landing charge according to Maximum 
Take-Off Weight. 
• Emission charge. 
• Noise charge. 
Port dues and other fees: 
• Ship gross tonnage/cargo type 
wharfage dues: 
• Ship gross tonnage/cargo type 
Norway Toll for all vehicles: 
• Vehicle type 
• Vehicle length 
City toll: 
• Day of week  
• Times of day  
• Type of vehicle  
 
Variable charges: 
• Charges per Gross t-km 
• Train-km 
 
Airport: Oslo 
• Landing charge according to Maximum 
Take-Off Weight. 
• Night time surcharge. 
Port dues, wharfage and other fees: 
• Ship gross tonnage 
• Frequency 
• Length of stay 
• Frequency 
• Type of activity 
Cargo dues: 
• Cargo type 
 
Table 4.6: Overview of criteria for infrastructure charging differentiation  
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4.3 CONCLUSION 
The brief overview of existing charging differentiation practices in Europe allows the evaluation of two 
different but interwoven processes: a) the degree of convergence across European countries around 
specific charging practices and b) the degree of differentiation reached by each charging scheme.  
 
The ‘degree of convergence’ looks at the level of current harmonization between existing charging 
practices across European countries. 
 
The ‘degree of differentiation’ concerns the capability of existing charging differentiation schemes to 
address the variability of transport conditions, e.g. time, locations, traffic conditions, etc, in order to 
charge the users at the point of use of the infrastructure by taking account of the full range of 
externalities.   
 
Table 4.7 shows the current state of the two processes for each infrastructure type as emerged from 
the review through a qualitative assessment in high, medium and low level.   
 
 
DEGREE OF DIFFERENTIATION  
High Medium Low 
High Motorways  Airport 
Medium  Rail  
DEGREE OF 
CONVERGENCE 
Low Maritime Urban Roads  
 
Table 4.7: Convergence and Differentiation 
It can be observed that both the degree of differentiation and the degree of convergence vary 
horizontally across transport modes and vertically inside each type of infrastructure: 
 
¾ Road (Motorways): for the use of motorways can benefit of a high degree of convergence across 
the European countries, i.e. in practice, most European countries charge for part of their 
motorway network.  The degree of differentiation is on average high: all the most important 
parameters affecting externalities, e.g. type of vehicle, distance travelled, weight, emission class, 
etc, have been considered in the determination of charge.  
¾ Maritime infrastructure charges also display a high degree of differentiation. However, the level 
of convergence is low in contrast to road transport. The high degree of differentiation originates 
from the historic development and adaptation process over time of port tariffs. The strong 
involvement  of local, municipal or regional authorities has led to low conversion in maritime 
transport as national as well as at European level.  From the list of drivers affecting externalities 
for sea ports shown below in Table 4.8, ship gross tonnage and vessel types are considered. 
Moreover, ports start to consider emission levels based on the bunker fuel and the speed of the 
vessel when approaching a port.  
 
Externality Drivers 
Demand profile & volume 
Vessel characteristics & operating condition 
Service requirements 
Port capacity (waterside) 
Technological infrastructure 
Personnel training & working experience 
Port congestion and delays 
Port operational characteristics (hub) 
Demand profile & volume 
Driving / manoeuvring behaviour 
Personnel training & working experience 
Accidents 
Port capacity (waterside) 
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Externality Drivers 
Vessel operating condition 
Technological infrastructure 
Demand profile & volume 
Traffic patterns (e.g., public transport use) 
Landside accessibility 
Port landside capacity 
Population area 
Port facilities (e.g. landside parking) 
Technological infrastructure 
Landside pollution 
Vessel characteristics (passenger/car capacity 
Fuel type 
Type of Engine 
Air Emissions 
Operating speed 
Sources: MC-ICAM (2002), Baird and Wilmsmeier (2007), UBA 2006 
T 
Table 4.8: Main external cost drivers in ports 
 
¾ The degree of differentiation and convergence in rail infrastructure charging occupies an 
intermediate position, in the sense that both processes are currently under way.  Differentiation 
charges currently applied consider infrastructure damage (gross t-km), type of train and distance 
travelled (train-km), which capture important drivers addressing externalities, as can be observed 
in Table 4.9 below. 
 
 
Externality Drivers 
Wear and tear costs Usage related damage 
Congestion and delays High level of capacity utilization 
Scarcity Capacity constraints 
Accidents Exact connection between rail infrastructure use and number & severity of accidents is unknown 
Train and fuel use 
Population living near tracks Environment 
Demand profile & volume 
Source: MC-ICAM (2002) 
 
Table 4.9: Main external cost drivers in rail 
¾ However, charges for congestion and scarcity are scarcely levied in rail track access charges in 
Europe.  On the other hand, the process of convergence, even if not completely fulfilled, has 
been supported by the European Commission through the “Common Transport Policy” and 
specific Directives24, aiming at ensuring interoperability and adopting common approaches in 
charging infrastructure at national level.    
¾ Urban roads and airport infrastructure charges show a mixed trend, i.e. a medium degree of 
differentiation with low convergence (urban roads) and a low degree of differentiation with high 
convergence (airport). 
¾ Charge differentiation for the use of urban roads has shown over the past years a rapid increase, 
i.e. from the charge of parking space for deterring the use of urban space (still the most common 
form of charging) to more sophisticated charging schemes addressing congestion and 
environment.  However, convergence is still slow: congestion charges have only been introduced 
                                                     
24   Directive 91/440, Directives 2001/12, 2001/13 and 2001/14 
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in very few cities (London, Stockholm), while access charges for entering in a specific city area 
are more wide-spread, but still follow different principles in different countries and cities. 
¾ For airports, there is large convergence towards the use of landing charges for recovering the 
runway provision and maintenance, based on the maximum take-off weight, and, particularly in 
large airports near urban areas, some convergence towards charges addressing noise and 
emissions.  It should be noted, however, that noise is basically addressed with command and 
control measures and charging still has a minor role.  Furthermore, even less examples can be 
found with reference to charging congestion and scarcity.       
 
Possible developments 
 
It is widely acknowledged that technology is deemed to play an important role, providing the material 
basis for a sharp increase in charging differentiation.  The future developments of positioning 
technologies, for example, including combinations of Dedicated Short-range Communication (DSRC) 
equipment and GPS/GSM approaches, are expected to allow further scope for charge variation.  
Highly sophisticated OBUs - fitted with maps, GPS devices, cellular technologies for communication 
and back-office operations - could allow the capture of variations in traffic situation, road infrastructure 
use, population distribution, etc.  GALILEO, the European satellite navigation system, has recently 
received a new push.  All the relevant parameters for a full assessment of external costs and in 
particular for an effective pricing of congestion could be potentially addressed through the use such 
technologies. 
 
It is to be expected that technological developments are pervasive and able to affect all transport 
modes in the same way.  Currently, GPS-GSM devices find their main application in the road sector, 
for instance in the German HGV tolling system that relies on satellite tracking to determine the 
distance trucks travel on the Autobahn network, while in several countries car insurance premiums are 
becoming based on distance travelled (through in-vehicle GPS).  Electronic charging in urban areas 
will improve the cost-effectiveness of solutions based on the combination of automatic number plate 
reading technologies (ANPR) and Radio Frequency Identification Devices, as being experimented in 
London25.  Also in the maritime sector, more pollutant ships are being tracked at ports and along the 
trip in most environmentally sensitive areas (Mediterranean Sea), and GPS devices are also used for 
real-time communications about rail delays in freight services. 
 
However, it should be stressed that technology in itself is only an enabling factor that need to be 
supported by other equally important factors.  In particular, the following ones deserve to be 
mentioned: 
 
¾ Legislative factors, providing a common (European) legislative framework ensuring non-
discrimination in the application of charging rules, particularly relevant for transport services with 
a pan-European playing field, e.g. road freight, for which the existence of common rules is a basic 
requirement; 
¾ Institutional factors, overcoming the barriers arising from the involvement of different authorities 
and administration, e.g. transport departments, local authorities, national and European 
institutions, etc; 
¾ Political problems (acceptability of pricing policies, equity issues, etc), which may hamper the 
implementation of charging schemes, even if technological solutions would allow them; in 
particular, the better enforcement of pricing policies allowed by the new technological 
developments may be stopped by the related problems of privacy violation through the growing 
use of cameras and tracking technologies.  
 
All in all it can be said that the promising technological developments towards major differentiation in 
charging practices need to be supported by a multi-faced strategy in order to be fully exploited.    
                                                     
25  KAPSCH, the Austrian provider of electronic fees collection in London, estimates a reduction by 20% of 
operating costs incurred by the city administration as result of the implementation of new technological 
solutions.    
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5 EXISTING MODELLING APPROACHES 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter deals with the capability of existing modelling approaches to simulate the differentiation of 
tariffs with reference to various modes of transport and at diverse level (urban, strategic, etc.).  A brief 
review of approaches and applications will be presented trying to emphasise the main methodological 
aspects related to the analysis of differentiation of charges. 
 
More specifically, the chapter will present: 
 
¾ example applications of the current situation of modelling approaches (on a mode by mode 
basis); 
¾ a discussion of the capability of the modelling applications presented to simulate differentiation of 
tariffs; 
¾ conclusions. 
 
5.2. THE CURRENT SITUATION 
5.2.1 MOTORWAY AND URBAN ROAD TRANSPORT 
 
Concerning modelling tools focused on motorways and urban road transport, several alternative 
approaches are available.  In particular, four approaches are well established26: 
 
1. Tactical models (assignment models), 
2. Conventional demand/supply interaction models, 
3. Integrated land use and transport models (LUTR), 
4. Microsimulation models. 
 
Most models of road transport allow travellers to respond to changes in journey time or out-of pocket 
costs.  Usually these two are combined into a “generalised cost” using appropriate values of time.    
 
Tactical models 
 
Tactical models (also referred to as assignment models) are used to simulate path choice of a given 
pattern of trips (usually road trips) on a given road network.  This type of models is therefore focused 
on a specific problem assuming that several circumstances are given, in particular: 
 
¾ the origin/destination matrix of trips is fixed: neither origins nor destinations can be changed as 
effect of the simulation; 
¾ modal split is fixed: road users do not shift on other modes as effect of the simulation. 
 
Tactical models exclude trip generation, distribution and modal split elements27 and are therefore 
suitable for evaluating schemes or policies which will only cause local re-routeing of traffic.  Typically, 
these models are developed to analyse interurban corridors (e.g. to forecast traffic on new motorways) 
or urban areas (the whole city area or city centres.)  Different demand segments are usually defined 
                                                     
26  This classification make reference to the work done in the Fifth Framework Programme research project 
ISHTAR, Integrated Software for Health, Transport efficiency and Artistic heritage Recovery, Del. 2 “Review of 
existing transport models and Selection of  Models for the ISHTAR Suite”, 2002 
27  Note: that there exists a special class of tactical models called “elastic assignment models” which allow the 
volume of demand in each OD cell to vary in response to changes in the cost associated with that movement. 
this is done by applying an elasticity parameter which represents all responses other than route choice.  
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according to vehicle type (e.g. passenger cars, buses, freight vehicles) and different classes of car 
driver (eg with different incomes) may be represented.  Each demand segment will have its own route 
choice  parameters. 
 
Assignment models are appropriate for modelling relatively short finite periods of time.  They are often 
used to model periods when demand is over capacity and when drivers tolerate a certain amount of 
delay due to congestion, leading to extended journey times.  Traffic assignment models are usually 
applied to examine traffic on a portion of day (e.g. morning peak) - though representation of peak and 
off-peak periods  (in two independent phases) is recommended.  Representation of assignment on a 
daily basis is possible even if more complex. 
 
Several software packages implementing tactical assignment models exist, e.g. CONTRAM, SATURN, 
DYNAMIT-P, DYNASMART-P.  
 
Conventional demand/supply interaction models 
 
The conventional demand/supply interaction models are characterised by the presence of four 
components: 
 
1. A trip generation sub-model which estimates the number of trips with origin and destination in 
each zone using land-use and/or socio-economic data. 
2. A trip distribution sub-model estimating where the trips from a particular origin zone are going to 
(i.e. which is the destination zone). 
3. A modal split sub-model which estimates the proportion of trips between each zone by transport 
mode. 
4. An assignment sub-model which allocates trips to particular routes through the transportation 
system. 
  
Some of these models also represent a fifth choice  - choice of departure time  – whereby travellers 
decide, in response to generalised cost changes, to travel in a different time period (e.g. off-peak 
rather than peak, or at 08:00 rather than at 08:30).  It is generally accepted that the positioning of this 
choice in the sequential series outlined above will vary with journey purpose.  It is good practice, when 
using a demand/supply interaction model, to employ feedback loops to ensure that the final result is in 
equilibrium but, due to the high computing costs that this may incur, it is common practice to stop short 
of this ideal. 
 
In conventional demand/supply interaction models, unlike most tactical models, the trip matrix is 
allowed to vary in response to changes in network conditions (or pricing policies).   This step forward 
in the analysis adds realism to the simulation and widens the range of causes and effects that can be 
analysed.  At the same time, the complexity of the model increases.  For instance, even if the focus is 
on road modes and networks (e.g. a motorway where a defined pricing scheme is implemented), 
information on alternative non-road modes costs, travel times, observed demand, etc. will be needed.  
 
As for tactical models, different demand segments are identified according to trip purpose (e.g. 
commuting, personal, etc.) and person type (eg income level) in order to allow for differences in 
response. 
 
Demand/supply interaction models work at the same scale of tactical models. So interurban corridors 
are often analysed, while in an urban context, demand/supply interaction models generally cover a 
whole city or town and are used to evaluate schemes and policies which are expected to have large 
scale effects over a considerable geographical area.  They tend to be used for long term forecasting, 
perhaps as far as 20 or 30 years ahead.  
 
Among others, software packages implementing demand/supply interaction models are VISUM, 
EMME/2, MINUTP, TransCAD, DAVISUM. 
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Integrated land use and transport models 
 
Land Use and Transport models (LUTR) have been developed to take into account that the 
development of the transport system influences the location decisions of landlords, investors, firms 
and households.  The main characteristic of integrated land use and transport models is that the socio-
economic inputs required by a transport model are provided by a land use model, instead of being 
provided exogenously.  Thus, the modelling of the transport side in LUTR models is generally 
entrusted to a demand/supply interaction model that uses matrices produced by a land-use module 
(where location and socio-economic activities are simulated).  In turn, the transport model calculates a 
generalised cost of transport, which is fed back into the land use model. 
 
Using a LUTR model, urban road transport is included in a wider perspective as one of the (main) 
determinants of zone accessibility.  Therefore, in addition to transport issues addressed by a 
conventional demand/supply interaction model, additional questions can be explored, e.g. how 
transportation improvements or changes in travel costs might, in a perfect market, shift the distribution 
of residents in an urban area or how a new motorway can affect the location of activities.  The price to 
pay for building this kind of models is that much more data is needed and the effort required to set-up 
the models is much higher. 
 
A number of integrated urban land use and transport systems are in use today; among the most 
popular, MEPLAN and TRANUS can be named.  They use different theoretical references and 
modelling techniques.  For instance, the measure of accessibility can be an attribute of a specific zone 
or can be given for each O/D pair.  Another significant difference concerns the modelling of location 
choices: some models are pivoted around interaction between different activities and estimate at the 
same time locations and trips matrices, while other models include a specific module for location and a 
separate module for estimating matrix.  The former models are more complex to use, but ensure more 
coherence to results. 
 
Integrated land use transport models differ in their detail (some have very few zones but might include 
many different types of trips and land uses, others have more zones but might include less 
disaggregation of trips and land uses).  They also differ in respect of the treatment of time; some 
provide predictions only for a single year, whereas others produce a sequence of predictions showing 
how an urban area might evolve over time as its land use gradually responds to evolving 
accessibilities. 
 
Microsimulation models 
 
Microsimulation models are based on three main pillars: 
 
1. the ability to accurately represent any road network geometry; 
2. the ability of simulating single vehicles and using behavioural models that can account for drivers’ 
reactions; 
3. a dynamic assignment of vehicles on the network.   
 
On the network side, dedicated graphic tools allow the representation of road networks in minute 
detail, coding of geometric data (length, number of lanes, width of lanes, etc.) including signalling 
systems (e.g. traffic-lights and their timing) etc.  This capability enables microsimulation models to 
simulate the sensitivity of traffic conditions to supply elements that macro models cannot take into 
account.  For instance, it is possible to analyse the effects of a traffic-lights timing or of vehicles 
entering motorways from access ramps taking account even of limited peaks of congestion that 
disappear when the average speed is considered. 
 
Further capabilities of microsimulation models are: 
 
1. Short term forecasting, e.g. use of real-time evaluation of a set of possible interventions following 
an incident on a motorway, or to predict emissions so that plans which restrict cars entering the 
city centre can be implemented if the predicted emissions rise above a set level.   
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2. Providing inputs to car driving simulators.  Sophisticated driving simulators are being developed to 
allow the assessment of many new in-car systems in a totally safe environment.  Microsimulation 
models can be used to provide realistic interactive scenarios for the simulator. 
 
One disadvantage of this capability is that very detailed information is required to design and set up a 
microsimulation model.  This means that the complexity of the model grows exponentially with the 
scale of the application and, therefore, such models need large computational power for larger 
networks.  Hence, their application has been originally confined to only very limited parts of any 
network, but, more recently, microsimulation has been also applied to model much larger networks, in 
particular urban networks with more than one hundred nodes. 
   
Among the software implementing microsimulation models, the most well known are: AIMSUN, 
VISSIM and PARAMICS. 
 
No simple categorisation of models can be entirely satisfactory because models are constantly being 
developed which do not fall neatly into any simple category.  An example of some relevance to pricing 
studies is the Bottleneck Model.  Bottleneck models are used to represent the performance of critical 
parts of a network under high demand.  These models are similar to microsimulation models in that 
they pay great regard to the detailed build up and performance of queues but they may be 
operationalised through a series of mathematical equations rather than via representation of individual 
vehicles and they may allow for elastic demand.  An example would be the model produced by de 
Palma et al (2002). 
 
Synthesis 
 
With some notable exceptions, the four approaches above can be classified on the basis of the 
following key characteristics, which are relevant with respect to the analysis of differentiation of road 
charges on motorways and in urban areas: 
 
¾ Fixed or variable demand 
Most tactical and microsimulation models assume that pattern of road demand is constant over 
the modelled period and any simulated measure can affect route choice, but does not change the 
amount of demand on the origin-destination pairs.  On the other hand, in conventional 
demand/supply interaction models as well as in land use and transport models, the amount and 
the pattern of road demand can change over time.  Therefore, the second group of models allow 
simulating a wider set of impacts of charge differentiation schemes.   
 
¾ Modelling of route choice 
Assuming that one of the main effects of motorways tolling and urban road charging schemes is a 
re-arrangement of routes, the capability of providing a realistic simulation of path choice is a key 
feature of models.  From this point of view, there are three aspects that can make a difference 
between models.  First, assignment algorithms should include congestion effects by relating 
travel costs to the flow patterns.  If there is no capacity restraint, the travel costs are assumed to 
be constant at all levels of flow, which is of course unrealistic.  Second, static models assume that 
demand (or any other element of the model) is constant over the modelled period, assuming that 
link flows (and other outputs) are steady.  On the other hand, dynamic models allow for time-
varying demand, usually by splitting the modelled period into a number of time intervals and 
generating a trip matrix for each time interval.  Third, some models use deterministic methods, 
where it is assumed that all drivers, in a same group, are identical in their perceptions of travel 
costs.  Stochastic methods, allowing for between-driver variation in travel costs add realism to the 
simulation.  The modelling of route choice is a feature of the specific software used rather than of 
the modelling approach discussed above.  It can be noted however, that microsimulation models 
are always dynamic models, while currently most of the demand/supply interaction models and of 
the land use and transport models do not allow simulating time-varying demand. 
 
¾ Mathematical or simulation based  
Mathematical methods are macroscopic in nature, treating the flow of traffic as if it was a 
continuous flow.  As a consequence, mathematical relations can be written to express the flow 
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continuity conditions and equilibrium or optimality conditions, and the process of finding the 
assigned flows can be expressed as a formal mathematical optimisation problem.  Simulation-
based methods, applied in microsimulation models use a microscopic traffic flow, tracking the 
location and path of each vehicle.  They therefore give a more realistic picture of the traffic flow 
through the network, in that individual vehicles can be tracked and the movements displayed.  
However, simulation-based methods generally lack any formal proofs of convergence.  In 
principle, segmentation of demand is very important when differentiation schemes are simulated.  
However, modelling single vehicles does not mean a full segmentation of demand (i.e. in 
microsimulation models parameters are not defined for each vehicle, but only for class of 
vehicles), so this aspect can be considered as neutral with respect of the analysis of charging 
differentiation schemes. 
 
¾ Modelling whole urban areas or portion of network 
Tactical models, demand/supply interaction models and land use and transport models are 
conveniently applied to large areas.  Microsimulation models can also be set-up only for large 
networks provided that enough computational power is available.  As the analysis of effects of 
motorways tolls and charges for urban road users often requires comparing the impacts in large 
parts of the network, it can be said that microsimulation models are more limited from this point of 
view. 
 
From the review above, it emerges that for simulating the various impacts of a road charging scheme, 
it is useful to use a modelling tool able to deal with more than route choice.  In urban or metropolitan 
areas, land-use models can be useful to enlarge the perspective of the analysis.  When an interurban 
corridor is considered, land use aspects are less relevant and a demand/supply interaction model can 
be useful.  Therefore, for the ex-ante simulation of impacts of further toll differentiation on the 
motorway section of the Brenner corridor which will be carried out DIFFERENT in later stages, a 
demand/supply interaction model will be used, where both passengers and freight demand is 
simulated.  
 
5.2.2 RAIL TRANSPORT 
 
There is a relatively small amount of literature on forecasting the demand for passenger rail services, 
as compared with that relating to the forecasting of road passenger traffic.  Within the area three broad 
types of methodology exist: 
 
¾ Aggregate direct demand models; 
¾ Disaggregate demand models; and 
¾ Mode choice and assignment models 
 
The aim of this section is to describe the main features of each methodology and indicate examples of 
their use.  The examples focus on those that are freely available within the research domain, where as 
there are further examples of rail models developed within rail companies or consultancies that are 
subject to confidentiality. 
 
Aggregate direct demand and elasticity models 
 
The approach involves relating the demand for rail travel between two stations in a given period (the 
dependent variable) to a vector of explanatory variables whose influence on demand is described by a 
set of model parameters.  Whilst the precise functional form of the demand expression varies from 
study to study, Fowkes et al (2004) identify a range of commonly used explanatory variables including: 
 
¾ Rail fares – derived from fares manuals or more commonly average revenue estimates; 
¾ Timetable related service quality – derived from timetables and includes in-vehicle time, service 
frequency, interchange requirement and connection time; 
¾ Access and egress times – derived from analysis of cross sectional data in the definition of 
station catchment areas; 
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¾ Rolling stock quality – the ‘unpacking’ of rolling stock quality attributes such as comfort, ride 
quality, cleanliness, availability of toilets, telephones etc. is usually obtained through market 
research whereas the total effect can be assessed using aggregate ticket sales data; 
¾ Performance - punctuality and reliability indices derived from published sources; 
¾ Competition – the influence of the price and quality of competing modes of transport (car, bus, 
coach, air); 
¾ Exogenous factors – derived from analysis of cross-sectional data to examine the influence of 
changes in population demographics, income (GDP) and car ownership on rail demand;  
¾ Time trend - to account for other secular trends; and 
¾ Dummy variables – to account for seasonality or other shocks to the system (e.g. rail 
privatisation). 
 
Four of the most commonly applied aggregate demand modelling methodologies are: 
 
¾ the Passenger Demand Forecasting Handbook (PDFH) - This is a manual of advice maintained 
by the Association of Train Operating Companies in Britain.  It provides a framework for the 
application of elasticities of demand and rail attribute valuation to facilitate forecasts of the 
aggregate demand response to changes in: 
 
• fares; 
• journey time, service frequency and interchange; 
• reliability and punctuality; 
• non-timetable related service quality (e.g. rolling stock quality, crowding); 
• new services and station access; 
• competition between operators; and 
• the external environment (e.g. GDP, car ownership, employment, cross modal competition); 
  
¾ The Rail Industry Framework (RIF) Model - Developed by consultants Steer Davies Gleave, RIF 
was designed to focus on the effect of external factors on rail demand.  The key demand drivers 
are similar to those identified in the PDFH but are adapted to take better account of the influence 
of changes in GDP on rail demand by journey purpose and to identify the contribution that 
changes in car ownership and road congestion have on rail demand. 
¾ MOIRA - Owned and maintained by AEAT, MOIRA again uses the same basic methodology as 
outlined in the PDFH but provides software to calculate changes in generalised journey time and 
consequently demand for all O/D pairs following a timetable change; it also allocates ticket 
revenue between competing operators.   
¾ The LYTHGOE Model - This model is centred on the specification of station catchment areas and 
competition between stations.  It forecasts the share of traffic travelling from a given origin zone 
to a given destination station via a given origin station as a function of: 
• fare and timetable related service quality of competing origin stations to the destination 
station;  
• population in zones around origin and destination stations; 
• access times and distances from origin population zones to origin and competitor origin 
stations; 
• egress times and distances from destination and competitor destination stations to 
destination population zones; and 
• quality and cost of competing car travel. 
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Disaggregate demand models 
 
The approach seeks to model individual choice and demand rather than forecasting collective 
behaviour such as market shares of travel flows.  The individual, in making a choice, expresses a 
preference amongst a set of alternatives which can be explained by their socio-economic 
characteristics and the attributes of the choice alternatives.  The approach is thought to have better 
theoretical foundations based on the economic theory of the consumer and, as such, the models aim 
to explain causality rather than simply capture correlations.  They can be readily calibrated to either 
revealed preference (RP) data, stated preference (SP) data or a combination of both.  
 
Many disaggregate demand models have been calibrated but have generally been tailored to a 
specific task or set of circumstances, and are therefore not readily transferable to other situations.  An 
exception to this is the PRAISE (Privatised Rail Services) model which was developed at the Institute 
for Transport Studies, University of Leeds to look at the potential for open access competition following 
the privatisation of rail services.  The model was initially developed to assess competition on the 
Leeds to London corridor but it has subsequently been applied to other routes in the UK and 
elsewhere. 
 
PRAISE has, more recently, been re-written and developed on behalf of the UK Strategic Rail 
Authority as a Windows software package capable of assessing demand and costs for small networks 
of stations incorporating the services of up to 5 operators, each with 10 different ticket types.  The 
software comprises:  
 
¾ a hierarchical disaggregate demand model, the lower level of which forecasts market shares for 
each service and ticket combination, with the upper level allowing for the rail market to expand or 
contract according to the overall level of service.  The model is also able to forecast ticket 
revenue by operator; 
¾ a cost model which allows costs to be varied by operator and rolling stock type and which can be 
combined with estimates of revenue to generate forecasts of operator profitability; and 
¾ an evaluation model, incorporating the model’s various outputs - passenger demand, passenger 
distance, operator revenue, operator costs, profitability, user benefits (consumer surplus), 
overcrowding, and diversion to and from other modes. 
 
Mode choice and assignment models 
 
Fowkes et al (2004) explain that these models typically estimate changes to base demand using either 
aggregate multi-modal choice models or aggregate elasticity models based on generalised cost or 
generalised journey time.  The forecast demand is then assigned to the network of services using a 
standard assignment routine which works on the basis of a hierarchy of optimal passenger strategies 
to transverse the network.   
 
Two examples of this approach, used in the UK are: 
 
¾ The National Rail Model (NRM) - Developed by Faber Maunsell on behalf of the Department for 
Transport, this is a strategic model covering all rail stations in Britain, as well as those on the 
London Underground.  Fowkes et al (2004) explain that “the model works in an iterative way 
moving through a number of key sub-models, the most important being a mode choice model and 
a trip assignment model” (Fowkes et al, 2004).  A multi-modal trip matrix is generated by the 
mode choice model, and this matrix is then passed to the EMME/2 assignment package which 
loads a passenger demand matrix to a network of rail services.  The assignment is based on the 
concept of optimal strategies whereby passengers choose a set of paths through the network and 
board the first train to arrive at their destination; as opposed to an individual based choice 
mechanism  
¾ The PLANET Suite of models - Also based on the EMME/2 network assignment package, this  
was originally commissioned by British Rail in the early 1990s and developed more recently  by 
Jacobs and Atkins on behalf of the UK Strategic Rail Authority.  Fowkes et al (2004) explain that 
“the model works by assigning a base demand matrix to the network, before estimating base 
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generalised journey time matrices which are passed to an elasticity model to estimate the 
demand impact of changes to the network” (Fowkes et al, 2004).  The revised demand matrix is 
then fed back into the assignment model to be loaded onto the network to generate forecasts of 
passenger kilometres, total passenger hours, un-crowded passenger hours, crowded passenger 
hours, passenger boardings and train kilometres.  
 
Summary 
 
For rail, it would appear that there are no existing models that directly address the questions being 
analysed within DIFFERENT.  One key difficulty is that most existing rail models are based on some 
sort of built-in response or elasticity on the part of end-users, but one issue for DIFFERENT is that we 
do not yet have sufficient evidence on responses to changes in infrastructure charges on the part of 
operators.  More generally, existing models focus on the end-user market rather than the market for 
infrastructure services.  As highlighted earlier, the perspective of rail models tends to be that of 
individuals that have to choose among alternatives.  Costs, times, etc. are those incurred by end-users 
(I.E. passengers) rather than operators.  The end-user market and the market for infrastructure 
services are, of course, linked, so it may be fruitful to have a model of infrastructure services somehow 
linked to a model of end-user demand so as to estimate the knock-on effects, or so as to allow for 
iteration between the demand for infrastructure services and the demand by end users.  Such an 
exercise may, however, not be possible within DIFFERENT’S resources and we may need to take a 
more pragmatic approach.  It may be possible to adapt one of the existing models of rail demand for 
use in modelling demand for infrastructure services.  Alternatively, it may be possible to use one or 
more of the existing models (The National Rail Model, PRAISE or PDFH for example) to test scenarios 
and generate outputs to serve as input to discussions with industry stakeholders. 
 
 
5.2.3 AIRPORTS 
 
In the case of airports (and similarly for railways and even more so for ports), there are very few 
models addressing the issue of differentiation of tariffs.  Most modelling efforts have been devoted to 
analyse demand behaviour, though there are also some models of interest that consider the case of 
congestion and environmental impacts.  In what follows the following types of models are considered: 
 
¾ Airport demand models; 
¾ Airport congestion pricing models; 
¾ Airport pricing models based on environmental damage and noise. 
 
Airport demand models 
 
Two main types of models can be used for airport demand (SH&E, 2003): 
 
¾ Airport demand allocation models; 
¾ Air service forecasting models. 
 
Airport demand allocation models 
 
These models try to explain the catchments area of several airports that are in competition, at least for 
some types of traffic.  For instance, Ashford and Benchemam (1987) considered the air fare, flight 
frequency and access travel time as the most important explanatory variables.  Other authors like 
Harvey (1988) include also some measure of ground access quality.  The air fare variable seems to be 
very significant, particularly for non-business passengers. Other more recent studies in this respect 
are Pels et al. (2003) and Mandel (1999) 
 
Air service forecasting models 
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These are typically aggregated models of demand forecasting in which future demand levels are 
explained by other variables as past demand levels, airport charges, or even macroeconomic 
indicators of the region where the airport is located, and so on. 
 
The analysis of demand is closely related with the concept of elasticity that in turn is very relevant for 
the DIFFERENT purposes.  It should be mentioned here, however, that direct estimates of airport 
price demand elasticities are very scarce.28  On the contrary, estimates of price demand elasticities in 
the case of airlines services (i.e. final demand or airline services that relates passengers carried by 
airlines and air fares as paid by passengers) are abundant.29 
 
Airport congestion pricing models 
 
Airport congestion pricing models look for optimal congestion charges, taking into account the effects 
that different prices have on delay costs and traffic rates. Models of congested air transportation 
systems fall into three categories (Daniel and Pahwa, 2000): 
 
¾ Standard peak-load pricing models  
¾ Deterministic bottleneck models 
¾ Stochastic bottleneck models 
Detailed characteristics of each of these models are described below. 
 
Standard peak-load pricing models 
 
Peak-load pricing models determine equilibrium congestion fees from estimated demand and delay 
functions that vary by time of day (see, for example, Morrison, 1983, and Morrison and Winston, 
1989).  Demand functions give the hourly airport demand by each type of aircraft, with demand in each 
period being a function of its average full price (monetary price plus the value of delay time). These 
models have non-structural specifications of delay functions and ignore traffic adjustments in response 
to congestion fees.  
 
By imposing a congestion fee equal to the cost of the difference in time between the marginal social 
delay and the private delay curves, the equilibrium moves to the intersection of the marginal social 
cost (delay) and marginal social benefit (demand).   In this setup, equilibrium congestion fees for each 
hour are computed. 
 
Deterministic bottleneck models 
 
Deterministic bottleneck models include intertemporal traffic adjustment, but use simple queuing or 
delay processes (see, for example, Vickrey, 1969, and Arnott et al., 1993).  Traffic rates and queue 
lengths are determined endogenously.  
 
Originally designed to model highway congestion, the bottleneck model is also applicable to aircraft 
queuing during arrival and departure banks at an airport.  To minimize connection and layover costs, 
hub-and-spoke networks schedule arrivals and departures at hub airports in banks of flights.  Unlike 
standard peak-load pricing models, these models estimate efficiency gains from congestion pricing 
when traffic rates adjust intertemporally in response to the fees. 
 
Stochastic bottleneck models 
 
Pure queuing-theoretic models capture the effects of stochastic arrivals on the evolution of queues, 
but assume exogenous arrival rates and do not include intertemporal traffic adjustments.  The 
stochastic bottleneck model, due to Daniel (1995, 2001), adds stochastic shocks to aircraft operating 
times and time-dependent stochastic queuing theory to deterministic bottleneck models.  In summary, 
                                                     
28  See for instance Kanafani and Gobrial (1985) 
29  See for instance Oum et al. (1992) for a survey on this. 
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the stochastic bottleneck model includes stochastic queues, time-varying traffic rates, and 
endogenous, intertemporal adjustment of traffic in response to queuing delay and fees. 
 
One of the main differences between deterministic and bottleneck models relates to the fact that the 
stochastic model produces smooth and continuous variation in traffic rates because of the non-linear 
relationship between traffic rates and expected queue length.  However, in deterministic bottleneck 
models, traffic rates are step functions over time. 
 
The stochastic model determines equilibrium traffic patterns, queuing delays, lay-over costs, 
congestion fees, airport revenues, efficiency gains, and distributional effects of congestion pricing.  
 
Daniel and Pahwa (2000) compare the three empirical models of airport congestion pricing explained 
above.  They conclude that the models produce similar traffic patterns under weight-based pricing, but 
differ significantly under congestion pricing.  Moreover, they demonstrate the importance of structural 
modelling of endogenous, stochastic traffic rates and queues that produce lower fees at peak and 
slack-demand periods than other models.  They also show the advantage of tolls that vary 
continuously- instead of by hour- to spread the peak and moderate extreme fee levels.  By 
demonstrating that such a charge involves modest changes in average fee levels and retains periods 
of low priced airport access, Daniel and Pahwa try to make this pricing mechanism more acceptable 
by policy makers, the industry and the public. 
 
Airport pricing models based on environmental damage and noise  
 
Airport charges may differ depending on the environmental damage and noise that airlines’ operations 
impose to the society. However, there are few articles in the literature forecasting the effects that such 
differentiated charges will have on the demand and the social welfare of the overall economy. 
 
Most of the studies use the hedonic price method to estimate the social cost derived from aircrafts 
noise and environmental pollution in the vicinity of the airport. This method is based on the household 
equilibrium marginal willingness to pay, which is used to extract the implicit prices of certain 
characteristics which determine property values, such as location, attributes of the neighbourhood and 
community, as well as environmental quality. 
 
The environmental charge level is optimal if the rate is determined at a level where the marginal social 
cost of the externalities equals the marginal abatement cost of airlines. 
 
Once the optimal environmental charge has been computed, the implications of such a charge on 
airline costs can be easily obtained. With an appropriate estimation of the demand elasticity and taking 
into account the market characteristics in which airlines are operating, the effects of different 
environmental charges on passengers demand can be also estimated.  
 
 
5.2.4 MARITIME TRANSPORT 
 
The text below relates to models and methods that are most commonly used to assess the relative 
attractiveness and competitiveness of seaports, some of which are related to price elasticities. 
However, there do not appear to be models that have been used specifically to predict effects of 
differentiated charges in ports. 
 
Multicriteria analysis  
An accepted rationale of port selection by shipping lines relates to the combined importance of quality 
of infrastructures, costs, service and geographical location.  Multicriteria analysis enables port 
preference to be assessed based on the relative importance given to specific port selection criteria 
(Song and Yeo, 2004; Guy and Urli, 2006).  Multicriteria analysis starts with the definition of a problem 
or a choice to be made, and the identification of possible alternatives.  The results then help to 
influence and guide decision makers towards the criteria that need to be taken into account and their 
relative importance.  With this information, different mathematical models can be used to produce an 
overall ranking of the alternatives considered. 
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Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is a multi criteria decision making approach that employs pairwise 
comparisons to arrive at a scale of preferences among a set of alternatives.  In AHP, a decision 
problem is decomposed into a hierarchy.  In the context of ports, decomposing a choice ‘problem’ 
involves the structuring of a hierarchy in terms of the decision to select a given port, based on 
selection criteria, and decision alternative (i.e. other ports).  Primary data can then be collected (e.g. 
through questionnaires) based on selected criteria for a given sample of ports.  Using AHP 
methodology in a decision problem involves four steps (Zahedi, 1986): 
1. Structuring the decision hierarchy (i.e. criteria, decision alternatives); 
2. Collecting input data, depicted by matrices of pairwise comparisons, of decision elements; 
3. Using the eigenvalue method to estimate relative weights of decision elements; 
4. Aggregating relative weights of decision elements to arrive at ratings for decision alternatives. 
 
In work by Lirn et al (2004), employing AHP methodology, the focus was on capturing the significance 
of subjective judgements affecting port selection.  While supporting the role of qualitative factors in 
port selection, they argued that monetary costs remained the most significant factor in deciding a 
port’s attractiveness.  Port attractiveness has also been assessed using Likert-style questionnaires to 
solicit the opinions of shipping lines that are major port users (Ng, 2006).  Results have tended to 
suggest that port choice reflects a mixture of different factors, and that monetary and time factors on 
their own were insufficient to decide port attractiveness. 
 
Optimisation techniques 
 
Optimisation techniques is another method whereby factors such as the optimal location of ports and 
the consequent configuration of shipping service networks may be evaluated (Horner & O’Kelly, 2001; 
Baird, 2002).  Use of multicriteria analysis was initially developed in reaction to perceived 
shortcomings of classic optimisation.  Decision makers can rarely select a course of action on the 
basis of a single factor.  Thus, decision making involves many criteria being taken into account and 
their relative importance.  Nevertheless, optimisation remains central in transportation studies in 
general and particularly in research on shipping service networks (especially container shipping). 
 
In their study, Veldman and Buckmann (2003) analysed the routing of West European container flows 
from the perspective of expansion of container terminal capacity at the port of Rotterdam.  Logit 
models were tested to explain the market shares of traffic zones in the continental and overseas 
hinterland of the port of Rotterdam.  Veldman et al (2005) extended this work by considering draft 
limitations at various hub ports as an explanatory variable in determining market shares as part of a 
range of quality of service and cost aspects.  Based on data for 2001 and 1997, the quality of service 
variable was split into components such as Mohring effect variable, expressing quality of service 
aspects related to service frequency; a maritime access cost variable, expressing the additional costs 
of including a port in a shipping route; and a maritime resistance variable, expressing the time ships 
have to wait for the tide. 
 
Port simulation models 
 
Simulation models have been used extensively in the planning and analysis of ship-berth 
requirements.  A variety of simulation models regarding port operations, coded in different simulation 
languages, have been developed by Gambardella et al (1998), Shabayek and Yeung (2002), and 
Demirci (2003).  The impact of the arrival process of ships on the efficiency of the loading and 
unloading processes in port simulations was assessed by van Asperen et al (2003).  Veenstra et al 
(2003) presented an economic evaluation of container terminals by operational simulations of 
generated cash flows.   
 
Most container terminal systems are sufficiently complex to warrant simulation analysis to determine 
system performance.  Simulation is recommended for analysing ship-berth link performance.  Ship-
berth link simulation models can be written by using general-purpose algorithmic languages and 
simulation languages (Schriber, 1991).  Simulation modelling has been found to be a very effective 
method to examine the impact of introducing priority berthing for certain classes of ships.  Simulation 
                                                         DELIVERABLE 2.1
 
Date: 18/1/2007 Deliverable 2.1 Page 75
 
can also lead to a reduction in ship queues, and the average time a ship spends in a queue.  
However, as cost is a key measure in the selection of alternative strategies, ideally research needs to 
incorporate a cost analysis of the ship-berth link (Dragovic et al, 2005). 
The ATENCO study undertaken on behalf of DG TREN (Analysis of the main Trans-European 
Network Ports’ Cost Structures) sought to provide input for an EU strategy to achieve efficient pricing 
in ports (Haralambides et al, 2001).  ATENCO used a questionnaire approach to gather information 
from ports and port users on pricing principles and strategies.  The survey was complemented by a 
quantitative simulation exercise, which showed how different pricing schemes would affect traffic 
volumes in individual ports, with a focus on container traffic.  Findings suggested that an across the 
board adherence to a specific pricing discipline may be expected to bring equality to the European port 
scene in the long run.  However, short term implications would vary substantially.   
 
5.2.5 STRATEGIC MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT (I.E. TRANSTOOLS, SCENES, ETC) 
 
A relevant category of models consists of multimodal models used at strategic level for analysing 
mobility.  In Europe there are several examples of such strategic models, using similar of dissimilar 
approaches.  In the following, first a brief description of major examples of such models is provided, 
then considerations on the capability of such a type of models of dealing with tariff differentiation are 
being presented. 
 
The TRANS-TOOLS model 
 
TRANS-TOOLS is a research project co-funded by the European Commission under the 6th 
Framework Programme for Research and Development.  The project aims to produce a European 
transport network model covering both passengers and freight, as well as intermodal transport, that 
overcomes the shortcomings of other existing European transport network models.  The philosophy of 
the model is to build upon available models, taking the best features of each and linking these models 
in one software-based tool.   
 
The TRANS-TOOLS model is made-up of different modules.  These model components exchange 
information according to a sequential approach although feed-back effects are taken into account (e.g. 
transport costs and times produced by the assignment model are fed back to the modal split model). 
 
The core parts of the model are, on the one side, the freight/logistics model based on the NEAC model 
and the SLAM model and, on the other side, the passenger model based on principles developed in 
the ASTRA and VACLAV models.  Main inputs for these two models are the transport network, the 
socio-economic data and the transport level of service produced by the assignment model developed 
for TRANS-TOOLS.  The model is refined by the inclusion of a spatial computable general equilibrium 
model, SCGE, based on the CGEurope principles, where transport costs/accessibility is a driving force 
for computing indirect effects (change in regional GDP) which are then fed in the freight and 
passenger models.  The geographical coverage of the model is the enlarged EU plus accession 
countries and countries at the borders of the EU.  The new member states and accession countries 
are modelled at the same zoning level as the EU-15, which is covered the NUTS-2 level, and NUTS-3 
zones for the assignment phase for both the passenger and the freight models. 
 
The TRANS-TOOLS model improves previous experience from several point of view.  Major points 
concern a detailed treatment of intermodality and logistic chains, the inclusion of intercontinental flows 
(mainly for freight), the treatment of the feed back between infrastructure development end the 
economy, a methodology to include local traffic and address the effect of congestion on long distance 
traffic.   For more information on the TRANS-TOOLS model see Burgess, A., et al. (2004). 
 
The SCENES model  
 
The SCENES model has been developed within several European projects.  SCENES is a four-stage 
transport model, covering EU25 countries (plus Switzerland and Norway) with zones defined at the 
NUTS 2 level, while other European countries are more coarsely represented.  The model simulates 
both passenger and freight transport and all relevant modes are considered: car, rail, air, ferry and 
coach for passengers; road, rail, maritime, inland navigation, air and pipeline for freight.  Different road 
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freight vehicles are considered according to their size.  At the same time, both passenger and freight 
demand is segmented into a substantial number of homogeneous segments, with each of them facing 
transport supply characteristics that are appropriate to that segment.   
 
Modal split is dealt with using a logit algorithm based on generalised cost.  Monetary cost (as well as 
value of time) is defined separately for each demand segment, transport mode and, for some modes, 
also type of service (e.g. high speed rail vs conventional rail).  Path choice is modelled by means of a 
stochastic user equilibrium (SUE) algorithm also based on generalised cost.  Monetary costs per link 
are modelled (e.g. tolls for each vehicle type allowed on motorways).  More details on SCENES can 
be found in ME&P et al. (2000). 
 
The NEAC model 
 
The NEAC model is a strategic freight model at the European level (not only EU countries but whole 
Europe: about 200 regions are in the database, most of which defined according to the NUTS 2 
geographical classification).  The model is built around the ‘transport chain’ concept, i.e.: the good is 
followed from the place of production via transhipment locations to the place of consumption where 
several modes can be used.  The modes road, rail, inland waterways, sea and rest (pipeline, air) are 
available to for the transport chain.  The transported products are coded into 11 commodity groups, at 
the so-called NSTR-1 digit level (or NSTR chapters, 10 in total) and a separate category for crude oil. 
The model is conceived to simulate the observed transport flows and to forecast the future transport 
flows in terms of multimodal chains across regions.  Therefore, a modal split module is included in 
NEAC where the modal-split is dependent upon a number of important factors.  The module is based 
on a segmentation of the transport markets.  Within each segment the development of the modal split 
is dependent on the transport time and the cost of transport of each mode in relation to other modes 
(cross elasticities).  Such elasticities are different for each mode and according to commodity groups, 
distance and total tonnage on relations transported.   For more elements on the NEAC model see NEA 
(1999).   
 
The VACLAV model 
 
The VACLAV model is a network-based Europe-wide forecasting model for passenger traffic.  The 
model structure follows the classic four-step approach of trip generation, trip distribution, modal choice 
and trip assignment.  The zonal system underlying the passenger transport demand modelling is 
NUTS 3.  The geographical scope of the model is the European continent.  Demand is segmented into 
two groups: business and non-business trips. 
 
Within VACLAV, the modal choice set comprises four means of transport: passenger car, railway, air 
and coach and a logit model is used to perform modal split.  Several elements describe the utility 
attached to each mode, e.g. costs, times, frequency, number of transfers.  In-vehicle costs are defined 
separately from access/egress costs.  For route choice, generalised users costs are calculated 
(derived from the utility functions in the mode choice model) for every link in the network and shortest 
path algorithms are applied.   A detailed documentation of the VACLAV model is reported by Schoch 
(2004). 
 
The Frisbee model 
 
The Frisbee model was developed in a Finnish project in order to produce an information system for 
freight transport and logistics at the strategic level.  Geographically, the system centres of the model is 
in North-eastern Europe and North-western Russia, but it also roughly covers other European 
countries and other continents.  The freight transport system includes a description of the transport 
networks and terminals as well as the supply of transport services; unit costs at market price for 
modes of transport and type of goods, freight flows classified into 12 product categories and 
information about mitigating factors that affect transport flows. 
 
The Frisbee model is used to analyse modal choice and route choice of freight flows in the study area.  
Therefore, a modal split and a path choice algorithm are implemented in the model.  Costs are major 
determinants of travel behaviour simulated in the model denote and particularly the route choice of 
freight transport.  Unit costs are defined in the model by product group, separately for the transport 
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phase (Euro/ton-km) and the terminal phase (Euro/ton-km) and also varied by region.  For more 
details see Lautso et al. (2005). 
 
The TREMOVE model 
 
TREMOVE is a policy assessment model to study the effects of different transport and environment 
policies on the emissions of the transport sector.  TREMOVE models both passenger and freight 
transport in the EU15 plus 6 extra countries30, and covers the period 1995-2020.  The demand 
baseline is provided to TREMOVE by the SCENES model (see above). 
 
TREMOVE consist of parallel country models, and one maritime model.  Each country model consists 
of three inter-linked ‘core’ modules: a transport demand module, a vehicle turnover module and an 
emission and fuel consumption module31.  The transport demand module describes transport flows 
and the users’ decision making process when it comes to making their modal choice.  Starting from 
the baseline level of demand for passenger and freight transport per mode, the module describes how 
the implementation of a policy measure (or a package of measures) will affect the baseline allocation 
of demand across different modes and different vehicle categories.  It is assumed that the transport 
users will select the volume of transport and their preferred mode based on the generalized cost for 
each alternative and applying Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) between alternatives.  The 
generalized cost is the sum of money costs (including taxes and subsidies) and time costs. 
 
On the passengers side, demand is segmented according to purpose (Commuting, Non-Working 
trips), geographical context (metropolitan, urban, non-urban), distance (short and long distance), time 
of the day (peak and off-peak time), mode (car, bus, motorcycle, slow, train/metro/tram, air), road 
vehicle size (large car, small car) and route type (motorway, other road).  On the freight side, trip 
purposes are replaced by three commodity types: bulk, unitised and general cargo, alternative modes 
available are road, rail and inland navigation and road vehicle types are small and large trucks.  The 
TREMOVE model does not include a network.   Detailed information on the TREMOVE model can be 
found in De Ceuster et al. (2005). 
 
Strategic multimodal models and fare differentiation 
 
From the brief descriptions above, it can be seen that each strategic model has specific features and 
specialisations.  In most of the cases, space is modelled in a relatively detailed way (with respect to 
the overall scale of the models) but the time dimension is ‘collapsed’ into an average day.  In other 
cases (e.g. TREMOVE model), some more detail on the time side is counterbalanced by a coarser 
modelling of space (e.g. no network available).  
 
Essentially, these models have been developed to analyse the transport sector at a large scale and to 
provide responses concerning the impact of elements like infrastructure development, demand growth, 
changes in relative competitiveness of modes, etc.  Pricing is one of the measures that such models 
can handle, but under the consolidated assumption that fares can be different, within each mode, 
according to demand segments (e.g. business and non-business air fares or motorway tolls different 
for trucks and cars).  Other sources of differentiation have not been commonly used or considered at 
the strategic level until a recent past, so models are generally not designed to deal with them.   
 
A major aspect to take into account is that DIFFERENT concerns charges for operators (e.g. tariff to 
access to infrastructure for rail companies, costs of slots for airline companies, etc.), while all of these 
models consider the final end user of services.  Therefore, operator tariffs differentiation can be dealt 
with only under the assumption that the whole difference of tariffs is passed on to the final users. 
 
In the following tables, the capability of the models presented above to simulate fares differentiation is 
summarised for each of the main models.  The sources of differentiation considered in the tables 
below are based on the analysis carried out in chapter 4. 
 
                                                     
30  An ongoing project is aimed at extending the scope of the TREMOVE model, including a full coverage of 
EU25 and other European countries. 
31 A welfare cost module and a life cycle emissions module are also part of the TREMOVE model 
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Road 
Source of differentiation 
Model Road type Destination Time of the day 
Day of the 
week 
Period 
of the 
year 
Vehicle 
type 
Occupancy
/load 
TRANS-
TOOLS 
Yes Partially(2) No No No Partially(4) No 
SCENES Yes Partially(2) No No No Partially(4) No 
NEAC Yes Partially(2) No No No No No 
VACLAV Yes Partially(2) No No No No No 
FRISBEE Yes Partially(2) No No No No No 
TREMOVE Partially(1) Partially(2) Yes(3) No No Partially(4) No 
Table 5.1: Capability of strategic models to simulate road charging differentiation 
(1)  TREMOVE distinguishes Urban, Motorway, Non motorway 
(2)  Different fares can be defined according e.g. to the region of destination, so distinguishing densely populated areas from 
rural areas or according the length of the trip (short distance, long distance), but e.g. fares increasing as city centre is 
approached cannot be defined. 
(3) Peak time or off-peak time 
(4) Two types of road freight vehicles are modelled in TREMOVE according to size, three types are modelled in SCENES still 
according to size.  In TRANS-TOOLS, cars and trucks are modelled.  Emission category is not distinguished in the models. 
 
 
 
 
Rail(1) 
Source of differentiation Model Route Slot time Service type 
TRANS-TOOLS Yes No No 
SCENES Yes No Yes 
NEAC Yes No No 
VACLAV Yes No No 
FRISBEE Yes No No 
TREMOVE No No No 
Table 5.2: Capability of strategic models to simulate road charging differentiation 
 (1)  Tariffs for final users not for rail operators 
 
 
 
Air(1) 
Source of differentiation 
Model Airport Aircraft 
type 
Slot time Day of the 
week 
Period of the 
year 
Domestic or  
international 
TRANS-TOOLS Yes No No No No Yes 
SCENES Yes No No No No Yes 
NEAC No No No No No No 
VACLAV Yes No No No No Yes 
FRISBEE No No No No No No 
TREMOVE No No No No No No 
Table 5.3: Capability of strategic models to simulate air charging differentiation 
 (1) Tariffs for final users not for rail operators 
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Maritime(1) 
Source of differentiation Model Port Vessel size Handling requirements 
TRANS-TOOLS Yes No Yes 
SCENES Yes No Yes 
NEAC Yes No Yes 
VACLAV No No No 
FRISBEE Yes No Yes 
TREMOVE No No No 
Table 5.4: Capability of strategic models to simulate maritime charging differentiation 
 (1) Tariffs for final users not for rail operators 
5.3. CONCLUSION 
The analysis above demonstrates that several modelling approaches are used to analyse transport 
activities in quantitative terms and to forecast impact of measures on either the demand or the supply 
side.  A classification of main approaches can be summarised as follows: 
 
¾ “Mainstream” transport models (four stages): modal split (Logit-type models) and assignment 
algorithms (deterministic/stochastic; static/dynamic); these are used in urban transport models as 
well as in wider models at the European scale.  These models are the most relevant and apply to 
the simulation of all modes of transport even though road demand typically receives more 
attentions; 
¾ microsimulation models, used in the analysis of road demand in urban contexts; 
¾ economic models like e.g. elasticities of substitution models which consider transport demand as 
the result of the behaviour of consumers rather than travellers.; 
 
From the DIFFERENT point of view, there are a number of limitations to these modelling approaches.  
The main issues to be mentioned are: 
 
¾ Road transport is much more analysed than other modes.   
¾ The point of view is generally that of individuals that have to choose among alternatives.  
Therefore, also non-road modes are generally modelled from this perspective: costs, times, etc. 
are those incurred by users.  Decisions of service providers (e.g. railway or airline companies) are 
generally assumed exogenously and not modelled.   
¾ Space is generally modelled in much more detail than time (e.g. route choice much more than 
departure time choice; peak hours or whole average days are modelled and not different periods 
of week or year) but it is more a matter of applications that of methodologies. 
¾ Vehicle differentiation is generally not relevant for the typical models and vehicle fleet size and 
composition is assumed exogenously as the elements which affect it are outside the domain of 
transport models.  Therefore, replacing the vehicle type as reaction to a charging policy are 
generally not addressed by models.    
¾ Most of the models are focused on demand behaviour and derived from engineering and 
statistical analysis.  Other specific contributions about tariff differentiation, especially for the air 
sector, come mainly from the economic analysis and therefore they are quantitative 
methodologies but not simulation models.    
A more general issue which is worth mentioning is that even when, in principle, several given sources 
of differentiation can be dealt with using a model, building a model able to simulate all the charging 
schemes can become a very complex task.  For instance, a correct simulation of different charges 
requires a careful segmentation of demand; so a large number of segments has to be defined and this 
can be very demanding both in computational terms and because of the data requirement.  Therefore, 
actual applications of models are often used to test simple charging schemes rather than complex 
ones. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
The state-of-the-art of the existing body of economic theory on charge differentiation, behavioural 
strategies of adaptation to differentiated charges, current charging structures, and modelling 
approaches for simulating the reaction (transport demand) to price differentiation suggests the 
following conclusions. 
 
Economic theory provides a complex picture.  On the one hand, an analytical stream of economic 
theory suggests the optimal framework (the normative approach) for transport charges differentiation.  
It is reached pursuing economic efficiency, a concept derived from welfare economics, according to 
which transport charges (prices) should equate with marginal social costs in order to obtain the 
maximal social welfare.  This implies that the price of transport services should be provided up to the 
point where the benefit for the marginal unit is equated with the costs of providing that unit (the so-
called first-best rule).   
 
On the other hand, a complementary stream of analysis questions the practical application of the 
concept of marginal cost in transport, due to technological, institutional and political reasons,  
opening the way for deviations from the first-best pricing rules, i.e. towards second-best pricing 
approaches.  This means a move from a normative approach (how transport charges should be in 
order to ensure welfare maximization) towards a positive approach (how transport charges actually are 
in order to take account of several constraints). 
 
In terms of impacts on charge differentiations practice, it can be said that following the normative 
approach a highly degree of charge differentiation is required, i.e. the charges should vary taking 
account simultaneously of several dimensions (variability of vehicle technology, time of travel, place of 
driving, driving style, etc).  Conversely, a less differentiated structure of charges, reducing its intrinsic 
complexity, can be suggested following a positive approach.         
 
The adoption of a less differentiated charge structure also emerges from the behavioural theory, 
according to which there are cognitive limitations that restrict the degree of complexity that people can 
deal with and thus the degree of differentiation possible.  However, the behavioural theory also 
stresses the importance of motivational factors in accepting differentiated charges.  Thus even if 
transport users are able to understand a complex pricing system and to predict prices in advance, it 
does not mean that they are willing to deal with these charges and to adjust their behaviour without a 
certain degree of acceptability. 
 
The contributions provided by the behavioural theory approach assume that there is one point where 
more differentiation of charges does not lead to more users’ adaptation, because people do not 
understand the system anymore.  Thus, when looking at user’s reaction of differentiated pricing, it 
seems reasonable to consider the question of people’s acceptability together with their ability to 
respond to the price signals. 
    
Current practice of the application of charges and, moreover, any differentiation within them is still 
very uneven within Europe as well as between and inside each transport mode.  
 
Road (motorways and urban roads) and rail infrastructure show on average the highest degrees of 
differentiation and convergence, while airport and, even more so, maritime infrastructure lag behind.  
However, the likely future developments are positive.  Promising technological developments, e.g. 
satellite communication devices, the start-up of the European satellite communication system 
GALILEO, extensive production of GPS and in-vehicle devices, etc, are deemed to favour the degree 
of charging differentiation with reference in general to all transport modes and road in particular.  The 
effective realization of that will depend on the complementary convergence in the appropriate 
institutional and political sides.   
 
The capability of the current transport models to simulate the impacts of charges differentiation on 
transport demand and supply depends on their specific features and field of specialization, e.g. the 
mainstream transport models: modal split (logit-type models) and assignment algorithms 
(deterministic/stochastic; static/dynamic) are used in urban transport contexts, strategic multimodal 
models are used for policies assessment affecting multimodal modes, etc.  Concerning the impact 
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assessment of charge differentiation, an important issue to be considered is that generally the 
modelled impacts of charge differentiation concern only the final users (transport demand) and not the 
strategies of transport operators, who pass all the charge variation on to the final consumers.  In 
addition, the impacts arising from charge differentiation suffer from a series of limitations, like the 
prevalence of impact analysis involving road transport and its various dimensions. 
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APPENDIX 1: CHARGING STRUCTURES FOR MOTORWAYS 
Forerunners (distance-based systems)         
           
Country   
Basic 
system 
Vehicle 
scope Geographic scope Differentiation Mark-ups 
Regulatory 
charges 
Use of 
revenues Technology Sources and general comments 
Existing Toll 
>3,5 t (time 
based vignette 
for vehicles 
<3,5 t) 
Motorways & some 
express roads 
General: vehicle class 
(axles) Additional: Type 
of road (Sondermat 
strecken in mountainous 
areas), Time (Brenner 
motorway day/night) 
Sondermaut 
strecken as a 
similar 
concept) 
_ Motorways (Asfinag) DSRC 
http://www.asfinag.at/ 
http://www.asecap.com/english/mem-austria-
en.html http://www.gomaut.at/go/default.asp 
Planned _ _ 
Discussion on 
inclusion of parallel 
roads on hold 
indefinitely 
_ _ _ _ _ No immediate plane 
Austria 
Additional 
opportunities None All vehicles All roads Emissions class 
Brenner 
(Sondrmaut 
strecken may 
already 
correspond to 
the maximum)  
In urban and 
mountainous 
areas 
Other transport 
or not transport 
use 
_ _ 
Existing Toll >12 t Motorways  vehicle class (axles), Emissions (Euro class) _ _ 
Transport 
sector (road, 
rail, inland 
shipping) 
GPS/GSM http://www.bmvbs.de/Verkehr/strasse-,1436/lkw-maut.htm http://www.tollcollect.de 
Planned _ _ 
Discussion on 
inclusion of certain 
parallel roads 
_ _ _ _ _ No plans beyond inclusion of some parallel roads 
Germany 
Additional 
opportunities None All vehicles All roads Emissions class 
Hardly 
applicable 
(possible in 
lower Inn valley 
on Brenner 
link) 
In urban (and 
mountainous 
areas) with 
congestion or 
environmental 
problems 
Other transport 
or not transport 
use 
_ _ 
Source: “A Price Worth Paying”, European Federation for TRANSPORT and ENVIRONMENT”      
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Traditional motorway operators (distance/matrix-based systems) 1/2       
           
Country   Basic system 
Vehicle 
scope Geographic scope Differentiation Mark-ups 
Regulatory 
charges 
Use of 
revenues Technology Sources and general comments 
Existing Toll All vehicles 
Part of motorways 
network (approx. 8000 
km; no tolls on e.g. 
urban motorways, 
some inter-urban 
motorways)  
vehicle class (axles) _ _ Motorways operator DSRC 
http://www.autoroutes.fr 
http.asecap.com.english/mem-france-en.html 
Planned _ _ Additional links (e.g. Alsace?) _ _ _ _ _ No Know plans 
France 
Additional 
opportunities _ _ 
All motorways, all 
roads Emissions class 
Lyon-Turin; 
Pyrenees 
In urban and 
mountainous 
areas 
Other transport 
or not transport 
use 
_ _ 
Existing Toll All vehicles <1000 km motorways vehicle class (axles) _ _ Motorways operators DSRC 
http://www.teo.org.gr 
http://www.asecap.com.english/mem-greece-
en.html 
Planned _ _ ? (possibly additional / new motorways) _ _ _ _ _ No Know plans 
Greece 
Additional 
opportunities _ _ 
All motorways, all 
roads Emissions class 
Possibly to 
Bulgarian 
border 
In urban and 
mountainous 
areas 
Other transport 
or not transport 
use 
_ _ 
Source: “A Price Worth Paying”, European Federation for TRANSPORT and ENVIRONMENT”      
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Country   Basic system 
Vehicle 
scope Geographic scope Differentiation Mark-ups 
Regulatory 
charges 
Use of 
revenues Technology Sources and general comments 
Existing Toll All vehicles Part of motorways network (5600 km) vehicle class (axles) _ _ 
Motorways 
operators DSRC 
http://www.aiscat.it 
http://www.asecap.com.english/mem-italy-
en.html 
Planned _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ No Know plans 
Italy 
Additional 
opportunities _ _ 
All motorways, all 
roads Emissions class 
Brenner link, 
Fréjus/Mont 
Blanc 
In urban and 
mountainous 
areas 
Other transport 
or not transport 
use 
_ _ 
Existing Toll All vehicles Part of motorways network (1300 km) vehicle class (axles) _ _ 
Motorways 
operators DSRC 
http://www.brisa.pt 
http://www.asecap.com/english/mem-
portugal-en.html 
Planned _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ No Know plans 
Portugal 
Additional 
opportunities _ _ 
All motorways, all 
roads Emissions class Not applicable In urban areas 
Other transport 
or not transport 
use 
_ _ 
Existing Toll All vehicles Part of motorways network (2800 km) vehicle class (axles) _ _ 
Motorways 
operators DSRC 
http://www.aseta.es 
http://www.asecap.com.english/mem-spain-
en.html 
Planned _ _ ? (possibly additional / new motorways) _ _ _ _ _ No Know plans 
Spain 
Additional 
opportunities _ _ 
All motorways, all 
roads Emissions class Pyrenean links 
In urban and 
mountainous 
areas 
Other transport 
or not transport 
use 
_ _ 
Source: “A Price Worth Paying”, European Federation for TRANSPORT and ENVIRONMENT”      
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Country   Basic system 
Vehicle 
scope Geographic scope Differentiation Mark-ups 
Regulatory 
charges 
Use of 
revenues Technology Sources and general comments 
Existing Eurovignette: user charge >12 t Motorways 
EURO 0 - EURO IV+, 
3/4 axles _ _ 
Regions for 
transport 
projects 
Manual/Sticker _ 
Planned 
Flat-rat (time-
based) all-
vehicle vignette 
Eurovignette + 
"e-vignette" for 
vehicles under 
12 t 
Motorways/all roads Weight/axles _ _ 
Under 
discussion 
between 
regions. 
Electronic fee 
collection 
using number 
plate 
recognition 
Plans for e-vignette for vehicles under 12t-
scheduled for January 2008. 
Belgium 
Additional 
opportunities 
Distance-based 
charges 
>3,5 t/all 
vehicles All roads 
vehicle class 
(weight/axles); 
emissions 
Not applicable In urban areas 
Other transport 
or not transport 
use 
_ _ 
Existing User charge >12 t Motorways EURO 0 - EURO IV+, 3/4 axles _ _ _ Manual/Sticker _ 
Planned No plans _ _ _ _ _ _ _ No Know plans 
Denmark 
Additional 
opportunities 
Distance-based 
charges 
>3,5 t/all 
vehicles All roads _ Not applicable In urban areas _ _ _ 
Existing User charge >12 t Motorways EURO 0 - EURO IV+, 3/4 axles _ _ _ Manual/Sticker http://www.do.etar.lu/vehaut/eurovignette.htm 
Planned _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ No Know plans 
Luxembourg 
Additional 
opportunities 
Distance-based 
charges 
>3,5 t/all 
vehicles All roads _ Not applicable In urban areas 
Other transport 
or not transport 
use 
_ _ 
Source: “A Price Worth Paying”, European Federation for TRANSPORT and ENVIRONMENT”      
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Netherlands Existing User charge >12 t Motorways EURO 0 - EURO IV+, 3/4 axles _ _ 
Motorways 
operators Manual/Sticker _ 
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Planned Distance-based charges _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
Plans under discussion for possible 
introduction 2008 
Additional 
opportunities 
Distance-based 
charges 
>3,5 t/all 
vehicles All roads _ Not applicable In urban areas 
Other transport 
or not transport 
use 
_ _ 
Existing User charge >12 t Motorways EURO 0 - EURO IV+, 3/4 axles _ 
(Stockholm 
congestion 
charge for all 
vehicles) 
_ Manual/Sticker _ 
Planned Distance-based charges 
> 7,5 t under 
discussion 
Motorways & major 
roads, possible 
regional exceptions 
EURO class, 
Environmental 
characteristics 
_ _ _ _ Plans under discussion not yet finalised 
Sweden 
Additional 
opportunities _ 
>3,5 t/all 
vehicles All roads _ Not applicable In urban areas _ _ _ 
Source: “A Price Worth Paying”, European Federation for TRANSPORT and ENVIRONMENT”      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
Late starters (no system yet)         
           
Country   Basic system 
Vehicle 
scope Geographic scope Differentiation Mark-ups 
Regulatory 
charges 
Use of 
revenues Technology Sources and general comments 
Finland Existing None _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
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Planned None _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Feasibility study but no plans 
Additional 
opportunities 
Distance-based 
charges 
>3,5 t/all 
vehicles All roads Emission Class Not applicable In urban areas 
Other transport 
or not transport 
use 
_ _ 
Existing None (but 3 Tolled links) (all vehicles) (3 motorway links) (Vehicle class) _ _ _ _ http://tinyurl.com/qq4re 
Planned 
Toll (PPP for 
road 
construction) 
All vehicles New roads/motorways _ _ _ PPP _ Provision for public consultation on tolling proposals. 
Ireland 
Additional 
opportunities Toll 
>3,5 t/all 
vehicles All motorways/all roads Emission Class Not applicable In urban areas _ _ _ 
Existing 
None (but 42 
km Tolled  on 
M6) 
(all vehicles) (42 km motorway) (Vehicle class) _ 
(London 
congestion 
charge) 
_ _ http://www.m6toll.co.uk/ 
Planned 
Toll (Lorry 
Road user 
charges, 
LRUC) 
> 3,5 t All roads Vehicle class _ 
(Several cities 
plan 
congestion 
charges) 
Treasury 
(comp. for red. 
excise duty) 
ETC Plans postponed 
United 
Kingdom 
Additional 
opportunities 
None if plans 
realised All vehicles None Emission Class Not applicable In urban areas 
Other transport 
or not transport 
use 
_ _ 
Source: “A Price Worth Paying”, European Federation for TRANSPORT and ENVIRONMENT”      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
New Member States (various situations) 1/2        
           
Country   Basic system 
Vehicle 
scope Geographic scope Differentiation Mark-ups 
Regulatory 
charges 
Use of 
revenues Technology Sources and general comments 
Czech Republic 
Existing User charge All vehicles, 4+ wheels 
Motorways and 
express-ways (740 km) Weight _ _ 
Regions for 
transport 
projects 
Manual/Sticker http://wwwmdcr.cz/en/ 
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Planned Toll for heavy goods vehicles 
First> 12 t later 
>3,5t 
Motorways and 
express-ways (2000 
km) 
Axles, emission class 
(EURO 0-EURO III+), 
Day/night 
_ _ 
Under 
discussion 
between 
regions. 
Electronic fee 
collection, 
DSRC 
Scheduled date of entry into force: 1st Jan 
2007 
Additional 
opportunities Toll All vehicles All roads 
Emission class: EURO 
0-EURO IV+ 
Limited 
applicability 
In urban and/or 
polluted areas 
Other transport 
or not transport 
use 
GPS _ 
Existing _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
Planned _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ No Know plans 
Estonia 
Additional 
opportunities Toll 
>3,5 t/all 
vehicles All roads Emission class Not applicable In urban areas 
Other transport 
or not transport 
use 
_ _ 
Existing User charge All vehicles 
Approx. 70% of 
motorway network(670 
km steadily increasing) 
Weight? _ _ Motorways  Manual/Sticker
http://www.aka.hu/ 
http://asecap.com/english/mem-hungary-
en.html http://www.autopalya.hu/engine.aspx 
Planned Toll > 3,5 t motorways, expressways Weight _ _ Motorways 
Electronic toll 
collection, 
DSRC 
Scheduled date of entry into force: 1st Jan 
2007 
Hungary 
Additional 
opportunities 
None if plans 
implemented None All roads Emission class Not applicable In urban areas 
Other transport 
or not transport 
use 
GPS _ 
Existing _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
Planned _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ No Know plans 
Latvia 
Additional 
opportunities Toll 
>3,5 t/all 
vehicles All roads Emission class Not applicable In urban areas 
Other transport 
or not transport 
use 
_ _ 
Source: “A Price Worth Paying”, European Federation for TRANSPORT and ENVIRONMENT”      
New Member States (various situations) 2/2        
           
Existing _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
Planned _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ No Know plans 
Lithuania 
Additional 
opportunities Toll 
>3,5 t/all 
vehicles All roads Emission class Not applicable In urban areas 
Other transport 
or not transport 
use 
_ _ 
Poland 
Existing User charge 
> 3,5 t (+ 
motorway toll 
for all 
motorised 
vehicles) 
Motorways and 
national roads 
Weight, Axles, 
Emissions (EURO 0-
EURO II+) 
_ _ _ _ http://www.gddkia.gov.pl/ 
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Planned User charge > 3,5 t All national roads 
Vehicles type, Weight, 
Emission class (EURO 
0-EURO II+) 
_ _ _ Not yet decided Draft legislation not yet approved 
Additional 
opportunities Toll All vehicles All roads 
Emission class: EURO 
0-EURO IV+ 
Possible 
applicability, 
High Tatras 
In urban and/or 
polluted areas 
Other transport 
or not transport 
use 
GPS _ 
Existing User charge All vehicles Motorways and 1st class road Weight _ _ Motorways Manual/Sticker http://www.telecom.gov.sk/index.php 
Planned Toll 
>3,5 t initially; 
all vehicles 
from 2011  
Motorways (340 km), 
expressways (80km) + 
later introduction of 
parallel trunk roads 
Vehicles type, Weight, 
Emission class _ _ Motorways 
EFC; DSRC, 
switching to 
GPS from 
2008-2012 
Scheduled date of entry into force: late 2007 
Slovakia 
Additional 
opportunities 
None if plans 
implemented All vehicles All roads 
Emission class: EURO 
0-EURO IV+ 
Possible 
applicability, 
High Tatras 
In urban and/or 
polluted areas 
and mountains 
Other transport 
or not transport 
use 
GPS _ 
Existing Toll All vehicles Motorways (440 km) Vehicle height, Axles _ _ Motorways 
EFC/DSRC for 
cars (manual 
for HGVs) 
http://www.dars.si/ 
http://www.asecap.com/english/mem-
slovenia-en.html 
Planned Toll All vehicles Motorways 
Emission 
(environmental 
characteristics?) 
_ _ Motorways 
EFC for 
HGVs, 
technology as 
yet decided 
Plans not yet finalised 
Slovenia 
Additional 
opportunities None  None None Emission class Alpine links 
In urban areas 
and mountains 
Other transport 
or not transport 
use 
GPS _ 
Source: “A Price Worth Paying”, European Federation for TRANSPORT and ENVIRONMENT”      
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APPENDIX 2 
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APPENDIX 2: LIST OF AIRPORTS ANALYSED 
Country Airport Web Other sources / Other information 
Austria Vienna www.viennaairport.com http://www.bmvit.gv.at/en/verkehr/aviation/index.html  
Belgium Brussels Intl http://www.brusselsairport.be/  http://www.mobilit.fgov.be/fr/index.htm 
Cyprus Larnaca Not available (Data obtained from GRACE) http://www.mcw.gov.cy/ 
Brno http://www.airport-brno.cz/index.php?id=0&lang=en  Czech Republic Praga http://www.prg.aero/en/site/klient/klient_index.htm 
http://www.mdcr.cz/en/Air+Transport/Air+Transport.htm  
Slots coordination system: 
http://www.slot-czech.cz/en/site/company/intro.htm  
Aalborg www.aal.dk  
Denmark Copenhagen 
(Kastrup) www.cph.dk 
 
Estonia Tallin http://www.tallinn-airport.ee/  Estonian Civil Aviation Administration: http://www.ecaa.ee/atp/?keel=en  
Finland Helsinki (Vantaa) www.helsinki-vantaa.fi http://www.finavia.fi/home  
Nice http://www.nice.aeroport.fr/include/default.asp?l=2
Paris / Charles de 
Gaulle http://www.aeroportsdeparis.fr 
Paris/Orly http://www.aeroportsdeparis.fr 
Marseille http://www.marseille.aeroport.fr/eng/index.jsp 
France 
Lyon http://www.bron-airport.com/ 
www.aviation-civile.gouv.fr 
www.aeroport.fr 
Stuttgart http://www.flughafen-stuttgart.de 
Rostock-Laage http://www.rostock-airport.de/ 
Berlin-Tempelhof http://www.berlin-airport.de/ 
Berlin-Schönefeld http://www.berlin-airport.de/ 
Berlin-Branden http://www.berlin-airport.de/ 
Germany 
Berlin-Tegel http://www.berlin-airport.de/ 
ADV German Airport Association: www.adv-net.org 
Greece Athens International airport http://www.aia.gr/ 
Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority: www.hcaa-eleng.gr  
Hungary Budapest - Ferihegy Airport http://www.bud.hu/ 
 
Ireland Dublin http://www.dublinairportauthority.com/index.html   
Rome, Ciampino www.adr.it (Data obtained from GRACE) Italy Rome, Fiumicino www.adr.it (Data obtained from GRACE) 
http://www.infrastrutturetrasporti.it/page/standard/site.php  
http://www.assaeroporti.it/  
Latvia Riga www.riga-airport.com (Data obtained from  
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Country Airport Web Other sources / Other information 
GRACE) 
Liepaja www.liepaja-airport.lv (Data obtained from GRACE) 
 
Lithuania Vilnius http://www.vilnius-airport.lt/index.php?lang=en  State Enterprise “Oro Navigacija”: www.ans.lt 
Luxembourg Luxembourg www.lux-airport.lu  
Malta Malta Intl. www.maltairport.com (Data obtained from GRACE) 
 
Netherlands Amsterdam Schipol www.schiphol.nl (Data obtained from GRACE)  
Norway Oslo www.osl.no http://www.avinor.no  
Warsaw Frederic 
Chopin www.chopin-airport.pl 
 
Krakow-John Paul II 
Intl. www.lotnisko-balice.pl 
 Poland 
Katowice Intl airport www.gtl.com.pl  
Portugal Lisbon www.ana-aeroportos.pt (Data obtained from GRACE) 
 
Slovakia Bratislava airport www.airportbratislava.sk  
Slovenia Ljubljana www.lju-airport.si  
Spain All airports www.aena.es  
Sweden Stockholm Arlanda www.arlanda.com (Data obtained from GRACE)  
Switzerland Zürich www.uniqueairport.com (Data obtained from GRACE) 
 
London Heathrow www.baa.com  
Manchester Intl www.manchesterairport.co.uk  
Gatwick www.baa.com  United 
Kingdom Scottish airports: 
Aberdeen, Glasgow 
and Edinburgh 
www.baa.com 
 
 
